2b58a39d30
The updateLog struct contains pointers that refer to the state of the commitment chains. Instead, query the commitments directly.
1513 lines
49 KiB
Go
1513 lines
49 KiB
Go
package htlcswitch
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import (
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"bytes"
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"sync"
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"sync/atomic"
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"time"
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"io"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"github.com/go-errors/errors"
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"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/chainntnfs"
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"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/lnwallet"
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"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/lnwire"
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"github.com/roasbeef/btcd/chaincfg/chainhash"
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"github.com/roasbeef/btcd/wire"
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"github.com/roasbeef/btcutil"
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)
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const (
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// expiryGraceDelta is a grace period that the timeout of incoming
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// HTLC's that pay directly to us (i.e we're the "exit node") must up
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// hold. We'll reject any HTLC's who's timeout minus this value is less
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// that or equal to the current block height. We require this in order
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// to ensure that if the extending party goes to the chain, then we'll
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// be able to claim the HTLC still.
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//
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// TODO(roasbeef): must be < default delta
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expiryGraceDelta = 2
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)
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// ForwardingPolicy describes the set of constraints that a given ChannelLink
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// is to adhere to when forwarding HTLC's. For each incoming HTLC, this set of
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// constraints will be consulted in order to ensure that adequate fees are
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// paid, and our time-lock parameters are respected. In the event that an
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// incoming HTLC violates any of these constraints, it is to be _rejected_ with
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// the error possibly carrying along a ChannelUpdate message that includes the
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// latest policy.
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type ForwardingPolicy struct {
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// MinHTLC is the smallest HTLC that is to be forwarded.
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MinHTLC lnwire.MilliSatoshi
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// BaseFee is the base fee, expressed in milli-satoshi that must be
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// paid for each incoming HTLC. This field, combined with FeeRate is
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// used to compute the required fee for a given HTLC.
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BaseFee lnwire.MilliSatoshi
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// FeeRate is the fee rate, expressed in milli-satoshi that must be
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// paid for each incoming HTLC. This field combined with BaseFee is
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// used to compute the required fee for a given HTLC.
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FeeRate lnwire.MilliSatoshi
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// TimeLockDelta is the absolute time-lock value, expressed in blocks,
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// that will be subtracted from an incoming HTLC's timelock value to
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// create the time-lock value for the forwarded outgoing HTLC. The
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// following constraint MUST hold for an HTLC to be forwarded:
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//
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// * incomingHtlc.timeLock - timeLockDelta = fwdInfo.OutgoingCTLV
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//
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// where fwdInfo is the forwarding information extracted from the
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// per-hop payload of the incoming HTLC's onion packet.
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TimeLockDelta uint32
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// TODO(roasbeef): add fee module inside of switch
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}
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// ExpectedFee computes the expected fee for a given htlc amount. The value
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// returned from this function is to be used as a sanity check when forwarding
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// HTLC's to ensure that an incoming HTLC properly adheres to our propagated
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// forwarding policy.
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//
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// TODO(roasbeef): also add in current available channel bandwidth, inverse
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// func
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func ExpectedFee(f ForwardingPolicy, htlcAmt lnwire.MilliSatoshi) lnwire.MilliSatoshi {
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// TODO(roasbeef): write some basic table driven tests
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return f.BaseFee + (htlcAmt*f.FeeRate)/1000000
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}
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// ChannelLinkConfig defines the configuration for the channel link. ALL
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// elements within the configuration MUST be non-nil for channel link to carry
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// out its duties.
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type ChannelLinkConfig struct {
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// FwrdingPolicy is the initial forwarding policy to be used when
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// deciding whether to forwarding incoming HTLC's or not. This value
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// can be updated with subsequent calls to UpdateForwardingPolicy
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// targeted at a given ChannelLink concrete interface implementation.
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FwrdingPolicy ForwardingPolicy
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// Switch is a subsystem which is used to forward the incoming HTLC
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// packets according to the encoded hop forwarding information
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// contained in the forwarding blob within each HTLC.
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//
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// TODO(roasbeef): remove in favor of simple ForwardPacket closure func
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Switch *Switch
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// DecodeHopIterator function is responsible for decoding HTLC Sphinx
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// onion blob, and creating hop iterator which will give us next
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// destination of HTLC.
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DecodeHopIterator func(r io.Reader, rHash []byte) (HopIterator, lnwire.FailCode)
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// DecodeOnionObfuscator function is responsible for decoding HTLC
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// Sphinx onion blob, and creating onion failure obfuscator.
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DecodeOnionObfuscator func(r io.Reader) (ErrorEncrypter, lnwire.FailCode)
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// GetLastChannelUpdate retrieves the latest routing policy for this
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// particular channel. This will be used to provide payment senders our
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// latest policy when sending encrypted error messages.
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GetLastChannelUpdate func() (*lnwire.ChannelUpdate, error)
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// Peer is a lightning network node with which we have the channel link
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// opened.
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Peer Peer
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// Registry is a sub-system which responsible for managing the invoices
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// in thread-safe manner.
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Registry InvoiceDatabase
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// BlockEpochs is an active block epoch event stream backed by an
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// active ChainNotifier instance. The ChannelLink will use new block
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// notifications sent over this channel to decide when a _new_ HTLC is
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// too close to expiry, and also when any active HTLC's have expired
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// (or are close to expiry).
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BlockEpochs *chainntnfs.BlockEpochEvent
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// SettledContracts is used to notify that a channel has peacefully
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// been closed. Once a channel has been closed the other subsystem no
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// longer needs to watch for breach closes.
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SettledContracts chan *wire.OutPoint
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// DebugHTLC should be turned on if you want all HTLCs sent to a node
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// with the debug htlc R-Hash are immediately settled in the next
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// available state transition.
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DebugHTLC bool
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// HodlHTLC should be active if you want this node to refrain from
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// settling all incoming HTLCs with the sender if it finds itself to be
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// the exit node.
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// NOTE: HodlHTLC should be active in conjunction with DebugHTLC.
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HodlHTLC bool
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}
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// channelLink is the service which drives a channel's commitment update
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// state-machine. In the event that an htlc needs to be propagated to another
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// link, the forward handler from config is used which sends htlc to the
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// switch. Additionally, the link encapsulate logic of commitment protocol
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// message ordering and updates.
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type channelLink struct {
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// The following fields are only meant to be used *atomically*
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started int32
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shutdown int32
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// cancelReasons stores the reason why a particular HTLC was cancelled.
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// The index of the HTLC within the log is mapped to the cancellation
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// reason. This value is used to thread the proper error through to the
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// htlcSwitch, or subsystem that initiated the HTLC.
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//
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// TODO(andrew.shvv) remove after payment descriptor start store
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// htlc cancel reasons.
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cancelReasons map[uint64]lnwire.OpaqueReason
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// clearedOnionBlobs tracks the remote log index of the incoming
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// htlc's, mapped to the htlc onion blob which encapsulates the next
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// hop. HTLC's are added to this map once the HTLC has been cleared,
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// meaning the commitment state reflects the update encoded within this
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// HTLC.
