30dbbd69a0
In this commit, we fix an existing bug that would result in some payments getting “stuck”. This would happen if one side restarted before the channel was fully locked in. In this case, since upon re-connection, the link will get added to the switch with a *short channel ID of zero*. If A then tries to make a multi-hop payment through B, B will fail to forward the payment, as it’ll mistakenly think that the payment originated from a local-subsystem as the channel ID is zero. A short channel ID of zero is used to map local payments back to their caller. With fix this by allowing the funding manager to dynamically update the short channel ID of a link after it discovers the short channel ID. In this commit, we fix a second instance of reported “stuck” payments by users.
1849 lines
59 KiB
Go
1849 lines
59 KiB
Go
package htlcswitch
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import (
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"bytes"
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"fmt"
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"sync"
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"sync/atomic"
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"time"
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"io"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"github.com/go-errors/errors"
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"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/chainntnfs"
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"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/channeldb"
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"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/contractcourt"
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"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/lnwallet"
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"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/lnwire"
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"github.com/roasbeef/btcd/chaincfg/chainhash"
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"github.com/roasbeef/btcutil"
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)
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const (
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// expiryGraceDelta is a grace period that the timeout of incoming
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// HTLC's that pay directly to us (i.e we're the "exit node") must up
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// hold. We'll reject any HTLC's who's timeout minus this value is less
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// that or equal to the current block height. We require this in order
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// to ensure that if the extending party goes to the chain, then we'll
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// be able to claim the HTLC still.
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//
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// TODO(roasbeef): must be < default delta
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expiryGraceDelta = 2
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)
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// ForwardingPolicy describes the set of constraints that a given ChannelLink
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// is to adhere to when forwarding HTLC's. For each incoming HTLC, this set of
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// constraints will be consulted in order to ensure that adequate fees are
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// paid, and our time-lock parameters are respected. In the event that an
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// incoming HTLC violates any of these constraints, it is to be _rejected_ with
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// the error possibly carrying along a ChannelUpdate message that includes the
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// latest policy.
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type ForwardingPolicy struct {
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// MinHTLC is the smallest HTLC that is to be forwarded. This is
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// set when a channel is first opened, and will be static for the
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// lifetime of the channel.
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MinHTLC lnwire.MilliSatoshi
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// BaseFee is the base fee, expressed in milli-satoshi that must be
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// paid for each incoming HTLC. This field, combined with FeeRate is
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// used to compute the required fee for a given HTLC.
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BaseFee lnwire.MilliSatoshi
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// FeeRate is the fee rate, expressed in milli-satoshi that must be
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// paid for each incoming HTLC. This field combined with BaseFee is
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// used to compute the required fee for a given HTLC.
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FeeRate lnwire.MilliSatoshi
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// TimeLockDelta is the absolute time-lock value, expressed in blocks,
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// that will be subtracted from an incoming HTLC's timelock value to
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// create the time-lock value for the forwarded outgoing HTLC. The
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// following constraint MUST hold for an HTLC to be forwarded:
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//
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// * incomingHtlc.timeLock - timeLockDelta = fwdInfo.OutgoingCTLV
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//
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// where fwdInfo is the forwarding information extracted from the
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// per-hop payload of the incoming HTLC's onion packet.
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TimeLockDelta uint32
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// TODO(roasbeef): add fee module inside of switch
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}
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// ExpectedFee computes the expected fee for a given htlc amount. The value
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// returned from this function is to be used as a sanity check when forwarding
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// HTLC's to ensure that an incoming HTLC properly adheres to our propagated
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// forwarding policy.
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//
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// TODO(roasbeef): also add in current available channel bandwidth, inverse
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// func
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func ExpectedFee(f ForwardingPolicy, htlcAmt lnwire.MilliSatoshi) lnwire.MilliSatoshi {
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// TODO(roasbeef): write some basic table driven tests
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return f.BaseFee + (htlcAmt*f.FeeRate)/1000000
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}
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// ChannelLinkConfig defines the configuration for the channel link. ALL
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// elements within the configuration MUST be non-nil for channel link to carry
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// out its duties.
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type ChannelLinkConfig struct {
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// FwrdingPolicy is the initial forwarding policy to be used when
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// deciding whether to forwarding incoming HTLC's or not. This value
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// can be updated with subsequent calls to UpdateForwardingPolicy
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// targeted at a given ChannelLink concrete interface implementation.
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FwrdingPolicy ForwardingPolicy
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// Switch is a subsystem which is used to forward the incoming HTLC
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// packets according to the encoded hop forwarding information
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// contained in the forwarding blob within each HTLC.
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//
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// TODO(roasbeef): remove in favor of simple ForwardPacket closure func
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Switch *Switch
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// DecodeHopIterator function is responsible for decoding HTLC Sphinx
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// onion blob, and creating hop iterator which will give us next
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// destination of HTLC.
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DecodeHopIterator func(r io.Reader, rHash []byte) (HopIterator, lnwire.FailCode)
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// DecodeOnionObfuscator function is responsible for decoding HTLC
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// Sphinx onion blob, and creating onion failure obfuscator.
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DecodeOnionObfuscator func(r io.Reader) (ErrorEncrypter, lnwire.FailCode)
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// GetLastChannelUpdate retrieves the latest routing policy for this
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// particular channel. This will be used to provide payment senders our
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// latest policy when sending encrypted error messages.
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GetLastChannelUpdate func() (*lnwire.ChannelUpdate, error)
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// Peer is a lightning network node with which we have the channel link
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// opened.
