d6d9ec6aa5
Previously the invoice registry wasn't aware of replayed htlcs. This was dealt with by keeping the invoice accept/settle logic idempotent, so that a replay wouldn't have an effect. This mechanism has two limitations: 1. No accurate tracking of the total amount paid to an invoice. The total amount couldn't just be increased with every htlc received, because it could be a replay which would lead to counting the htlc amount multiple times. Therefore the total amount was set to the amount of the first htlc that was received, even though there may have been multiple htlcs paying to the invoice. 2. Impossible to check htlc expiry consistently for hodl invoices. When an htlc is new, its expiry needs to be checked against the invoice cltv delta. But for a replay, that check must be skipped. The htlc was accepted in time, the invoice was moved to the accepted state and a replay some blocks later shouldn't lead to that htlc being cancelled. Because the invoice registry couldn't recognize replays, it stopped checking htlc expiry heights when the invoice reached the accepted state. This prevents hold htlcs from being cancelled after a restart. But unfortunately this also caused additional htlcs to be accepted on an already accepted invoice without their expiry being checked. In this commit, the invoice registry starts to persistently track htlcs so that replays can be recognized. For replays, an htlc resolution action is returned early. This fixes both limitations mentioned above. |
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| .github | ||
| aezeed | ||
| autopilot | ||
| brontide | ||
| buffer | ||
| build | ||
| chainntnfs | ||
| chanbackup | ||
| channeldb | ||
| channelnotifier | ||
| cmd | ||
| contractcourt | ||
| contrib | ||
| discovery | ||
| docker | ||
| docs | ||
| htlcswitch | ||
| input | ||
| invoices | ||
| keychain | ||
| lncfg | ||
| lnpeer | ||
| lnrpc | ||
| lntest | ||
| lntypes | ||
| lnwallet | ||
| lnwire | ||
| macaroons | ||
| make | ||
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| routing | ||
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| shachain | ||
| signal | ||
| subscribe | ||
| sweep | ||
| ticker | ||
| tlv | ||
| tor | ||
| walletunlocker | ||
| watchtower | ||
| zpay32 | ||
| .gitignore | ||
| .golangci.yml | ||
| .travis.yml | ||
| breacharbiter_test.go | ||
| breacharbiter.go | ||
| chainparams.go | ||
| chainregistry.go | ||
| chancloser.go | ||
| channel_notifier.go | ||
| chanrestore.go | ||
| config.go | ||
| doc.go | ||
| Dockerfile | ||
| fundingmanager_test.go | ||
| fundingmanager.go | ||
| go.mod | ||
| go.sum | ||
| LICENSE | ||
| lnd.go | ||
| log.go | ||
| logo.png | ||
| Makefile | ||
| mock.go | ||
| nursery_store_test.go | ||
| nursery_store.go | ||
| peer_test.go | ||
| peer.go | ||
| pilot.go | ||
| README.md | ||
| release.sh | ||
| rpcserver.go | ||
| sample-lnd.conf | ||
| server_test.go | ||
| server.go | ||
| subrpcserver_config.go | ||
| test_utils.go | ||
| utxonursery_test.go | ||
| utxonursery.go | ||
| witness_beacon.go | ||
Lightning Network Daemon
The Lightning Network Daemon (lnd) - is a complete implementation of a
Lightning Network node. lnd has several pluggable back-end
chain services including btcd (a
full-node), bitcoind, and
neutrino (a new experimental light client). The project's codebase uses the
btcsuite set of Bitcoin libraries, and also
exports a large set of isolated re-usable Lightning Network related libraries
within it. In the current state lnd is capable of:
- Creating channels.
- Closing channels.
- Completely managing all channel states (including the exceptional ones!).
- Maintaining a fully authenticated+validated channel graph.
- Performing path finding within the network, passively forwarding incoming payments.
- Sending outgoing onion-encrypted payments through the network.
- Updating advertised fee schedules.
- Automatic channel management (
autopilot).
Lightning Network Specification Compliance
lnd fully conforms to the Lightning Network specification
(BOLTs). BOLT stands for:
Basis of Lightning Technology. The specifications are currently being drafted
by several groups of implementers based around the world including the
developers of lnd. The set of specification documents as well as our
implementation of the specification are still a work-in-progress. With that
said, the current status of lnd's BOLT compliance is:
- BOLT 1: Base Protocol
- BOLT 2: Peer Protocol for Channel Management
- BOLT 3: Bitcoin Transaction and Script Formats
- BOLT 4: Onion Routing Protocol
- BOLT 5: Recommendations for On-chain Transaction Handling
- BOLT 7: P2P Node and Channel Discovery
- BOLT 8: Encrypted and Authenticated Transport
- BOLT 9: Assigned Feature Flags
- BOLT 10: DNS Bootstrap and Assisted Node Location
- BOLT 11: Invoice Protocol for Lightning Payments
Developer Resources
The daemon has been designed to be as developer friendly as possible in order
to facilitate application development on top of lnd. Two primary RPC
interfaces are exported: an HTTP REST API, and a gRPC
service. The exported API's are not yet stable, so be warned: they may change
drastically in the near future.
An automatically generated set of documentation for the RPC APIs can be found at api.lightning.community. A set of developer resources including talks, articles, and example applications can be found at: dev.lightning.community.
Finally, we also have an active
Slack where protocol developers, application developers, testers and users gather to
discuss various aspects of lnd and also Lightning in general.
Installation
In order to build from source, please see the installation instructions.
Docker
To run lnd from Docker, please see the main Docker instructions
IRC
- irc.freenode.net
- channel #lnd
- webchat
Security
The developers of lnd take security very seriously. The disclosure of
security vulnerabilities helps us secure the health of lnd, privacy of our
users, and also the health of the Lightning Network as a whole. If you find
any issues regarding security or privacy, please disclose the information
responsibly by sending an email to security at lightning dot engineering,
preferably encrypted using our designated PGP key
(91FE464CD75101DA6B6BAB60555C6465E5BCB3AF) which can be found
here.