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//
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// TODO(andrew.shvv) remove after payment descriptor start store
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// htlc onion blobs.
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clearedOnionBlobs map[uint64][lnwire.OnionPacketSize]byte
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// batchCounter is the number of updates which we received from remote
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// side, but not include in commitment transaction yet and plus the
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// current number of settles that have been sent, but not yet committed
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// to the commitment.
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//
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// TODO(andrew.shvv) remove after we add additional
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// BatchNumber() method in state machine.
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batchCounter uint32
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// bestHeight is the best known height of the main chain. The link will
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// use this information to govern decisions based on HTLC timeouts.
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bestHeight uint32
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// channel is a lightning network channel to which we apply htlc
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// updates.
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channel *lnwallet.LightningChannel
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// cfg is a structure which carries all dependable fields/handlers
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// which may affect behaviour of the service.
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cfg ChannelLinkConfig
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// overflowQueue is used to store the htlc add updates which haven't
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// been processed because of the commitment transaction overflow.
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overflowQueue *packetQueue
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// availableBandwidth is an integer with units of millisatoshi which
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// indicates the total available bandwidth of a link, taking into
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// account any pending (uncommitted) HLTC's, and any HTLC's that are
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// within the overflow queue.
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availableBandwidth uint64
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// upstream is a channel that new messages sent from the remote peer to
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// the local peer will be sent across.
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upstream chan lnwire.Message
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// downstream is a channel in which new multi-hop HTLC's to be
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// forwarded will be sent across. Messages from this channel are sent
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// by the HTLC switch.
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downstream chan *htlcPacket
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// linkControl is a channel which is used to query the state of the
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// link, or update various policies used which govern if an HTLC is to
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// be forwarded and/or accepted.
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linkControl chan interface{}
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// logCommitTimer is a timer which is sent upon if we go an interval
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// without receiving/sending a commitment update. It's role is to
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// ensure both chains converge to identical state in a timely manner.
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//
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// TODO(roasbeef): timer should be >> then RTT
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logCommitTimer *time.Timer
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logCommitTick <-chan time.Time
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wg sync.WaitGroup
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quit chan struct{}
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}
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// NewChannelLink creates a new instance of a ChannelLink given a configuration
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// and active channel that will be used to verify/apply updates to.
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func NewChannelLink(cfg ChannelLinkConfig, channel *lnwallet.LightningChannel,
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currentHeight uint32) ChannelLink {
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return &channelLink{
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cfg: cfg,
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channel: channel,
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clearedOnionBlobs: make(map[uint64][lnwire.OnionPacketSize]byte),
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upstream: make(chan lnwire.Message),
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downstream: make(chan *htlcPacket),
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linkControl: make(chan interface{}),
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// TODO(roasbeef): just do reserve here?
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availableBandwidth: uint64(channel.StateSnapshot().LocalBalance),
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cancelReasons: make(map[uint64]lnwire.OpaqueReason),
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logCommitTimer: time.NewTimer(300 * time.Millisecond),
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overflowQueue: newPacketQueue(lnwallet.MaxHTLCNumber / 2),
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bestHeight: currentHeight,
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quit: make(chan struct{}),
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}
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}
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// A compile time check to ensure channelLink implements the ChannelLink
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// interface.
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var _ ChannelLink = (*channelLink)(nil)
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// Start starts all helper goroutines required for the operation of the channel
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// link.
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//
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// NOTE: Part of the ChannelLink interface.
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func (l *channelLink) Start() error {
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if !atomic.CompareAndSwapInt32(&l.started, 0, 1) {
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log.Warnf("channel link(%v): already started", l)
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return nil
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}
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log.Infof("ChannelLink(%v) is starting", l)
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l.overflowQueue.Start()
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l.wg.Add(1)
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go l.htlcManager()
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return nil
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}
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// Stop gracefully stops all active helper goroutines, then waits until they've
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// exited.
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//
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// NOTE: Part of the ChannelLink interface.
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func (l *channelLink) Stop() {
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if !atomic.CompareAndSwapInt32(&l.shutdown, 0, 1) {
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log.Warnf("channel link(%v): already stopped", l)
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return
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}
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log.Infof("ChannelLink(%v) is stopping", l)
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l.channel.Stop()
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l.overflowQueue.Stop()
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close(l.quit)
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l.wg.Wait()
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l.cfg.BlockEpochs.Cancel()
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}
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// htlcManager is the primary goroutine which drives a channel's commitment
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// update state-machine in response to messages received via several channels.
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// This goroutine reads messages from the upstream (remote) peer, and also from
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// downstream channel managed by the channel link. In the event that an htlc
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// needs to be forwarded, then send-only forward handler is used which sends
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// htlc packets to the switch. Additionally, the this goroutine handles acting
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// upon all timeouts for any active HTLCs, manages the channel's revocation
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// window, and also the htlc trickle queue+timer for this active channels.
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//
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// NOTE: This MUST be run as a goroutine.
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func (l *channelLink) htlcManager() {
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defer l.wg.Done()
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log.Infof("HTLC manager for ChannelPoint(%v) started, "+
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"bandwidth=%v", l.channel.ChannelPoint(), l.Bandwidth())
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// TODO(roasbeef): check to see if able to settle any currently pending
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// HTLCs
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// * also need signals when new invoices are added by the
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// invoiceRegistry
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batchTimer := time.NewTicker(50 * time.Millisecond)
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defer batchTimer.Stop()
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// TODO(roasbeef): fail chan in case of protocol violation
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// If the number of updates on this channel has been zero, we should
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// resend the fundingLocked message. This is because in this case we
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// cannot be sure if the peer really received the last fundingLocked we
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// sent, so resend now.
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if l.channel.StateSnapshot().NumUpdates == 0 {
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log.Debugf("Resending fundingLocked message to peer.")
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nextRevocation, err := l.channel.NextRevocationKey()
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if err != nil {
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log.Errorf("unable to create next revocation: %v", err)
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}
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fundingLockedMsg := lnwire.NewFundingLocked(l.ChanID(),
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nextRevocation)
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err = l.cfg.Peer.SendMessage(fundingLockedMsg)
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if err != nil {
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log.Errorf("failed resending fundingLocked to peer: %v",
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err)
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}
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}
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out:
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for {
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select {
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// A new block has arrived, we'll examine all the active HTLC's
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// to see if any of them have expired, and also update our
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// track of the best current height.
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case blockEpoch, ok := <-l.cfg.BlockEpochs.Epochs:
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if !ok {
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break out
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}
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log.Tracef("ChannelPoint(%v): new block(height=%v, "+
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"hash=%v) examining active HTLC's",
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l.channel.ChannelPoint(), blockEpoch.Height,
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blockEpoch.Hash)
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// TODO(roasbeef): check HTLC's for expiry
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l.bestHeight = uint32(blockEpoch.Height)
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// The underlying channel has notified us of a unilateral close
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// carried out by the remote peer. In the case of such an
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// event, we'll wipe the channel state from the peer, and mark
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// the contract as fully settled. Afterwards we can exit.