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Peer Peer
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// Registry is a sub-system which responsible for managing the invoices
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// in thread-safe manner.
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Registry InvoiceDatabase
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// PreimageCache is a global witness baacon that houses any new
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// preimges discovered by other links. We'll use this to add new
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// witnesses that we discover which will notify any sub-systems
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// subscribed to new events.
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PreimageCache contractcourt.WitnessBeacon
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// UpdateContractSignals is a function closure that we'll use to update
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// outside sub-systems with the latest signals for our inner Lightning
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// channel. These signals will notify the caller when the channel has
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// been closed, or when the set of active HTLC's is updated.
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UpdateContractSignals func(*contractcourt.ContractSignals) error
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// ChainEvents is an active subscription to the chain watcher for this
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// channel to be notified of any on-chain activity related to this
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// channel.
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ChainEvents *contractcourt.ChainEventSubscription
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// FeeEstimator is an instance of a live fee estimator which will be
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// used to dynamically regulate the current fee of the commitment
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// transaction to ensure timely confirmation.
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FeeEstimator lnwallet.FeeEstimator
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// BlockEpochs is an active block epoch event stream backed by an
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// active ChainNotifier instance. The ChannelLink will use new block
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// notifications sent over this channel to decide when a _new_ HTLC is
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// too close to expiry, and also when any active HTLC's have expired
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// (or are close to expiry).
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BlockEpochs *chainntnfs.BlockEpochEvent
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// DebugHTLC should be turned on if you want all HTLCs sent to a node
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// with the debug htlc R-Hash are immediately settled in the next
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// available state transition.
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DebugHTLC bool
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// HodlHTLC should be active if you want this node to refrain from
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// settling all incoming HTLCs with the sender if it finds itself to be
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// the exit node.
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//
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// NOTE: HodlHTLC should be active in conjunction with DebugHTLC.
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HodlHTLC bool
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// SyncStates is used to indicate that we need send the channel
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// reestablishment message to the remote peer. It should be done if our
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// clients have been restarted, or remote peer have been reconnected.
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SyncStates bool
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}
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// channelLink is the service which drives a channel's commitment update
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// state-machine. In the event that an htlc needs to be propagated to another
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// link, the forward handler from config is used which sends htlc to the
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// switch. Additionally, the link encapsulate logic of commitment protocol
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// message ordering and updates.
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type channelLink struct {
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// The following fields are only meant to be used *atomically*
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started int32
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shutdown int32
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// batchCounter is the number of updates which we received from remote
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// side, but not include in commitment transaction yet and plus the
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// current number of settles that have been sent, but not yet committed
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// to the commitment.
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//
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// TODO(andrew.shvv) remove after we add additional
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// BatchNumber() method in state machine.
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batchCounter uint32
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// bestHeight is the best known height of the main chain. The link will
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// use this information to govern decisions based on HTLC timeouts.
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bestHeight uint32
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// channel is a lightning network channel to which we apply htlc
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// updates.
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channel *lnwallet.LightningChannel
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// shortChanID is the most up to date short channel ID for the link.
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shortChanID lnwire.ShortChannelID
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// cfg is a structure which carries all dependable fields/handlers
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// which may affect behaviour of the service.
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cfg ChannelLinkConfig
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// overflowQueue is used to store the htlc add updates which haven't
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// been processed because of the commitment transaction overflow.
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overflowQueue *packetQueue
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// mailBox is the main interface between the outside world and the
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// link. All incoming messages will be sent over this mailBox. Messages
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// include new updates from our connected peer, and new packets to be
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// forwarded sent by the switch.
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mailBox *memoryMailBox
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// upstream is a channel that new messages sent from the remote peer to
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// the local peer will be sent across.
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upstream chan lnwire.Message
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// downstream is a channel in which new multi-hop HTLC's to be
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// forwarded will be sent across. Messages from this channel are sent
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// by the HTLC switch.
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downstream chan *htlcPacket
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// linkControl is a channel which is used to query the state of the
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// link, or update various policies used which govern if an HTLC is to
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// be forwarded and/or accepted.
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linkControl chan interface{}
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// htlcUpdates is a channel that we'll use to update outside
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// sub-systems with the latest set of active HTLC's on our channel.
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htlcUpdates chan []channeldb.HTLC
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// logCommitTimer is a timer which is sent upon if we go an interval
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// without receiving/sending a commitment update. It's role is to
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// ensure both chains converge to identical state in a timely manner.
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//
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// TODO(roasbeef): timer should be >> then RTT
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logCommitTimer *time.Timer
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logCommitTick <-chan time.Time
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sync.RWMutex
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wg sync.WaitGroup
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quit chan struct{}
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}
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// NewChannelLink creates a new instance of a ChannelLink given a configuration
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// and active channel that will be used to verify/apply updates to.
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func NewChannelLink(cfg ChannelLinkConfig, channel *lnwallet.LightningChannel,
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currentHeight uint32) ChannelLink {
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link := &channelLink{
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cfg: cfg,
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channel: channel,
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shortChanID: channel.ShortChanID(),
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mailBox: newMemoryMailBox(),
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linkControl: make(chan interface{}),
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// TODO(roasbeef): just do reserve here?
