In this commit, we extract the time lock policy verification logic from
the processRemoteAdds method to the HtlcSatifiesPolicy method. With this
change, we fix a lingering bug within the link: we'll no longer verify
time lock polices within the incoming link, instead we'll verify it at
forwarding time like we should. This is a bug left over from the switch
of what the CLTV delta denotes in the channel update message we made
within the spec sometime last year.
In this commit, we extend the existing HtlcSatifiesPolicy method to also
accept timelock and height information. This is required as an upcoming
commit will fix an existing bug in the forwarding logic wherein we use
the time lock policies of the incoming node rather than that of the
outgoing node.
In this commit, we fix a bug in the generateHops helper function. Before
this commit, it erroneously used the CLTV delta of the current hop,
rather than that of the prior hop when computing the payload. This was
incorrect, as when computing the timelock for the incoming hop, we need
to factor in the CTLV delta of the outgoing lock, not the incoming lock.
In this commit, we add a new test to the switch:
TestForwardingAsymmetricTimeLockPolicies. This test ensures that a link
has two channels, one of which has a greater CLTV delta than the latter,
that a payment will successfully be routed across the channels. Atm, the
test fails (including the fix to hop payload generation included in the
next commit).
Atm, due to the way that we check forwarding policies, we'll reject this
payment as we're attempting to enforce the policy of the incoming link
(cltv delta of 7), instead of that of the outgoing link (cltv delta of
6). As a result, atm, the incoming link checks if (incoming_timeout -
delta < outgoing_timeout). For the values in the test case: 112 - 7 <
106 -> 105 < 106, this check fails. The payload is proper, but the check
itself should be applied at the outgoing hop.
In this commit, we add a timeout within the writeMessage method when we go to write to the socket. We do this as otherwise, if the other peer is blocked for some reason, we'll never actually unblock ourselves, which may cause issues in other sub-systems waiting on this write call. For now, we use a value of 10 seconds, and will adjust in the future if we deem this time period too short.
In this commit, we add a new package level mutex. Each time we decode a
new set of chan IDs w/ zlib, we also grab this mutex. The purpose here
is to ensure that we only EVER allocate the maxZlibBufSize globally
across all peers. Otherwise, it may be possible for us to allocate up to
64 MB for _each_ peer, exposing an easy OOM attack vector.
In this commit, we implement zlib encoding and decoding for the channel
range queries. Notably, we utilize an io.LimitedReader to ensure that we
can enforce a hard cap on the total number of bytes we'll ever allocate
in a decoding attempt.
In this commit, we modify the removeLink method to be more asynchronous.
Before this commit, we would attempt to block until the peer exits.
However, it may be the case that at times time, then target link is
attempting to forward a batch of packets to the switch (forwardBatch).
Atm, this method doesn't pass in an external context/quit, so we can't
cancel this message/request. As a result, we'll now ensure that
`removeLink` doesn't block, so we can resume the switch's main loop as
soon as possible.
In this commit, we move the block height dependency from the links in
the switch to the switch itself. This is possible due to a recent change
on the links no longer depending on the block height to update their
commitment fees.
We'll now only have the switch be alerted of new blocks coming in and
links will retrieve the height from it atomically.
In this commit, we modify the behavior of links updating their
commitment fees. Rather than attempting to update the commitment fee for
each link every time a new block comes in, we'll use a timer with a
random interval between 10 and 60 minutes for each link to determine
when to update their corresponding commitment fee. This prevents us from
oscillating the fee rate for our various commitment transactions.
In this commit, we randomize the order of the different bootstrappers in
order to prevent from always querying potentially unreliable
bootstrappers first.
In this commit, we address an existing issue with regards to the inital
peer bootstrapping stage. At times, the bootstrappers can be unreliable
by providing addresses for peers that no longer exist/are currently
offline. This would lead to nodes quickly entering an exponential
backoff method used to maintain a minimum target of peers without first
achieving said target.
We address this by separating the peer bootstrapper into two stages: the
initial peer bootstrapping and maintaining a target set of nodes to
maintain an up-to-date view of the network. The initial peer
bootstrapping stage has been made aggressive in order to provide such
view of the network as quickly as possible. Once done, we continue on
with the existing exponential backoff method responsible for maintaining
a target set of nodes.