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case <-l.channel.UnilateralCloseSignal:
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log.Warnf("Remote peer has closed ChannelPoint(%v) on-chain",
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l.channel.ChannelPoint())
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if err := l.cfg.Peer.WipeChannel(l.channel); err != nil {
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log.Errorf("unable to wipe channel %v", err)
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}
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// TODO(roasbeef): need to send HTLC outputs to nursery
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// TODO(roasbeef): or let the arb sweep?
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l.cfg.SettledContracts <- l.channel.ChannelPoint()
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break out
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// A local sub-system has initiated a force close of the active
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// channel. In this case we can exit immediately as no further
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// updates should be processed for the channel.
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case <-l.channel.ForceCloseSignal:
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// TODO(roasbeef): path never taken now that server
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// force closes's directly?
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log.Warnf("ChannelPoint(%v) has been force "+
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"closed, disconnecting from peer(%x)",
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l.channel.ChannelPoint(), l.cfg.Peer.PubKey())
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break out
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case <-l.logCommitTick:
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// If we haven't sent or received a new commitment
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// update in some time, check to see if we have any
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// pending updates we need to commit due to our
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// commitment chains being desynchronized.
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if l.channel.FullySynced() {
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continue
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}
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if err := l.updateCommitTx(); err != nil {
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l.fail("unable to update commitment: %v", err)
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break out
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}
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case <-batchTimer.C:
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// If the current batch is empty, then we have no work
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// here.
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if l.batchCounter == 0 {
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continue
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}
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// Otherwise, attempt to extend the remote commitment
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// chain including all the currently pending entries.
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// If the send was unsuccessful, then abandon the
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// update, waiting for the revocation window to open
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// up.
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if err := l.updateCommitTx(); err != nil {
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l.fail("unable to update commitment: %v", err)
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break out
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}
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|
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// A packet that previously overflowed the commitment
|
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// transaction is now eligible for processing once again. So
|
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// we'll attempt to re-process the packet in order to allow it
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// to continue propagating within the network.
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case packet := <-l.overflowQueue.outgoingPkts:
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msg := packet.htlc.(*lnwire.UpdateAddHTLC)
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log.Tracef("Reprocessing downstream add update "+
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"with payment hash(%x)", msg.PaymentHash[:])
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l.handleDownStreamPkt(packet, true)
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// A message from the switch was just received. This indicates
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// that the link is an intermediate hop in a multi-hop HTLC
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// circuit.
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case pkt := <-l.downstream:
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// If we have non empty processing queue then we'll add
|
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// this to the overflow rather than processing it
|
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// directly. Once an active HTLC is either settled or
|
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// failed, then we'll free up a new slot.
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htlc, ok := pkt.htlc.(*lnwire.UpdateAddHTLC)
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if ok && l.overflowQueue.Length() != 0 {
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log.Infof("Downstream htlc add update with "+
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"payment hash(%x) have been added to "+
|
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"reprocessing queue, batch_size=%v",
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htlc.PaymentHash[:],
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l.batchCounter)
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// As we're adding a new pkt to the overflow
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// queue, decrement the available bandwidth.
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atomic.AddUint64(
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&l.availableBandwidth,
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-uint64(htlc.Amount),
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)
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l.overflowQueue.AddPkt(pkt)
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continue
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}
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l.handleDownStreamPkt(pkt, false)
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// A message from the connected peer was just received. This
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// indicates that we have a new incoming HTLC, either directly
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// for us, or part of a multi-hop HTLC circuit.
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case msg := <-l.upstream:
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l.handleUpstreamMsg(msg)
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case cmd := <-l.linkControl:
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switch req := cmd.(type) {
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case *policyUpdate:
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// In order to avoid overriding a valid policy
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// with a "null" field in the new policy, we'll
|
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// only update to the set sub policy if the new
|
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// value isn't uninitialized.
|
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if req.policy.MinHTLC != 0 {
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l.cfg.FwrdingPolicy.MinHTLC = req.policy.MinHTLC
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}
|
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if req.policy.BaseFee != 0 {
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l.cfg.FwrdingPolicy.BaseFee = req.policy.BaseFee
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}
|
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if req.policy.FeeRate != 0 {
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l.cfg.FwrdingPolicy.FeeRate = req.policy.FeeRate
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}
|
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if req.policy.TimeLockDelta != 0 {
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l.cfg.FwrdingPolicy.TimeLockDelta = req.policy.TimeLockDelta
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}
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if req.done != nil {
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close(req.done)
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}
|
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}
|
|
|
|
case <-l.quit:
|
|
break out
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log.Infof("ChannelLink(%v) has exited", l)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// handleDownStreamPkt processes an HTLC packet sent from the downstream HTLC
|
|
// Switch. Possible messages sent by the switch include requests to forward new
|
|
// HTLCs, timeout previously cleared HTLCs, and finally to settle currently
|
|
// cleared HTLCs with the upstream peer.
|
|
//
|
|
// TODO(roasbeef): add sync ntfn to ensure switch always has consistent view?
|
|
func (l *channelLink) handleDownStreamPkt(pkt *htlcPacket, isReProcess bool) {
|
|
var isSettle bool
|
|
switch htlc := pkt.htlc.(type) {
|
|
case *lnwire.UpdateAddHTLC:
|
|
// A new payment has been initiated via the downstream channel,
|
|
// so we add the new HTLC to our local log, then update the
|
|
// commitment chains.
|
|
htlc.ChanID = l.ChanID()
|
|
index, err := l.channel.AddHTLC(htlc)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
switch err {
|
|
|
|
// The channels spare bandwidth is fully allocated, so
|
|
// we'll put this HTLC into the overflow queue.
|
|
case lnwallet.ErrMaxHTLCNumber:
|
|
log.Infof("Downstream htlc add update with "+
|
|
"payment hash(%x) have been added to "+
|
|
"reprocessing queue, batch: %v",
|
|
htlc.PaymentHash[:],
|
|
l.batchCounter)
|
|
|
|
// If we're processing this HTLC for the first
|
|
// time, then we'll decrement the available
|
|
// bandwidth. As otherwise, we'd double count
|
|
// the effect of the HTLC.
|
|
if !isReProcess {
|
|
atomic.AddUint64(
|
|
&l.availableBandwidth, -uint64(htlc.Amount),
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
l.overflowQueue.AddPkt(pkt)
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
// The HTLC was unable to be added to the state
|
|
// machine, as a result, we'll signal the switch to
|
|
// cancel the pending payment.
|
|
default:
|
|
var (
|
|
isObfuscated bool
|
|
reason lnwire.OpaqueReason
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// We'll parse the sphinx packet enclosed so we
|
|
// can obtain the shared secret required to
|
|
// encrypt the error back to the source.
|
|
failure := lnwire.NewTemporaryChannelFailure(nil)
|
|
onionReader := bytes.NewReader(htlc.OnionBlob[:])
|
|
obfuscator, failCode := l.cfg.DecodeOnionObfuscator(onionReader)
|
|
|
|
switch {
|
|
// If we were unable to parse the onion blob,
|
|
// then we'll send an error back to the source.