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logCommitTimer: time.NewTimer(300 * time.Millisecond),
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overflowQueue: newPacketQueue(lnwallet.MaxHTLCNumber / 2),
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bestHeight: currentHeight,
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htlcUpdates: make(chan []channeldb.HTLC),
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quit: make(chan struct{}),
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}
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link.upstream = link.mailBox.MessageOutBox()
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link.downstream = link.mailBox.PacketOutBox()
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return link
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}
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// A compile time check to ensure channelLink implements the ChannelLink
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// interface.
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var _ ChannelLink = (*channelLink)(nil)
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// Start starts all helper goroutines required for the operation of the channel
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// link.
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//
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// NOTE: Part of the ChannelLink interface.
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func (l *channelLink) Start() error {
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if !atomic.CompareAndSwapInt32(&l.started, 0, 1) {
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err := errors.Errorf("channel link(%v): already started", l)
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log.Warn(err)
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return err
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}
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log.Infof("ChannelLink(%v) is starting", l)
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// Before we start the link, we'll update the ChainArbitrator with the
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// set of new channel signals for this channel.
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//
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// TODO(roasbeef): split goroutines within channel arb to avoid
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go func() {
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err := l.cfg.UpdateContractSignals(&contractcourt.ContractSignals{
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HtlcUpdates: l.htlcUpdates,
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ShortChanID: l.channel.ShortChanID(),
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})
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if err != nil {
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log.Errorf("Unable to update signals for "+
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"ChannelLink(%v)", l)
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}
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}()
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l.mailBox.Start()
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l.overflowQueue.Start()
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l.wg.Add(1)
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go l.htlcManager()
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return nil
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}
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// Stop gracefully stops all active helper goroutines, then waits until they've
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// exited.
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//
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// NOTE: Part of the ChannelLink interface.
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func (l *channelLink) Stop() {
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if !atomic.CompareAndSwapInt32(&l.shutdown, 0, 1) {
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log.Warnf("channel link(%v): already stopped", l)
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return
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}
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log.Infof("ChannelLink(%v) is stopping", l)
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if l.cfg.ChainEvents.Cancel != nil {
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l.cfg.ChainEvents.Cancel()
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}
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l.channel.Stop()
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l.mailBox.Stop()
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l.overflowQueue.Stop()
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close(l.quit)
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l.wg.Wait()
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}
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// EligibleToForward returns a bool indicating if the channel is able to
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// actively accept requests to forward HTLC's. We're able to forward HTLC's if
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// we know the remote party's next revocation point. Otherwise, we can't
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// initiate new channel state.
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func (l *channelLink) EligibleToForward() bool {
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return l.channel.RemoteNextRevocation() != nil
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}
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// sampleNetworkFee samples the current fee rate on the network to get into the
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// chain in a timely manner. The returned value is expressed in fee-per-kw, as
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// this is the native rate used when computing the fee for commitment
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// transactions, and the second-level HTLC transactions.
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func (l *channelLink) sampleNetworkFee() (btcutil.Amount, error) {
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// We'll first query for the sat/weight recommended to be confirmed
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// within 3blocks.
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feePerWeight, err := l.cfg.FeeEstimator.EstimateFeePerWeight(3)
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if err != nil {
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return 0, err
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}
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// Once we have this fee rate, we'll convert to sat-per-kw.
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feePerKw := feePerWeight * 1000
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log.Debugf("ChannelLink(%v): sampled fee rate for 3 block conf: %v "+
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"sat/kw", l, int64(feePerKw))
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return feePerKw, nil
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}
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// shouldAdjustCommitFee returns true if we should update our commitment fee to
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// match that of the network fee. We'll only update our commitment fee if the
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// network fee is +/- 10% to our network fee.
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func shouldAdjustCommitFee(netFee, chanFee btcutil.Amount) bool {
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switch {
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// If the network fee is greater than the commitment fee, then we'll
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// switch to it if it's at least 10% greater than the commit fee.
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case netFee > chanFee && netFee >= (chanFee+(chanFee*10)/100):
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return true
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// If the network fee is less than our commitment fee, then we'll
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// switch to it if it's at least 10% less than the commitment fee.
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case netFee < chanFee && netFee <= (chanFee-(chanFee*10)/100):
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return true
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// Otherwise, we won't modify our fee.
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default:
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return false
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}
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}
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// syncChanState attempts to synchronize channel states with the remote party.
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// This method is to be called upon reconnection after the initial funding
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// flow. We'll compare out commitment chains with the remote party, and re-send
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// either a danging commit signature, a revocation, or both.
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func (l *channelLink) syncChanStates() error {
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log.Infof("Attempting to re-resynchronize ChannelPoint(%v)",
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l.channel.ChannelPoint())
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// First, we'll generate our ChanSync message to send to the other
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// side. Based on this message, the remote party will decide if they
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// need to retransmit any data or not.
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localChanSyncMsg, err := l.channel.ChanSyncMsg()
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("unable to generate chan sync message for "+
|
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"ChannelPoint(%v)", l.channel.ChannelPoint())
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}
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if err := l.cfg.Peer.SendMessage(localChanSyncMsg); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("Unable to send chan sync message for "+
|
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"ChannelPoint(%v)", l.channel.ChannelPoint())
|
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}
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|
|
var msgsToReSend []lnwire.Message
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|
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// Next, we'll wait to receive the ChanSync message with a timeout
|
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// period. The first message sent MUST be the ChanSync message,
|
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// otherwise, we'll terminate the connection.
