lnd.xprv/brontide/noise_test.go
Conner Fromknecht 73cf352daa
brontide/conn: migrate to WriteMessage + Flush
This commit modifies WriteMessage to only perform encryption on the
passed plaintext, and buffer the ciphertext within the connection
object. We then modify internal uses of WriteMessage to follow with a
call to Flush, which actually writes the message to the wire.
Additionally, since WriteMessage does not actually perform the write
itself, the io.Writer argument is removed from the function signature
and all call sites.
2019-04-22 16:03:56 -07:00

539 lines
17 KiB
Go

package brontide
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/hex"
"io"
"math"
"net"
"sync"
"testing"
"github.com/btcsuite/btcd/btcec"
"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/lnwire"
)
type maybeNetConn struct {
conn net.Conn
err error
}
func makeListener() (*Listener, *lnwire.NetAddress, error) {
// First, generate the long-term private keys for the brontide listener.
localPriv, err := btcec.NewPrivateKey(btcec.S256())
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
// Having a port of ":0" means a random port, and interface will be
// chosen for our listener.
addr := "localhost:0"
// Our listener will be local, and the connection remote.
listener, err := NewListener(localPriv, addr)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
netAddr := &lnwire.NetAddress{
IdentityKey: localPriv.PubKey(),
Address: listener.Addr().(*net.TCPAddr),
}
return listener, netAddr, nil
}
func establishTestConnection() (net.Conn, net.Conn, func(), error) {
listener, netAddr, err := makeListener()
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, nil, err
}
defer listener.Close()
// Nos, generate the long-term private keys remote end of the connection
// within our test.
remotePriv, err := btcec.NewPrivateKey(btcec.S256())
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, nil, err
}
// Initiate a connection with a separate goroutine, and listen with our
// main one. If both errors are nil, then encryption+auth was
// successful.
remoteConnChan := make(chan maybeNetConn, 1)
go func() {
remoteConn, err := Dial(remotePriv, netAddr, net.Dial)
remoteConnChan <- maybeNetConn{remoteConn, err}
}()
localConnChan := make(chan maybeNetConn, 1)
go func() {
localConn, err := listener.Accept()
localConnChan <- maybeNetConn{localConn, err}
}()
remote := <-remoteConnChan
if remote.err != nil {
return nil, nil, nil, err
}
local := <-localConnChan
if local.err != nil {
return nil, nil, nil, err
}
cleanUp := func() {
local.conn.Close()
remote.conn.Close()
}
return local.conn, remote.conn, cleanUp, nil
}
func TestConnectionCorrectness(t *testing.T) {
// Create a test connection, grabbing either side of the connection
// into local variables. If the initial crypto handshake fails, then
// we'll get a non-nil error here.
localConn, remoteConn, cleanUp, err := establishTestConnection()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to establish test connection: %v", err)
}
defer cleanUp()
// Test out some message full-message reads.
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
msg := []byte("hello" + string(i))
if _, err := localConn.Write(msg); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("remote conn failed to write: %v", err)
}
readBuf := make([]byte, len(msg))
if _, err := remoteConn.Read(readBuf); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("local conn failed to read: %v", err)
}
if !bytes.Equal(readBuf, msg) {
t.Fatalf("messages don't match, %v vs %v",
string(readBuf), string(msg))
}
}
// Now try incremental message reads. This simulates first writing a
// message header, then a message body.
outMsg := []byte("hello world")
if _, err := localConn.Write(outMsg); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("remote conn failed to write: %v", err)
}
readBuf := make([]byte, len(outMsg))
if _, err := remoteConn.Read(readBuf[:len(outMsg)/2]); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("local conn failed to read: %v", err)
}
if _, err := remoteConn.Read(readBuf[len(outMsg)/2:]); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("local conn failed to read: %v", err)
}
if !bytes.Equal(outMsg, readBuf) {
t.Fatalf("messages don't match, %v vs %v",
string(readBuf), string(outMsg))
}
}
// TestConecurrentHandshakes verifies the listener's ability to not be blocked
// by other pending handshakes. This is tested by opening multiple tcp
// connections with the listener, without completing any of the brontide acts.