|
|
case failCode != lnwire.CodeNone:
|
|
var b bytes.Buffer
|
|
err := lnwire.EncodeFailure(&b, failure, 0)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Errorf("unable to encode failure: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
reason = lnwire.OpaqueReason(b.Bytes())
|
|
isObfuscated = false
|
|
|
|
// Otherwise, we'll send back a proper failure
|
|
// message.
|
|
default:
|
|
reason, err = obfuscator.EncryptFirstHop(failure)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Errorf("unable to obfuscate error: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
isObfuscated = true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
upddateFail := &lnwire.UpdateFailHTLC{
|
|
Reason: reason,
|
|
}
|
|
failPkt := newFailPacket(
|
|
l.ShortChanID(), upddateFail,
|
|
htlc.PaymentHash, htlc.Amount,
|
|
isObfuscated,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
atomic.AddUint64(&l.availableBandwidth, uint64(htlc.Amount))
|
|
|
|
// TODO(roasbeef): need to identify if sent
|
|
// from switch so don't need to obfuscate
|
|
go l.cfg.Switch.forward(failPkt)
|
|
log.Infof("Unable to handle downstream add HTLC: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If we're processing this HTLC for the first time, then we'll
|
|
// decrement the available bandwidth.
|
|
if !isReProcess {
|
|
// Subtract the available bandwidth as we have a new
|
|
// HTLC in limbo.
|
|
atomic.AddUint64(&l.availableBandwidth, -uint64(htlc.Amount))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log.Tracef("Received downstream htlc: payment_hash=%x, "+
|
|
"local_log_index=%v, batch_size=%v",
|
|
htlc.PaymentHash[:], index, l.batchCounter+1)
|
|
|
|
htlc.ID = index
|
|
l.cfg.Peer.SendMessage(htlc)
|
|
|
|
case *lnwire.UpdateFufillHTLC:
|
|
// An HTLC we forward to the switch has just settled somewhere
|
|
// upstream. Therefore we settle the HTLC within the our local
|
|
// state machine.
|
|
pre := htlc.PaymentPreimage
|
|
logIndex, amt, err := l.channel.SettleHTLC(pre)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// TODO(roasbeef): broadcast on-chain
|
|
l.fail("unable to settle incoming HTLC: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Increment the available bandwidth as we've settled an HTLC
|
|
// extended by tbe remote party.
|
|
atomic.AddUint64(&l.availableBandwidth, uint64(amt))
|
|
|
|
// With the HTLC settled, we'll need to populate the wire
|
|
// message to target the specific channel and HTLC to be
|
|
// cancelled.
|
|
htlc.ChanID = l.ChanID()
|
|
htlc.ID = logIndex
|
|
|
|
// Then we send the HTLC settle message to the connected peer
|
|
// so we can continue the propagation of the settle message.
|
|
l.cfg.Peer.SendMessage(htlc)
|
|
isSettle = true
|
|
|
|
case *lnwire.UpdateFailHTLC:
|
|
// An HTLC cancellation has been triggered somewhere upstream,
|
|
// we'll remove then HTLC from our local state machine.
|
|
logIndex, err := l.channel.FailHTLC(pkt.payHash)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Errorf("unable to cancel HTLC: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// With the HTLC removed, we'll need to populate the wire
|
|
// message to target the specific channel and HTLC to be
|
|
// cancelled. The "Reason" field will have already been set
|
|
// within the switch.
|
|
htlc.ChanID = l.ChanID()
|
|
htlc.ID = logIndex
|
|
|
|
// Finally, we send the HTLC message to the peer which
|
|
// initially created the HTLC.
|
|
l.cfg.Peer.SendMessage(htlc)
|
|
isSettle = true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
l.batchCounter++
|
|
|
|
// If this newly added update exceeds the min batch size for adds, or
|
|
// this is a settle request, then initiate an update.
|
|
if l.batchCounter >= 10 || isSettle {
|
|
if err := l.updateCommitTx(); err != nil {
|
|
l.fail("unable to update commitment: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// handleUpstreamMsg processes wire messages related to commitment state
|
|
// updates from the upstream peer. The upstream peer is the peer whom we have a
|
|
// direct channel with, updating our respective commitment chains.
|
|
func (l *channelLink) handleUpstreamMsg(msg lnwire.Message) {
|
|
switch msg := msg.(type) {
|
|
case *lnwire.UpdateAddHTLC:
|
|
// We just received an add request from an upstream peer, so we
|
|
// add it to our state machine, then add the HTLC to our
|
|
// "settle" list in the event that we know the preimage.
|
|
index, err := l.channel.ReceiveHTLC(msg)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
l.fail("unable to handle upstream add HTLC: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
log.Tracef("Receive upstream htlc with payment hash(%x), "+
|
|
"assigning index: %v", msg.PaymentHash[:], index)
|
|
|
|
// Store the onion blob which encapsulate the htlc route and
|
|
// use in on stage of HTLC inclusion to retrieve the next hop
|
|
// and propagate the HTLC along the remaining route.
|
|
l.clearedOnionBlobs[index] = msg.OnionBlob
|
|
|
|
case *lnwire.UpdateFufillHTLC:
|
|
pre := msg.PaymentPreimage
|
|
idx := msg.ID
|
|
if err := l.channel.ReceiveHTLCSettle(pre, idx); err != nil {
|
|
// TODO(roasbeef): broadcast on-chain
|
|
l.fail("unable to handle upstream settle HTLC: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TODO(roasbeef): add preimage to DB in order to swipe
|
|
// repeated r-values
|
|
|
|
case *lnwire.UpdateFailMalformedHTLC:
|
|
// If remote side have been unable to parse the onion blob we
|
|
// have sent to it, than we should transform the malformed HTLC
|
|
// message to the usual HTLC fail message.
|
|
idx := msg.ID
|
|
amt, err := l.channel.ReceiveFailHTLC(idx)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
l.fail("unable to handle upstream fail HTLC: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Increment the available bandwidth as they've removed our
|
|
// HTLC.
|
|
atomic.AddUint64(&l.availableBandwidth, uint64(amt))
|
|
|
|
// Convert the failure type encoded within the HTLC fail
|
|
// message to the proper generic lnwire error code.
|
|
var failure lnwire.FailureMessage
|
|
switch msg.FailureCode {
|
|
case lnwire.CodeInvalidOnionVersion:
|
|
failure = &lnwire.FailInvalidOnionVersion{
|
|
OnionSHA256: msg.ShaOnionBlob,
|
|
}
|
|
case lnwire.CodeInvalidOnionHmac:
|
|
failure = &lnwire.FailInvalidOnionHmac{
|
|
OnionSHA256: msg.ShaOnionBlob,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case lnwire.CodeInvalidOnionKey:
|
|
failure = &lnwire.FailInvalidOnionKey{
|
|
OnionSHA256: msg.ShaOnionBlob,
|
|
}
|
|
default:
|
|
// TODO(roasbeef): fail channel here?
|
|
log.Errorf("unable to understand code of received " +
|
|
"malformed error")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// With the error parsed, we'll convert the into it's opaque
|
|
// form.