|
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chanSyncDeadline := time.After(time.Second * 30)
|
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select {
|
|
case msg := <-l.upstream:
|
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remoteChanSyncMsg, ok := msg.(*lnwire.ChannelReestablish)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("first message sent to sync "+
|
|
"should be ChannelReestablish, instead "+
|
|
"received: %T", msg)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If the remote party indicates that they think we haven't
|
|
// done any state updates yet, then we'll retransmit the
|
|
// funding locked message first. We do this, as at this point
|
|
// we can't be sure if they've really received the
|
|
// FundingLocked message.
|
|
if remoteChanSyncMsg.NextLocalCommitHeight == 1 &&
|
|
localChanSyncMsg.NextLocalCommitHeight == 1 &&
|
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!l.channel.IsPending() {
|
|
|
|
log.Infof("ChannelPoint(%v): resending "+
|
|
"FundingLocked message to peer",
|
|
l.channel.ChannelPoint())
|
|
|
|
nextRevocation, err := l.channel.NextRevocationKey()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("unable to create next "+
|
|
"revocation: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fundingLockedMsg := lnwire.NewFundingLocked(
|
|
l.ChanID(), nextRevocation,
|
|
)
|
|
err = l.cfg.Peer.SendMessage(fundingLockedMsg)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("unable to re-send "+
|
|
"FundingLocked: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// In any case, we'll then process their ChanSync message.
|
|
log.Infof("Received re-establishment message from remote side "+
|
|
"for channel(%v)", l.channel.ChannelPoint())
|
|
|
|
// We've just received a ChnSync message from the remote party,
|
|
// so we'll process the message in order to determine if we
|
|
// need to re-transmit any messages to the remote party.
|
|
msgsToReSend, err = l.channel.ProcessChanSyncMsg(remoteChanSyncMsg)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// TODO(roasbeef): check concrete type of error, act
|
|
// accordingly
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("unable to handle upstream reestablish "+
|
|
"message: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(msgsToReSend) > 0 {
|
|
log.Infof("Sending %v updates to synchronize the "+
|
|
"state for ChannelPoint(%v)", len(msgsToReSend),
|
|
l.channel.ChannelPoint())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If we have any messages to retransmit, we'll do so
|
|
// immediately so we return to a synchronized state as soon as
|
|
// possible.
|
|
for _, msg := range msgsToReSend {
|
|
l.cfg.Peer.SendMessage(msg)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case <-l.quit:
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("shutting down")
|
|
|
|
case <-chanSyncDeadline:
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("didn't receive ChannelReestablish before " +
|
|
"deadline")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// In order to prep for the fragment below, we'll note if we
|
|
// retransmitted any HTLC's settles earlier. We'll track them by the
|
|
// HTLC index of the remote party in order to avoid erroneously sending
|
|
// a duplicate settle.
|
|
htlcsSettled := make(map[uint64]struct{})
|
|
for _, msg := range msgsToReSend {
|
|
settleMsg, ok := msg.(*lnwire.UpdateFufillHTLC)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
// If this isn't a settle message, then we'll skip it.
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Otherwise, we'll note the ID of the HTLC we're settling so we
|
|
// don't duplicate it below.
|
|
htlcsSettled[settleMsg.ID] = struct{}{}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Now that we've synchronized our state, we'll check to see if
|
|
// there're any HTLC's that we received, but weren't able to settle
|
|
// directly the last time we were active. If we find any, then we'll
|
|
// send the settle message, then being to initiate a state transition.
|
|
//
|
|
// TODO(roasbeef): can later just inspect forwarding package
|
|
activeHTLCs := l.channel.ActiveHtlcs()
|
|
for _, htlc := range activeHTLCs {
|
|
if !htlc.Incoming {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Before we attempt to settle this HTLC, we'll check to see if
|
|
// we just re-sent it as part of the channel sync. If so, then
|
|
// we'll skip it.
|
|
if _, ok := htlcsSettled[htlc.HtlcIndex]; ok {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Now we'll check to if we we actually know the preimage if we
|
|
// don't then we'll skip it.
|
|
preimage, ok := l.cfg.PreimageCache.LookupPreimage(htlc.RHash[:])
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// At this point, we've found an unsettled HTLC that we know
|
|
// the preimage to, so we'll send a settle message to the
|
|
// remote party.
|
|
var p [32]byte
|
|
copy(p[:], preimage)
|
|
err := l.channel.SettleHTLC(p, htlc.HtlcIndex)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
l.fail("unable to settle htlc: %v", err)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We'll now mark the HTLC as settled in the invoice database,
|
|
// then send the settle message to the remote party.
|
|
err = l.cfg.Registry.SettleInvoice(htlc.RHash)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
l.fail("unable to settle invoice: %v", err)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
l.batchCounter++
|
|
l.cfg.Peer.SendMessage(&lnwire.UpdateFufillHTLC{
|
|
ChanID: l.ChanID(),
|
|
ID: htlc.HtlcIndex,
|
|
PaymentPreimage: p,
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// htlcManager is the primary goroutine which drives a channel's commitment
|
|
// update state-machine in response to messages received via several channels.
|
|
// This goroutine reads messages from the upstream (remote) peer, and also from
|
|
// downstream channel managed by the channel link. In the event that an htlc
|
|
// needs to be forwarded, then send-only forward handler is used which sends
|
|
// htlc packets to the switch. Additionally, the this goroutine handles acting
|
|
// upon all timeouts for any active HTLCs, manages the channel's revocation
|
|
// window, and also the htlc trickle queue+timer for this active channels.
|
|
//
|
|
// NOTE: This MUST be run as a goroutine.
