In this commit, we move to make a full deep copy of the commitment
transaction in `getSignedCommitTx` to ensure that we don't mutate the
commitment on disk, possibly resulting in a "hot commitment".
In order to prevent future unforeseen issues, we are temporarily
disabling the ability to send custom tlv records to the receiver of a
payment. Currently the receiver does not process or expose these
additional fields via rpc or internally, so they are being disabled
until the end-to-end flow is finished and fully validated.
Here we set start_time to 24 hours prior
if it's not provided on the CLI. The
effect of this is when you don't provide
a start_time:
CLI: -24h
RPC: Unix Epoch
Fixes https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/3357. When
start_time isn't specified, its default value is 0. This meant when
users explicitly specified a start_time of 0, we would incorrectly set
start_time to 24 hours in the past. Now, n0 means n0.
Without waiting, we would proceed to retrieve the remote peer's
supported features, which may have not been set due to not yet receiving
their Init message.
In this commit, we create a new Single version for channels that use the
tweakless commitment scheme. When recovering from an SCB into an open
channel shell, we'll now check this field and use it to determine the
proper channel type. Otherwise, we may attempt to sweep the on chain
funds using the commitment point, when it goes directly to our key, or
the other way around.
In this commit, we consolidate the number of areas where we derive our
commitment keys. Before this commit, the `isOurCommitment` function in
the chain watcher used a custom routine to derive the expected
scripts/keys for our commitment at that height. With the recent changes,
we now have additional logic in `DeriveCommitmentKeys` that wasn't
copied over to this area. As a result, the prior logic would erroneously
detect if it was our commitment that had hit the chain or not.
In this commit, we remove the old custom code, and use
`DeriveCommitmentKeys` wihtin the chain watcher as well. This ensures
that we only need to maintain the key derivation code in a single place,
preventing future bugs of this nature.
In this commit, we add a new legacy protocol command line flag:
`committweak`. When set, this forces the node to NOT signal usage of the
new commitment format. This allows us to test that we're able to
properly establish channels with legacy nodes. Within the server, we'll
now gate our signalling of this new feature based on the legacy protocol
config. Finally, when accepting/initiating a new channel funding, we'll
now check both the local and remote global feature bits, only using the
new commitment format if both signal the global feature bit.
In this commit, we update the brar logic in the channel state machine,
and also the brar itself to be aware of the new commitment format.
Similar to the unilateral close summary, we'll now blank out the
SingleTweak field in `NewBreachRetribution` if it's a tweakless
commitment. The brar will then use this to properly identify the
commitment type, to ensure we use the proper witness generation function
when we're handling our own breach.