|
|
var b bytes.Buffer
|
|
if err := lnwire.EncodeFailure(&b, failure, 0); err != nil {
|
|
log.Errorf("unable to encode malformed error: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
l.cancelReasons[idx] = lnwire.OpaqueReason(b.Bytes())
|
|
|
|
case *lnwire.UpdateFailHTLC:
|
|
idx := msg.ID
|
|
amt, err := l.channel.ReceiveFailHTLC(idx)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
l.fail("unable to handle upstream fail HTLC: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Increment the available bandwidth as they've removed our
|
|
// HTLC.
|
|
atomic.AddUint64(&l.availableBandwidth, uint64(amt))
|
|
|
|
l.cancelReasons[idx] = msg.Reason
|
|
|
|
case *lnwire.CommitSig:
|
|
// We just received a new update to our local commitment chain,
|
|
// validate this new commitment, closing the link if invalid.
|
|
err := l.channel.ReceiveNewCommitment(msg.CommitSig, msg.HtlcSigs)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
l.fail("unable to accept new commitment: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// As we've just just accepted a new state, we'll now
|
|
// immediately send the remote peer a revocation for our prior
|
|
// state.
|
|
nextRevocation, err := l.channel.RevokeCurrentCommitment()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Errorf("unable to revoke commitment: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
l.cfg.Peer.SendMessage(nextRevocation)
|
|
|
|
// As we've just received a commitment signature, we'll
|
|
// re-start the log commit timer to wake up the main processing
|
|
// loop to check if we need to send a commitment signature as
|
|
// we owe one.
|
|
//
|
|
// TODO(roasbeef): instead after revocation?
|
|
if !l.logCommitTimer.Stop() {
|
|
select {
|
|
case <-l.logCommitTimer.C:
|
|
default:
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
l.logCommitTimer.Reset(300 * time.Millisecond)
|
|
l.logCommitTick = l.logCommitTimer.C
|
|
|
|
// If both commitment chains are fully synced from our PoV,
|
|
// then we don't need to reply with a signature as both sides
|
|
// already have a commitment with the latest accepted l.
|
|
if l.channel.FullySynced() {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Otherwise, the remote party initiated the state transition,
|
|
// so we'll reply with a signature to provide them with their
|
|
// version of the latest commitment l.
|
|
if err := l.updateCommitTx(); err != nil {
|
|
l.fail("unable to update commitment: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case *lnwire.RevokeAndAck:
|
|
// We've received a revocation from the remote chain, if valid,
|
|
// this moves the remote chain forward, and expands our
|
|
// revocation window.
|
|
htlcs, err := l.channel.ReceiveRevocation(msg)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
l.fail("unable to accept revocation: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// After we treat HTLCs as included in both remote/local
|
|
// commitment transactions they might be safely propagated over
|
|
// htlc switch or settled if our node was last node in htlc
|
|
// path.
|
|
htlcsToForward := l.processLockedInHtlcs(htlcs)
|
|
go func() {
|
|
log.Debugf("ChannelPoint(%v) forwarding %v HTLC's",
|
|
l.channel.ChannelPoint(), len(htlcsToForward))
|
|
for _, packet := range htlcsToForward {
|
|
if err := l.cfg.Switch.forward(packet); err != nil {
|
|
log.Errorf("channel link(%v): "+
|
|
"unhandled error while forwarding "+
|
|
"htlc packet over htlc "+
|
|
"switch: %v", l, err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}()
|
|
case *lnwire.UpdateFee:
|
|
// We received fee update from peer. If we are the initator we
|
|
// will fail the channel, if not we will apply the update.
|
|
fee := msg.FeePerKw
|
|
if err := l.channel.ReceiveUpdateFee(fee); err != nil {
|
|
l.fail("error receiving fee update: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// updateCommitTx signs, then sends an update to the remote peer adding a new
|
|
// commitment to their commitment chain which includes all the latest updates
|
|
// we've received+processed up to this point.
|
|
func (l *channelLink) updateCommitTx() error {
|
|
theirCommitSig, htlcSigs, err := l.channel.SignNextCommitment()
|
|
if err == lnwallet.ErrNoWindow {
|
|
log.Tracef("revocation window exhausted, unable to send %v",
|
|
l.batchCounter)
|
|
return nil
|
|
} else if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
commitSig := &lnwire.CommitSig{
|
|
ChanID: l.ChanID(),
|
|
CommitSig: theirCommitSig,
|
|
HtlcSigs: htlcSigs,
|
|
}
|
|
l.cfg.Peer.SendMessage(commitSig)
|
|
|
|
// We've just initiated a state transition, attempt to stop the
|
|
// logCommitTimer. If the timer already ticked, then we'll consume the
|
|
// value, dropping
|
|
if l.logCommitTimer != nil && !l.logCommitTimer.Stop() {
|
|
select {
|
|
case <-l.logCommitTimer.C:
|
|
default:
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
l.logCommitTick = nil
|
|
|
|
// Finally, clear our the current batch, so we can accurately make
|
|
// further batch flushing decisions.
|
|
l.batchCounter = 0
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Peer returns the representation of remote peer with which we have the
|
|
// channel link opened.
|
|
//
|
|
// NOTE: Part of the ChannelLink interface.
|
|
func (l *channelLink) Peer() Peer {
|
|
return l.cfg.Peer
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ShortChanID returns the short channel ID for the channel link. The short
|
|
// channel ID encodes the exact location in the main chain that the original
|
|
// funding output can be found.
|
|
//
|
|
// NOTE: Part of the ChannelLink interface.
|
|
func (l *channelLink) ShortChanID() lnwire.ShortChannelID {
|
|
return l.channel.ShortChanID()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ChanID returns the channel ID for the channel link. The channel ID is a more
|
|
// compact representation of a channel's full outpoint.
|
|
//
|
|
// NOTE: Part of the ChannelLink interface.
|
|
func (l *channelLink) ChanID() lnwire.ChannelID {
|
|
return lnwire.NewChanIDFromOutPoint(l.channel.ChannelPoint())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// getBandwidthCmd is a wrapper for get bandwidth handler.
|
|
type getBandwidthCmd struct {
|
|
resp chan lnwire.MilliSatoshi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Bandwidth returns the total amount that can flow through the channel link at
|
|
// this given instance. The value returned is expressed in millatoshi and
|
|
// can be used by callers when making forwarding decisions to determine if a
|
|
// link can accept an HTLC.
|
|
//
|
|
// NOTE: Part of the ChannelLink interface.
|
|
func (l *channelLink) Bandwidth() lnwire.MilliSatoshi {
|
|
// TODO(roasbeef): subtract reserverj
|
|
return lnwire.MilliSatoshi(atomic.LoadUint64(&l.availableBandwidth))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// policyUpdate is a message sent to a channel link when an outside sub-system
|
|
// wishes to update the current forwarding policy.
|
|
type policyUpdate struct {
|
|
policy ForwardingPolicy
|
|
|
|
done chan struct{}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// UpdateForwardingPolicy updates the forwarding policy for the target
|
|
// ChannelLink. Once updated, the link will use the new forwarding policy to
|
|
// govern if it an incoming HTLC should be forwarded or not. Note that this
|
|
// processing of the new policy will ensure that uninitialized fields in the
|
|
// passed policy won't override already initialized fields in the current
|
|
// policy.