|
|
func (l *channelLink) htlcManager() {
|
|
defer func() {
|
|
l.wg.Done()
|
|
l.cfg.BlockEpochs.Cancel()
|
|
log.Infof("ChannelLink(%v) has exited", l)
|
|
}()
|
|
|
|
log.Infof("HTLC manager for ChannelPoint(%v) started, "+
|
|
"bandwidth=%v", l.channel.ChannelPoint(), l.Bandwidth())
|
|
|
|
// TODO(roasbeef): need to call wipe chan whenever D/C?
|
|
|
|
// If this isn't the first time that this channel link has been
|
|
// created, then we'll need to check to see if we need to
|
|
// re-synchronize state with the remote peer. settledHtlcs is a map of
|
|
// HTLC's that we re-settled as part of the channel state sync.
|
|
if l.cfg.SyncStates {
|
|
// TODO(roasbeef): need to ensure haven't already settled?
|
|
if err := l.syncChanStates(); err != nil {
|
|
l.fail(err.Error())
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
batchTimer := time.NewTicker(50 * time.Millisecond)
|
|
defer batchTimer.Stop()
|
|
|
|
// TODO(roasbeef): fail chan in case of protocol violation
|
|
out:
|
|
for {
|
|
select {
|
|
|
|
// A new block has arrived, we'll check the network fee to see
|
|
// if we should adjust our commitment fee, and also update our
|
|
// track of the best current height.
|
|
case blockEpoch, ok := <-l.cfg.BlockEpochs.Epochs:
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
break out
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
l.bestHeight = uint32(blockEpoch.Height)
|
|
|
|
// If we're not the initiator of the channel, don't we
|
|
// don't control the fees, so we can ignore this.
|
|
if !l.channel.IsInitiator() {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If we are the initiator, then we'll sample the
|
|
// current fee rate to get into the chain within 3
|
|
// blocks.
|
|
feePerKw, err := l.sampleNetworkFee()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Errorf("unable to sample network fee: %v", err)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We'll check to see if we should update the fee rate
|
|
// based on our current set fee rate.
|
|
commitFee := l.channel.CommitFeeRate()
|
|
if !shouldAdjustCommitFee(feePerKw, commitFee) {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If we do, then we'll send a new UpdateFee message to
|
|
// the remote party, to be locked in with a new update.
|
|
if err := l.updateChannelFee(feePerKw); err != nil {
|
|
log.Errorf("unable to update fee rate: %v", err)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The underlying channel has notified us of a unilateral close
|
|
// carried out by the remote peer. In the case of such an
|
|
// event, we'll wipe the channel state from the peer, and mark
|
|
// the contract as fully settled. Afterwards we can exit.
|
|
case <-l.cfg.ChainEvents.UnilateralClosure:
|
|
log.Warnf("Remote peer has closed ChannelPoint(%v) on-chain",
|
|
l.channel.ChannelPoint())
|
|
|
|
// TODO(roasbeef): remove all together
|
|
go func() {
|
|
chanPoint := l.channel.ChannelPoint()
|
|
if err := l.cfg.Peer.WipeChannel(chanPoint); err != nil {
|
|
log.Errorf("unable to wipe channel %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}()
|
|
|
|
break out
|
|
|
|
case <-l.logCommitTick:
|
|
// If we haven't sent or received a new commitment
|
|
// update in some time, check to see if we have any
|
|
// pending updates we need to commit due to our
|
|
// commitment chains being desynchronized.
|
|
if l.channel.FullySynced() {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := l.updateCommitTx(); err != nil {
|
|
l.fail("unable to update commitment: %v", err)
|
|
break out
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case <-batchTimer.C:
|
|
// If the current batch is empty, then we have no work
|
|
// here.
|
|
if l.batchCounter == 0 {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Otherwise, attempt to extend the remote commitment
|
|
// chain including all the currently pending entries.
|
|
// If the send was unsuccessful, then abandon the
|
|
// update, waiting for the revocation window to open
|
|
// up.
|
|
if err := l.updateCommitTx(); err != nil {
|
|
l.fail("unable to update commitment: %v", err)
|
|
break out
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// A packet that previously overflowed the commitment
|
|
// transaction is now eligible for processing once again. So
|
|
// we'll attempt to re-process the packet in order to allow it
|
|
// to continue propagating within the network.
|
|
case packet := <-l.overflowQueue.outgoingPkts:
|
|
msg := packet.htlc.(*lnwire.UpdateAddHTLC)
|
|
log.Tracef("Reprocessing downstream add update "+
|
|
"with payment hash(%x)", msg.PaymentHash[:])
|
|
|
|
l.handleDownStreamPkt(packet, true)
|
|
|
|
// A message from the switch was just received. This indicates
|
|
// that the link is an intermediate hop in a multi-hop HTLC
|
|
// circuit.
|
|
case pkt := <-l.downstream:
|
|
// If we have non empty processing queue then we'll add
|
|
// this to the overflow rather than processing it
|
|
// directly. Once an active HTLC is either settled or
|
|
// failed, then we'll free up a new slot.
|
|
htlc, ok := pkt.htlc.(*lnwire.UpdateAddHTLC)
|
|
if ok && l.overflowQueue.Length() != 0 {
|
|
log.Infof("Downstream htlc add update with "+
|
|
"payment hash(%x) have been added to "+
|
|
"reprocessing queue, batch_size=%v",
|
|
htlc.PaymentHash[:],
|
|
l.batchCounter)
|
|
|
|
l.overflowQueue.AddPkt(pkt)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
l.handleDownStreamPkt(pkt, false)
|
|
|
|
// A message from the connected peer was just received. This
|
|
// indicates that we have a new incoming HTLC, either directly
|
|
// for us, or part of a multi-hop HTLC circuit.