// The test passes if real brontide dialer connects while the others are
// stalled.
func TestConcurrentHandshakes(t *testing.T) {
listener, netAddr, err := makeListener()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to create listener connection: %v", err)
}
defer listener.Close()
const nblocking = 5
// Open a handful of tcp connections, that do not complete any steps of
// the brontide handshake.
connChan := make(chan maybeNetConn)
for i := 0; i < nblocking; i++ {
go func() {
conn, err := net.Dial("tcp", listener.Addr().String())
connChan <- maybeNetConn{conn, err}
}()
}
// Receive all connections/errors from our blocking tcp dials. We make a
// pass to gather all connections and errors to make sure we defer the
// calls to Close() on all successful connections.
tcpErrs := make([]error, 0, nblocking)
for i := 0; i < nblocking; i++ {
result := <-connChan
if result.conn != nil {
defer result.conn.Close()
}
if result.err != nil {
tcpErrs = append(tcpErrs, result.err)
}
}
for _, tcpErr := range tcpErrs {
if tcpErr != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to tcp dial listener: %v", tcpErr)
}
}
// Now, construct a new private key and use the brontide dialer to
// connect to the listener.
remotePriv, err := btcec.NewPrivateKey(btcec.S256())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to generate private key: %v", err)
}
go func() {
remoteConn, err := Dial(remotePriv, netAddr, net.Dial)
connChan <- maybeNetConn{remoteConn, err}
}()
// This connection should be accepted without error, as the brontide
// connection should bypass stalled tcp connections.
conn, err := listener.Accept()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to accept dial: %v", err)
}
defer conn.Close()
result := <-connChan
if result.err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to dial %v: %v", netAddr, result.err)
}
result.conn.Close()
}
func TestMaxPayloadLength(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
b := Machine{}
b.split()
// Create a payload that's only *slightly* above the maximum allotted
// payload length.
payloadToReject := make([]byte, math.MaxUint16+1)
// A write of the payload generated above to the state machine should
// be rejected as it's over the max payload length.
err := b.WriteMessage(payloadToReject)
if err != ErrMaxMessageLengthExceeded {
t.Fatalf("payload is over the max allowed length, the write " +
"should have been rejected")
}
// Generate another payload which should be accepted as a valid
// payload.
payloadToAccept := make([]byte, math.MaxUint16-1)
if err := b.WriteMessage(payloadToAccept); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write for payload was rejected, should have been " +
"accepted")
}
// Generate a final payload which is only *slightly* above the max payload length
// when the MAC is accounted for.
payloadToReject = make([]byte, math.MaxUint16+1)
// This payload should be rejected.
err = b.WriteMessage(payloadToReject)
if err != ErrMaxMessageLengthExceeded {
t.Fatalf("payload is over the max allowed length, the write " +
"should have been rejected")
}
}
func TestWriteMessageChunking(t *testing.T) {
// Create a test connection, grabbing either side of the connection
// into local variables. If the initial crypto handshake fails, then
// we'll get a non-nil error here.
localConn, remoteConn, cleanUp, err := establishTestConnection()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to establish test connection: %v", err)
}
defer cleanUp()
// Attempt to write a message which is over 3x the max allowed payload
// size.
largeMessage := bytes.Repeat([]byte("kek"), math.MaxUint16*3)
// Launch a new goroutine to write the large message generated above in
// chunks. We spawn a new goroutine because otherwise, we may block as
// the kernel waits for the buffer to flush.
var wg sync.WaitGroup
wg.Add(1)
go func() {
bytesWritten, err := localConn.Write(largeMessage)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to write message: %v", err)
}
// The entire message should have been written out to the remote
// connection.
if bytesWritten != len(largeMessage) {
t.Fatalf("bytes not fully written!")