|
|
//
|
|
// NOTE: Part of the ChannelLink interface.
|
|
func (l *channelLink) UpdateForwardingPolicy(newPolicy ForwardingPolicy) {
|
|
cmd := &policyUpdate{
|
|
policy: newPolicy,
|
|
done: make(chan struct{}),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
select {
|
|
case l.linkControl <- cmd:
|
|
case <-l.quit:
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
select {
|
|
case <-cmd.done:
|
|
case <-l.quit:
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Stats returns the statistics of channel link.
|
|
//
|
|
// NOTE: Part of the ChannelLink interface.
|
|
func (l *channelLink) Stats() (uint64, lnwire.MilliSatoshi, lnwire.MilliSatoshi) {
|
|
snapshot := l.channel.StateSnapshot()
|
|
|
|
return snapshot.NumUpdates,
|
|
snapshot.TotalMilliSatoshisSent,
|
|
snapshot.TotalMilliSatoshisReceived
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// String returns the string representation of channel link.
|
|
//
|
|
// NOTE: Part of the ChannelLink interface.
|
|
func (l *channelLink) String() string {
|
|
return l.channel.ChannelPoint().String()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// HandleSwitchPacket handles the switch packets. This packets which might be
|
|
// forwarded to us from another channel link in case the htlc update came from
|
|
// another peer or if the update was created by user
|
|
//
|
|
// NOTE: Part of the ChannelLink interface.
|
|
func (l *channelLink) HandleSwitchPacket(packet *htlcPacket) {
|
|
select {
|
|
case l.downstream <- packet:
|
|
case <-l.quit:
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// HandleChannelUpdate handles the htlc requests as settle/add/fail which sent
|
|
// to us from remote peer we have a channel with.
|
|
//
|
|
// NOTE: Part of the ChannelLink interface.
|
|
func (l *channelLink) HandleChannelUpdate(message lnwire.Message) {
|
|
select {
|
|
case l.upstream <- message:
|
|
case <-l.quit:
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// updateChannelFee updates the commitment fee-per-kw on this channel by
|
|
// committing to an update_fee message.
|
|
func (l *channelLink) updateChannelFee(feePerKw btcutil.Amount) error {
|
|
// Update local fee.
|
|
if err := l.channel.UpdateFee(feePerKw); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Send fee update to remote.
|
|
msg := lnwire.NewUpdateFee(l.ChanID(), feePerKw)
|
|
return l.cfg.Peer.SendMessage(msg)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// processLockedInHtlcs serially processes each of the log updates which have
|
|
// been "locked-in". An HTLC is considered locked-in once it has been fully
|
|
// committed to in both the remote and local commitment state. Once a channel
|
|
// updates is locked-in, then it can be acted upon, meaning: settling HTLCs,
|
|
// cancelling them, or forwarding new HTLCs to the next hop.
|
|
func (l *channelLink) processLockedInHtlcs(
|
|
paymentDescriptors []*lnwallet.PaymentDescriptor) []*htlcPacket {
|
|
|
|
var (
|
|
needUpdate bool
|
|
packetsToForward []*htlcPacket
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
for _, pd := range paymentDescriptors {
|
|
// TODO(roasbeef): rework log entries to a shared
|
|
// interface.
|
|
switch pd.EntryType {
|
|
|
|
// A settle for an HTLC we previously forwarded HTLC has been
|
|
// received. So we'll forward the HTLC to the switch which
|
|
// will handle propagating the settle to the prior hop.
|
|
case lnwallet.Settle:
|
|
settleUpdate := &lnwire.UpdateFufillHTLC{
|
|
PaymentPreimage: pd.RPreimage,
|
|
}
|
|
settlePacket := newSettlePacket(l.ShortChanID(),
|
|
settleUpdate, pd.RHash, pd.Amount)
|
|
|
|
// Add the packet to the batch to be forwarded, and
|
|
// notify the overflow queue that a spare spot has been
|
|
// freed up within the commitment state.
|
|
packetsToForward = append(packetsToForward, settlePacket)
|
|
l.overflowQueue.SignalFreeSlot()
|
|
|
|
// A failureCode message for a previously forwarded HTLC has been
|
|
// received. As a result a new slot will be freed up in our
|
|
// commitment state, so we'll forward this to the switch so the
|
|
// backwards undo can continue.
|
|
case lnwallet.Fail:
|
|
// Fetch the reason the HTLC was cancelled so we can
|
|
// continue to propagate it.
|
|
opaqueReason := l.cancelReasons[pd.ParentIndex]
|
|
|
|
failUpdate := &lnwire.UpdateFailHTLC{
|
|
Reason: opaqueReason,
|
|
ChanID: l.ChanID(),
|
|
}
|
|
failPacket := newFailPacket(l.ShortChanID(), failUpdate,
|
|
pd.RHash, pd.Amount, false)
|
|
|
|
// Add the packet to the batch to be forwarded, and
|
|
// notify the overflow queue that a spare spot has been
|
|
// freed up within the commitment state.
|
|
packetsToForward = append(packetsToForward, failPacket)
|
|
l.overflowQueue.SignalFreeSlot()
|
|
|
|
// An incoming HTLC add has been full-locked in. As a result we
|
|
// can now examine the forwarding details of the HTLC, and the
|
|
// HTLC itself to decide if: we should forward it, cancel it,
|
|
// or are able to settle it (and it adheres to our fee related
|
|
// constraints).
|
|
case lnwallet.Add:
|
|
// Fetch the onion blob that was included within this
|
|
// processed payment descriptor.
|
|
onionBlob := l.clearedOnionBlobs[pd.HtlcIndex]
|
|
delete(l.clearedOnionBlobs, pd.HtlcIndex)
|
|
|
|
// Retrieve onion obfuscator from onion blob in order
|
|
// to produce initial obfuscation of the onion
|
|
// failureCode.
|
|
onionReader := bytes.NewReader(onionBlob[:])
|
|
obfuscator, failureCode := l.cfg.DecodeOnionObfuscator(
|
|
onionReader,
|
|
)
|
|
if failureCode != lnwire.CodeNone {
|
|
// If we're unable to process the onion blob
|
|
// than we should send the malformed htlc error
|
|
// to payment sender.
|
|
l.sendMalformedHTLCError(pd.RHash, failureCode,
|
|
onionBlob[:])
|
|
needUpdate = true
|
|
|
|
log.Errorf("unable to decode onion "+
|
|
"obfuscator: %v", failureCode)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Before adding the new htlc to the state machine,
|
|
// parse the onion object in order to obtain the
|
|
// routing information with DecodeHopIterator function
|
|
// which process the Sphinx packet.
|
|
//
|
|
// We include the payment hash of the htlc as it's
|
|
// authenticated within the Sphinx packet itself as
|
|
// associated data in order to thwart attempts a replay
|
|
// attacks. In the case of a replay, an attacker is
|
|
// *forced* to use the same payment hash twice, thereby
|
|
// losing their money entirely.