|
|
case msg := <-l.upstream:
|
|
l.handleUpstreamMsg(msg)
|
|
|
|
// TODO(roasbeef): make distinct goroutine to handle?
|
|
case cmd := <-l.linkControl:
|
|
|
|
switch req := cmd.(type) {
|
|
case *policyUpdate:
|
|
// In order to avoid overriding a valid policy
|
|
// with a "null" field in the new policy, we'll
|
|
// only update to the set sub policy if the new
|
|
// value isn't uninitialized.
|
|
if req.policy.BaseFee != 0 {
|
|
l.cfg.FwrdingPolicy.BaseFee = req.policy.BaseFee
|
|
}
|
|
if req.policy.FeeRate != 0 {
|
|
l.cfg.FwrdingPolicy.FeeRate = req.policy.FeeRate
|
|
}
|
|
if req.policy.TimeLockDelta != 0 {
|
|
l.cfg.FwrdingPolicy.TimeLockDelta = req.policy.TimeLockDelta
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if req.done != nil {
|
|
close(req.done)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case <-l.quit:
|
|
break out
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// handleDownStreamPkt processes an HTLC packet sent from the downstream HTLC
|
|
// Switch. Possible messages sent by the switch include requests to forward new
|
|
// HTLCs, timeout previously cleared HTLCs, and finally to settle currently
|
|
// cleared HTLCs with the upstream peer.
|
|
//
|
|
// TODO(roasbeef): add sync ntfn to ensure switch always has consistent view?
|
|
func (l *channelLink) handleDownStreamPkt(pkt *htlcPacket, isReProcess bool) {
|
|
var isSettle bool
|
|
switch htlc := pkt.htlc.(type) {
|
|
case *lnwire.UpdateAddHTLC:
|
|
// A new payment has been initiated via the downstream channel,
|
|
// so we add the new HTLC to our local log, then update the
|
|
// commitment chains.
|
|
htlc.ChanID = l.ChanID()
|
|
index, err := l.channel.AddHTLC(htlc)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
switch err {
|
|
|
|
// The channels spare bandwidth is fully allocated, so
|
|
// we'll put this HTLC into the overflow queue.
|
|
case lnwallet.ErrMaxHTLCNumber:
|
|
log.Infof("Downstream htlc add update with "+
|
|
"payment hash(%x) have been added to "+
|
|
"reprocessing queue, batch: %v",
|
|
htlc.PaymentHash[:],
|
|
l.batchCounter)
|
|
|
|
l.overflowQueue.AddPkt(pkt)
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
// The HTLC was unable to be added to the state
|
|
// machine, as a result, we'll signal the switch to
|
|
// cancel the pending payment.
|
|
default:
|
|
log.Warnf("Unable to handle downstream add HTLC: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
var (
|
|
localFailure = false
|
|
reason lnwire.OpaqueReason
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
failure := lnwire.NewTemporaryChannelFailure(nil)
|
|
|
|
// Encrypt the error back to the source unless the payment was
|
|
// generated locally.
|
|
if pkt.obfuscator == nil {
|
|
var b bytes.Buffer
|
|
err := lnwire.EncodeFailure(&b, failure, 0)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Errorf("unable to encode failure: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
reason = lnwire.OpaqueReason(b.Bytes())
|
|
localFailure = true
|
|
} else {
|
|
var err error
|
|
reason, err = pkt.obfuscator.EncryptFirstHop(failure)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Errorf("unable to obfuscate error: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
failPkt := &htlcPacket{
|
|
incomingChanID: pkt.incomingChanID,
|
|
incomingHTLCID: pkt.incomingHTLCID,
|
|
amount: htlc.Amount,
|
|
isRouted: true,
|
|
localFailure: localFailure,
|
|
htlc: &lnwire.UpdateFailHTLC{
|
|
Reason: reason,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TODO(roasbeef): need to identify if sent
|
|
// from switch so don't need to obfuscate
|
|
go l.cfg.Switch.forward(failPkt)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log.Tracef("Received downstream htlc: payment_hash=%x, "+
|
|
"local_log_index=%v, batch_size=%v",
|
|
htlc.PaymentHash[:], index, l.batchCounter+1)
|
|
|
|
// Create circuit (remember the path) in order to forward settle/fail
|
|
// packet back.
|
|
l.cfg.Switch.addCircuit(&PaymentCircuit{
|
|
PaymentHash: htlc.PaymentHash,
|
|
IncomingChanID: pkt.incomingChanID,
|
|
IncomingHTLCID: pkt.incomingHTLCID,
|
|
OutgoingChanID: l.ShortChanID(),
|
|
OutgoingHTLCID: index,
|
|
ErrorEncrypter: pkt.obfuscator,
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
htlc.ID = index
|
|
l.cfg.Peer.SendMessage(htlc)
|
|
|
|
case *lnwire.UpdateFufillHTLC:
|
|
// An HTLC we forward to the switch has just settled somewhere
|
|
// upstream. Therefore we settle the HTLC within the our local
|
|
// state machine.
|
|
err := l.channel.SettleHTLC(htlc.PaymentPreimage, pkt.incomingHTLCID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// TODO(roasbeef): broadcast on-chain
|
|
l.fail("unable to settle incoming HTLC: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// With the HTLC settled, we'll need to populate the wire
|
|
// message to target the specific channel and HTLC to be
|
|
// cancelled.