}
wg.Done()
}()
// Attempt to read the entirety of the message generated above.
buf := make([]byte, len(largeMessage))
if _, err := io.ReadFull(remoteConn, buf); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to read message: %v", err)
}
wg.Wait()
// Finally, the message the remote end of the connection received
// should be identical to what we sent from the local connection.
if !bytes.Equal(buf, largeMessage) {
t.Fatalf("bytes don't match")
}
}
// TestBolt0008TestVectors ensures that our implementation of brontide exactly
// matches the test vectors within the specification.
func TestBolt0008TestVectors(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// First, we'll generate the state of the initiator from the test
// vectors at the appendix of BOLT-0008
initiatorKeyBytes, err := hex.DecodeString("1111111111111111111111" +
"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to decode hex: %v", err)
}
initiatorPriv, _ := btcec.PrivKeyFromBytes(btcec.S256(),
initiatorKeyBytes)
// We'll then do the same for the responder.
responderKeyBytes, err := hex.DecodeString("212121212121212121212121" +
"2121212121212121212121212121212121212121")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to decode hex: %v", err)
}
responderPriv, responderPub := btcec.PrivKeyFromBytes(btcec.S256(),
responderKeyBytes)
// With the initiator's key data parsed, we'll now define a custom
// EphemeralGenerator function for the state machine to ensure that the
// initiator and responder both generate the ephemeral public key
// defined within the test vectors.
initiatorEphemeral := EphemeralGenerator(func() (*btcec.PrivateKey, error) {
e := "121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212" +
"1212121212"
eBytes, err := hex.DecodeString(e)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
priv, _ := btcec.PrivKeyFromBytes(btcec.S256(), eBytes)
return priv, nil
})
responderEphemeral := EphemeralGenerator(func() (*btcec.PrivateKey, error) {
e := "222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222" +
"2222222222222"
eBytes, err := hex.DecodeString(e)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
priv, _ := btcec.PrivKeyFromBytes(btcec.S256(), eBytes)
return priv, nil
})
// Finally, we'll create both brontide state machines, so we can begin
// our test.
initiator := NewBrontideMachine(true, initiatorPriv, responderPub,
initiatorEphemeral)
responder := NewBrontideMachine(false, responderPriv, nil,
responderEphemeral)
// We'll start with the initiator generating the initial payload for
// act one. This should consist of exactly 50 bytes. We'll assert that
// the payload return is _exactly_ the same as what's specified within
// the test vectors.
actOne, err := initiator.GenActOne()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to generate act one: %v", err)
}
expectedActOne, err := hex.DecodeString("00036360e856310ce5d294e" +
"8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df608655115" +
"1f58b8afe6c195782c6a")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to parse expected act one: %v", err)
}
if !bytes.Equal(expectedActOne, actOne[:]) {
t.Fatalf("act one mismatch: expected %x, got %x",
expectedActOne, actOne)
}
// With the assertion above passed, we'll now process the act one
// payload with the responder of the crypto handshake.
if err := responder.RecvActOne(actOne); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("responder unable to process act one: %v", err)
}
// Next, we'll start the second act by having the responder generate
// its contribution to the crypto handshake. We'll also verify that we
// produce the _exact_ same byte stream as advertised within the spec's
// test vectors.
actTwo, err := responder.GenActTwo()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to generate act two: %v", err)
}
expectedActTwo, err := hex.DecodeString("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0" +
"d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac58" +
"3c9ef6eafca3f730ae")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to parse expected act two: %v", err)
}
if !bytes.Equal(expectedActTwo, actTwo[:]) {
t.Fatalf("act two mismatch: expected %x, got %x",
expectedActTwo, actTwo)
}
// Moving the handshake along, we'll also ensure that the initiator
// accepts the act two payload.
if err := initiator.RecvActTwo(actTwo); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("initiator unable to process act two: %v", err)
}
// At the final step, we'll generate the last act from the initiator
// and once again verify that it properly matches the test vectors.
actThree, err := initiator.GenActThree()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to generate act three: %v", err)
}
expectedActThree, err := hex.DecodeString("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2e" +
"d6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8f" +
"c28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to parse expected act three: %v", err)
}
if !bytes.Equal(expectedActThree, actThree[:]) {
t.Fatalf("act three mismatch: expected %x, got %x",
expectedActThree, actThree)
}
// Finally, we'll ensure that the responder itself also properly parses
// the last payload in the crypto handshake.
if err := responder.RecvActThree(actThree); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("responder unable to process act three: %v", err)
}
// As a final assertion, we'll ensure that both sides have derived the
// proper symmetric encryption keys.