|
|
onionReader = bytes.NewReader(onionBlob[:])
|
|
chanIterator, failureCode := l.cfg.DecodeHopIterator(
|
|
onionReader, pd.RHash[:],
|
|
)
|
|
if failureCode != lnwire.CodeNone {
|
|
// If we're unable to process the onion blob
|
|
// than we should send the malformed htlc error
|
|
// to payment sender.
|
|
l.sendMalformedHTLCError(pd.RHash, failureCode,
|
|
onionBlob[:])
|
|
needUpdate = true
|
|
|
|
log.Errorf("unable to decode onion hop "+
|
|
"iterator: %v", failureCode)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
heightNow := l.bestHeight
|
|
|
|
fwdInfo := chanIterator.ForwardingInstructions()
|
|
switch fwdInfo.NextHop {
|
|
case exitHop:
|
|
// First, we'll check the expiry of the HTLC
|
|
// itself against, the current block height. If
|
|
// the timeout is too soon, then we'll reject
|
|
// the HTLC.
|
|
if pd.Timeout-expiryGraceDelta <= heightNow {
|
|
log.Errorf("htlc(%x) has an expiry "+
|
|
"that's too soon: expiry=%v, "+
|
|
"best_height=%v", pd.RHash[:],
|
|
pd.Timeout, heightNow)
|
|
|
|
failure := lnwire.FailFinalIncorrectCltvExpiry{}
|
|
l.sendHTLCError(pd.RHash, &failure, obfuscator)
|
|
needUpdate = true
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We're the designated payment destination.
|
|
// Therefore we attempt to see if we have an
|
|
// invoice locally which'll allow us to settle
|
|
// this htlc.
|
|
invoiceHash := chainhash.Hash(pd.RHash)
|
|
invoice, err := l.cfg.Registry.LookupInvoice(invoiceHash)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Errorf("unable to query invoice registry: "+
|
|
" %v", err)
|
|
failure := lnwire.FailUnknownPaymentHash{}
|
|
l.sendHTLCError(pd.RHash, failure, obfuscator)
|
|
needUpdate = true
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If we're not currently in debug mode, and
|
|
// the extended htlc doesn't meet the value
|
|
// requested, then we'll fail the htlc.
|
|
// Otherwise, we settle this htlc within our
|
|
// local state update log, then send the update
|
|
// entry to the remote party.
|
|
if !l.cfg.DebugHTLC && pd.Amount < invoice.Terms.Value {
|
|
log.Errorf("rejecting htlc due to incorrect "+
|
|
"amount: expected %v, received %v",
|
|
invoice.Terms.Value, pd.Amount)
|
|
failure := lnwire.FailIncorrectPaymentAmount{}
|
|
l.sendHTLCError(pd.RHash, failure, obfuscator)
|
|
needUpdate = true
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// As we're the exit hop, we'll double check
|
|
// the hop-payload included in the HTLC to
|
|
// ensure that it was crafted correctly by the
|
|
// sender and matches the HTLC we were
|
|
// extended.
|
|
if !l.cfg.DebugHTLC &&
|
|
fwdInfo.AmountToForward != invoice.Terms.Value {
|
|
|
|
log.Errorf("Onion payload of incoming "+
|
|
"htlc(%x) has incorrect value: "+
|
|
"expected %v, got %v", pd.RHash,
|
|
invoice.Terms.Value,
|
|
fwdInfo.AmountToForward)
|
|
|
|
failure := lnwire.FailIncorrectPaymentAmount{}
|
|
l.sendHTLCError(pd.RHash, failure, obfuscator)
|
|
needUpdate = true
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We'll also ensure that our time-lock value
|
|
// has been computed correctly.
|
|
//
|
|
// TODO(roasbeef): also accept global default?
|
|
expectedHeight := heightNow + l.cfg.FwrdingPolicy.TimeLockDelta
|
|
if !l.cfg.DebugHTLC {
|
|
switch {
|
|
case fwdInfo.OutgoingCTLV < expectedHeight:
|
|
log.Errorf("Onion payload of incoming "+
|
|
"htlc(%x) has incorrect time-lock: "+
|
|
"expected %v, got %v",
|
|
pd.RHash[:], expectedHeight,
|
|
fwdInfo.OutgoingCTLV)
|
|
|
|
failure := lnwire.NewFinalIncorrectCltvExpiry(
|
|
fwdInfo.OutgoingCTLV,
|
|
)
|
|
l.sendHTLCError(pd.RHash, failure, obfuscator)
|
|
needUpdate = true
|
|
continue
|
|
case pd.Timeout != fwdInfo.OutgoingCTLV:
|
|
log.Errorf("HTLC(%x) has incorrect "+
|
|
"time-lock: expected %v, got %v",
|
|
pd.RHash[:], pd.Timeout,
|
|
fwdInfo.OutgoingCTLV)
|
|
|
|
failure := lnwire.NewFinalIncorrectCltvExpiry(
|
|
fwdInfo.OutgoingCTLV,
|
|
)
|
|
l.sendHTLCError(pd.RHash, failure, obfuscator)
|
|
needUpdate = true
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if l.cfg.DebugHTLC && l.cfg.HodlHTLC {
|
|
log.Warnf("hodl HTLC mode enabled, " +
|
|
"will not attempt to settle " +
|
|
"HTLC with sender")
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
preimage := invoice.Terms.PaymentPreimage
|
|
logIndex, amt, err := l.channel.SettleHTLC(preimage)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
l.fail("unable to settle htlc: %v", err)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Increment the available bandwidth as we've
|
|
// settled an HTLC extended by tbe remote
|
|
// party.
|
|
atomic.AddUint64(
|
|
&l.availableBandwidth, uint64(amt),
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// Notify the invoiceRegistry of the invoices
|
|
// we just settled with this latest commitment
|
|
// update.
|
|
err = l.cfg.Registry.SettleInvoice(invoiceHash)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
l.fail("unable to settle invoice: %v", err)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// HTLC was successfully settled locally send
|
|
// notification about it remote peer.
|
|
l.cfg.Peer.SendMessage(&lnwire.UpdateFufillHTLC{
|
|
ChanID: l.ChanID(),
|
|
ID: logIndex,
|
|
PaymentPreimage: preimage,
|
|
})
|
|
needUpdate = true
|
|
|
|
// There are additional channels left within this
|
|
// route. So we'll verify that our forwarding
|
|
// constraints have been properly met by by this
|
|
// incoming HTLC.
|
|
default:
|
|
// We want to avoid forwarding an HTLC which
|
|
// will expire in the near future, so we'll
|
|
// reject an HTLC if its expiration time is too
|
|
// close to the current height.
|
|
timeDelta := l.cfg.FwrdingPolicy.TimeLockDelta
|
|
if pd.Timeout-timeDelta <= heightNow {
|
|
log.Errorf("htlc(%x) has an expiry "+
|
|
"that's too soon: outgoing_expiry=%v, "+
|
|
"best_height=%v", pd.RHash[:],
|
|
pd.Timeout-timeDelta, heightNow)
|
|
|
|
var failure lnwire.FailureMessage
|
|
update, err := l.cfg.GetLastChannelUpdate()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
failure = lnwire.NewTemporaryChannelFailure(nil)
|
|
} else {
|
|
failure = lnwire.NewExpiryTooSoon(*update)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
l.sendHTLCError(pd.RHash, failure, obfuscator)
|
|
needUpdate = true
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// As our second sanity check, we'll ensure that
|
|
// the passed HTLC isn't too small. If so, then
|
|
// we'll cancel the HTLC directly.