|
|
htlc.ChanID = l.ChanID()
|
|
htlc.ID = pkt.incomingHTLCID
|
|
|
|
// Then we send the HTLC settle message to the connected peer
|
|
// so we can continue the propagation of the settle message.
|
|
l.cfg.Peer.SendMessage(htlc)
|
|
isSettle = true
|
|
|
|
case *lnwire.UpdateFailHTLC:
|
|
// An HTLC cancellation has been triggered somewhere upstream,
|
|
// we'll remove then HTLC from our local state machine.
|
|
err := l.channel.FailHTLC(pkt.incomingHTLCID, htlc.Reason)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Errorf("unable to cancel HTLC: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// With the HTLC removed, we'll need to populate the wire
|
|
// message to target the specific channel and HTLC to be
|
|
// cancelled. The "Reason" field will have already been set
|
|
// within the switch.
|
|
htlc.ChanID = l.ChanID()
|
|
htlc.ID = pkt.incomingHTLCID
|
|
|
|
// Finally, we send the HTLC message to the peer which
|
|
// initially created the HTLC.
|
|
l.cfg.Peer.SendMessage(htlc)
|
|
isSettle = true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
l.batchCounter++
|
|
|
|
// If this newly added update exceeds the min batch size for adds, or
|
|
// this is a settle request, then initiate an update.
|
|
if l.batchCounter >= 10 || isSettle {
|
|
if err := l.updateCommitTx(); err != nil {
|
|
l.fail("unable to update commitment: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// handleUpstreamMsg processes wire messages related to commitment state
|
|
// updates from the upstream peer. The upstream peer is the peer whom we have a
|
|
// direct channel with, updating our respective commitment chains.
|
|
func (l *channelLink) handleUpstreamMsg(msg lnwire.Message) {
|
|
switch msg := msg.(type) {
|
|
|
|
case *lnwire.UpdateAddHTLC:
|
|
// We just received an add request from an upstream peer, so we
|
|
// add it to our state machine, then add the HTLC to our
|
|
// "settle" list in the event that we know the preimage.
|
|
index, err := l.channel.ReceiveHTLC(msg)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
l.fail("unable to handle upstream add HTLC: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log.Tracef("Receive upstream htlc with payment hash(%x), "+
|
|
"assigning index: %v", msg.PaymentHash[:], index)
|
|
|
|
case *lnwire.UpdateFufillHTLC:
|
|
pre := msg.PaymentPreimage
|
|
idx := msg.ID
|
|
if err := l.channel.ReceiveHTLCSettle(pre, idx); err != nil {
|
|
// TODO(roasbeef): broadcast on-chain
|
|
l.fail("unable to handle upstream settle HTLC: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TODO(roasbeef): pipeline to switch
|
|
|
|
// As we've learned of a new preimage for the first time, we'll
|
|
// add it to to our preimage cache. By doing this, we ensure
|
|
// any contested contracts watched by any on-chain arbitrators
|
|
// can now sweep this HTLC on-chain.
|
|
go func() {
|
|
err := l.cfg.PreimageCache.AddPreimage(pre[:])
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Errorf("unable to add preimage=%x to "+
|
|
"cache", pre[:])
|
|
}
|
|
}()
|
|
|
|
case *lnwire.UpdateFailMalformedHTLC:
|
|
// Convert the failure type encoded within the HTLC fail
|
|
// message to the proper generic lnwire error code.
|
|
var failure lnwire.FailureMessage
|
|
switch msg.FailureCode {
|
|
case lnwire.CodeInvalidOnionVersion:
|
|
failure = &lnwire.FailInvalidOnionVersion{
|
|
OnionSHA256: msg.ShaOnionBlob,
|
|
}
|
|
case lnwire.CodeInvalidOnionHmac:
|
|
failure = &lnwire.FailInvalidOnionHmac{
|
|
OnionSHA256: msg.ShaOnionBlob,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case lnwire.CodeInvalidOnionKey:
|
|
failure = &lnwire.FailInvalidOnionKey{
|
|
OnionSHA256: msg.ShaOnionBlob,
|
|
}
|
|
default:
|
|
log.Errorf("Unknown failure code: %v", msg.FailureCode)
|
|
failure = &lnwire.FailTemporaryChannelFailure{}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// With the error parsed, we'll convert the into it's opaque
|
|
// form.
|
|
var b bytes.Buffer
|
|
if err := lnwire.EncodeFailure(&b, failure, 0); err != nil {
|
|
log.Errorf("unable to encode malformed error: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If remote side have been unable to parse the onion blob we
|
|
// have sent to it, than we should transform the malformed HTLC
|
|
// message to the usual HTLC fail message.
|
|
err := l.channel.ReceiveFailHTLC(msg.ID, b.Bytes())
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
l.fail("unable to handle upstream fail HTLC: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case *lnwire.UpdateFailHTLC:
|
|
idx := msg.ID
|
|
err := l.channel.ReceiveFailHTLC(idx, msg.Reason[:])
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
l.fail("unable to handle upstream fail HTLC: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case *lnwire.CommitSig:
|
|
// We just received a new updates to our local commitment
|
|
// chain, validate this new commitment, closing the link if
|
|
// invalid.
|
|
err := l.channel.ReceiveNewCommitment(msg.CommitSig, msg.HtlcSigs)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// If we were unable to reconstruct their proposed
|
|
// commitment, then we'll examine the type of error. If
|
|
// it's an InvalidCommitSigError, then we'll send a
|
|
// direct error.