sendingKey, err := hex.DecodeString("969ab31b4d288cedf6218839b27a3e2" +
"140827047f2c0f01bf5c04435d43511a9")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to parse sending key: %v", err)
}
recvKey, err := hex.DecodeString("bb9020b8965f4df047e07f955f3c4b884" +
"18984aadc5cdb35096b9ea8fa5c3442")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to parse receiving key: %v", err)
}
chainKey, err := hex.DecodeString("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840" +
"bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to parse chaining key: %v", err)
}
if !bytes.Equal(initiator.sendCipher.secretKey[:], sendingKey) {
t.Fatalf("sending key mismatch: expected %x, got %x",
initiator.sendCipher.secretKey[:], sendingKey)
}
if !bytes.Equal(initiator.recvCipher.secretKey[:], recvKey) {
t.Fatalf("receiving key mismatch: expected %x, got %x",
initiator.recvCipher.secretKey[:], recvKey)
}
if !bytes.Equal(initiator.chainingKey[:], chainKey) {
t.Fatalf("chaining key mismatch: expected %x, got %x",
initiator.chainingKey[:], chainKey)
}
if !bytes.Equal(responder.sendCipher.secretKey[:], recvKey) {
t.Fatalf("sending key mismatch: expected %x, got %x",
responder.sendCipher.secretKey[:], recvKey)
}
if !bytes.Equal(responder.recvCipher.secretKey[:], sendingKey) {
t.Fatalf("receiving key mismatch: expected %x, got %x",
responder.recvCipher.secretKey[:], sendingKey)
}
if !bytes.Equal(responder.chainingKey[:], chainKey) {
t.Fatalf("chaining key mismatch: expected %x, got %x",
responder.chainingKey[:], chainKey)
}
// Now test as per section "transport-message test" in Test Vectors
// (the transportMessageVectors ciphertexts are from this section of BOLT 8);
// we do slightly greater than 1000 encryption/decryption operations
// to ensure that the key rotation algorithm is operating as expected.
// The starting point for enc/decr is already guaranteed correct from the
// above tests of sendingKey, receivingKey, chainingKey.
transportMessageVectors := map[int]string{
0: "cf2b30ddf0cf3f80e7c35a6e6730b59fe802473180f396d88a8fb0db8cb" +
"cf25d2f214cf9ea1d95",
1: "72887022101f0b6753e0c7de21657d35a4cb2a1f5cde2650528bbc8f837" +
"d0f0d7ad833b1a256a1",
500: "178cb9d7387190fa34db9c2d50027d21793c9bc2d40b1e14dcf30ebeeeb2" +
"20f48364f7a4c68bf8",
501: "1b186c57d44eb6de4c057c49940d79bb838a145cb528d6e8fd26dbe50a6" +
"0ca2c104b56b60e45bd",
1000: "4a2f3cc3b5e78ddb83dcb426d9863d9d9a723b0337c89dd0b005d89f8d3" +
"c05c52b76b29b740f09",
1001: "2ecd8c8a5629d0d02ab457a0fdd0f7b90a192cd46be5ecb6ca570bfc5e2" +
"68338b1a16cf4ef2d36",
}
// Payload for every message is the string "hello".
payload := []byte("hello")
var buf bytes.Buffer
for i := 0; i < 1002; i++ {
err = initiator.WriteMessage(payload)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("could not write message %s", payload)
}
_, err = initiator.Flush(&buf)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("could not flush message: %v", err)
}
if val, ok := transportMessageVectors[i]; ok {
binaryVal, err := hex.DecodeString(val)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to decode hex string %s", val)
}
if !bytes.Equal(buf.Bytes(), binaryVal) {
t.Fatalf("Ciphertext %x was not equal to expected %s",
buf.String()[:], val)
}
}
// Responder decrypts the bytes, in every iteration, and
// should always be able to decrypt the same payload message.
plaintext, err := responder.ReadMessage(&buf)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to read message in responder: %v", err)
}
// Ensure decryption succeeded
if !bytes.Equal(plaintext, payload) {
t.Fatalf("Decryption failed to receive plaintext: %s, got %s",
payload, plaintext)
}
// Clear out the buffer for the next iteration
buf.Reset()
}
}