|
|
if pd.Amount < l.cfg.FwrdingPolicy.MinHTLC {
|
|
log.Errorf("Incoming htlc(%x) is too "+
|
|
"small: min_htlc=%v, hltc_value=%v",
|
|
pd.RHash[:], l.cfg.FwrdingPolicy.MinHTLC,
|
|
pd.Amount)
|
|
|
|
// As part of the returned error, we'll
|
|
// send our latest routing policy so
|
|
// the sending node obtains the most up
|
|
// to date data.
|
|
var failure lnwire.FailureMessage
|
|
update, err := l.cfg.GetLastChannelUpdate()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
failure = lnwire.NewTemporaryChannelFailure(nil)
|
|
} else {
|
|
failure = lnwire.NewAmountBelowMinimum(
|
|
pd.Amount, *update)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
l.sendHTLCError(pd.RHash, failure, obfuscator)
|
|
needUpdate = true
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Next, using the amount of the incoming HTLC,
|
|
// we'll calculate the expected fee this
|
|
// incoming HTLC must carry in order to be
|
|
// accepted.
|
|
expectedFee := ExpectedFee(
|
|
l.cfg.FwrdingPolicy,
|
|
fwdInfo.AmountToForward,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// If the amount of the incoming HTLC, minus
|
|
// our expected fee isn't equal to the
|
|
// forwarding instructions, then either the
|
|
// values have been tampered with, or the send
|
|
// used incorrect/dated information to
|
|
// construct the forwarding information for
|
|
// this hop. In any case, we'll cancel this
|
|
// HTLC.
|
|
if pd.Amount-expectedFee < fwdInfo.AmountToForward {
|
|
log.Errorf("Incoming htlc(%x) has "+
|
|
"insufficient fee: expected "+
|
|
"%v, got %v", pd.RHash[:],
|
|
int64(expectedFee),
|
|
int64(pd.Amount-fwdInfo.AmountToForward))
|
|
|
|
// As part of the returned error, we'll
|
|
// send our latest routing policy so
|
|
// the sending node obtains the most up
|
|
// to date data.
|
|
var failure lnwire.FailureMessage
|
|
update, err := l.cfg.GetLastChannelUpdate()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
failure = lnwire.NewTemporaryChannelFailure(nil)
|
|
} else {
|
|
failure = lnwire.NewFeeInsufficient(pd.Amount,
|
|
*update)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
l.sendHTLCError(pd.RHash, failure, obfuscator)
|
|
needUpdate = true
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Finally, we'll ensure that the time-lock on
|
|
// the outgoing HTLC meets the following
|
|
// constraint: the incoming time-lock minus our
|
|
// time-lock delta should equal the outgoing
|
|
// time lock. Otherwise, whether the sender
|
|
// messed up, or an intermediate node tampered
|
|
// with the HTLC.
|
|
if pd.Timeout-timeDelta < fwdInfo.OutgoingCTLV {
|
|
log.Errorf("Incoming htlc(%x) has "+
|
|
"incorrect time-lock value: "+
|
|
"expected at least %v block delta, "+
|
|
"got %v block delta", pd.RHash[:],
|
|
timeDelta,
|
|
pd.Timeout-fwdInfo.OutgoingCTLV)
|
|
|
|
// Grab the latest routing policy so
|
|
// the sending node is up to date with
|
|
// our current policy.
|
|
update, err := l.cfg.GetLastChannelUpdate()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
l.fail("unable to create channel update "+
|
|
"while handling the error: %v", err)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
failure := lnwire.NewIncorrectCltvExpiry(
|
|
pd.Timeout, *update)
|
|
l.sendHTLCError(pd.RHash, failure, obfuscator)
|
|
needUpdate = true
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TODO(roasbeef): also add max timeout value
|
|
|
|
// With all our forwarding constraints met,
|
|
// we'll create the outgoing HTLC using the
|
|
// parameters as specified in the forwarding
|
|
// info.
|
|
addMsg := &lnwire.UpdateAddHTLC{
|
|
Expiry: fwdInfo.OutgoingCTLV,
|
|
Amount: fwdInfo.AmountToForward,
|
|
PaymentHash: pd.RHash,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Finally, we'll encode the onion packet for
|
|
// the _next_ hop using the hop iterator
|
|
// decoded for the current hop.
|
|
buf := bytes.NewBuffer(addMsg.OnionBlob[0:0])
|
|
err := chanIterator.EncodeNextHop(buf)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Errorf("unable to encode the "+
|
|
"remaining route %v", err)
|
|
|
|
failure := lnwire.NewTemporaryChannelFailure(nil)
|
|
l.sendHTLCError(pd.RHash, failure, obfuscator)
|
|
needUpdate = true
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
updatePacket := newAddPacket(l.ShortChanID(),
|
|
fwdInfo.NextHop, addMsg, obfuscator)
|
|
packetsToForward = append(packetsToForward, updatePacket)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if needUpdate {
|
|
// With all the settle/cancel updates added to the local and
|
|
// remote HTLC logs, initiate a state transition by updating
|
|
// the remote commitment chain.
|
|
if err := l.updateCommitTx(); err != nil {
|
|
l.fail("unable to update commitment: %v", err)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return packetsToForward
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// sendHTLCError functions cancels HTLC and send cancel message back to the
|
|
// peer from which HTLC was received.
|
|
func (l *channelLink) sendHTLCError(rHash [32]byte, failure lnwire.FailureMessage,
|
|
e ErrorEncrypter) {
|
|
|
|
reason, err := e.EncryptFirstHop(failure)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Errorf("unable to obfuscate error: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
index, err := l.channel.FailHTLC(rHash)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Errorf("unable cancel htlc: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
l.cfg.Peer.SendMessage(&lnwire.UpdateFailHTLC{
|
|
ChanID: l.ChanID(),
|
|
ID: index,
|
|
Reason: reason,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// sendMalformedHTLCError helper function which sends the malformed HTLC update
|
|
// to the payment sender.
|
|
func (l *channelLink) sendMalformedHTLCError(rHash [32]byte, code lnwire.FailCode,
|
|
onionBlob []byte) {
|
|
index, err := l.channel.FailHTLC(rHash)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Errorf("unable cancel htlc: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
l.cfg.Peer.SendMessage(&lnwire.UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
|
|
ChanID: l.ChanID(),
|
|
ID: index,
|
|
ShaOnionBlob: sha256.Sum256(onionBlob),
|
|
FailureCode: code,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// fail helper function which is used to encapsulate the action necessary for
|
|
// proper disconnect.
|
|
func (l *channelLink) fail(format string, a ...interface{}) {
|
|
reason := errors.Errorf(format, a...)
|
|
log.Error(reason)
|
|
l.cfg.Peer.Disconnect(reason)
|
|
}
|