|
|
//
|
|
// TODO(roasbeef): force close chan
|
|
if _, ok := err.(*lnwallet.InvalidCommitSigError); ok {
|
|
l.cfg.Peer.SendMessage(&lnwire.Error{
|
|
ChanID: l.ChanID(),
|
|
Data: []byte(err.Error()),
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
l.fail("ChannelPoint(%v): unable to accept new "+
|
|
"commitment: %v", l.channel.ChannelPoint(), err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// As we've just just accepted a new state, we'll now
|
|
// immediately send the remote peer a revocation for our prior
|
|
// state.
|
|
nextRevocation, currentHtlcs, err := l.channel.RevokeCurrentCommitment()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Errorf("unable to revoke commitment: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
l.cfg.Peer.SendMessage(nextRevocation)
|
|
|
|
// Since we just revoked our commitment, we may have a new set
|
|
// of HTLC's on our commitment, so we'll send them over our
|
|
// HTLC update channel so any callers can be notified.
|
|
select {
|
|
case l.htlcUpdates <- currentHtlcs:
|
|
case <-l.quit:
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// As we've just received a commitment signature, we'll
|
|
// re-start the log commit timer to wake up the main processing
|
|
// loop to check if we need to send a commitment signature as
|
|
// we owe one.
|
|
//
|
|
// TODO(roasbeef): instead after revocation?
|
|
if !l.logCommitTimer.Stop() {
|
|
select {
|
|
case <-l.logCommitTimer.C:
|
|
default:
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
l.logCommitTimer.Reset(300 * time.Millisecond)
|
|
l.logCommitTick = l.logCommitTimer.C
|
|
|
|
// If both commitment chains are fully synced from our PoV,
|
|
// then we don't need to reply with a signature as both sides
|
|
// already have a commitment with the latest accepted l.
|
|
if l.channel.FullySynced() {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Otherwise, the remote party initiated the state transition,
|
|
// so we'll reply with a signature to provide them with their
|
|
// version of the latest commitment.
|
|
if err := l.updateCommitTx(); err != nil {
|
|
l.fail("unable to update commitment: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case *lnwire.RevokeAndAck:
|
|
// We've received a revocation from the remote chain, if valid,
|
|
// this moves the remote chain forward, and expands our
|
|
// revocation window.
|
|
htlcs, err := l.channel.ReceiveRevocation(msg)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
l.fail("unable to accept revocation: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// After we treat HTLCs as included in both remote/local
|
|
// commitment transactions they might be safely propagated over
|
|
// htlc switch or settled if our node was last node in htlc
|
|
// path.
|
|
htlcsToForward := l.processLockedInHtlcs(htlcs)
|
|
go func() {
|
|
log.Debugf("ChannelPoint(%v) forwarding %v HTLC's",
|
|
l.channel.ChannelPoint(), len(htlcsToForward))
|
|
for _, packet := range htlcsToForward {
|
|
if err := l.cfg.Switch.forward(packet); err != nil {
|
|
// TODO(roasbeef): cancel back htlc
|
|
// under certain conditions?
|
|
log.Errorf("channel link(%v): "+
|
|
"unhandled error while forwarding "+
|
|
"htlc packet over htlc "+
|
|
"switch: %v", l, err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}()
|
|
|
|
case *lnwire.UpdateFee:
|
|
// We received fee update from peer. If we are the initiator we
|
|
// will fail the channel, if not we will apply the update.
|
|
fee := btcutil.Amount(msg.FeePerKw)
|
|
if err := l.channel.ReceiveUpdateFee(fee); err != nil {
|
|
l.fail("error receiving fee update: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// updateCommitTx signs, then sends an update to the remote peer adding a new
|
|
// commitment to their commitment chain which includes all the latest updates
|
|
// we've received+processed up to this point.
|
|
func (l *channelLink) updateCommitTx() error {
|
|
theirCommitSig, htlcSigs, err := l.channel.SignNextCommitment()
|
|
if err == lnwallet.ErrNoWindow {
|
|
log.Tracef("revocation window exhausted, unable to send %v",
|
|
l.batchCounter)
|
|
return nil
|
|
} else if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
commitSig := &lnwire.CommitSig{
|
|
ChanID: l.ChanID(),
|
|
CommitSig: theirCommitSig,
|
|
HtlcSigs: htlcSigs,
|
|
}
|
|
l.cfg.Peer.SendMessage(commitSig)
|
|
|
|
// We've just initiated a state transition, attempt to stop the
|
|
// logCommitTimer. If the timer already ticked, then we'll consume the
|
|
// value, dropping
|
|
if l.logCommitTimer != nil && !l.logCommitTimer.Stop() {
|
|
select {
|
|
case <-l.logCommitTimer.C:
|
|
default:
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
l.logCommitTick = nil
|
|
|
|
// Finally, clear our the current batch, so we can accurately make
|
|
// further batch flushing decisions.
|
|
l.batchCounter = 0
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Peer returns the representation of remote peer with which we have the
|
|
// channel link opened.
|
|
//
|
|
// NOTE: Part of the ChannelLink interface.
|
|
func (l *channelLink) Peer() Peer {
|
|
return l.cfg.Peer
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ShortChanID returns the short channel ID for the channel link. The short
|
|
// channel ID encodes the exact location in the main chain that the original
|
|
// funding output can be found.
|
|
//
|
|
// NOTE: Part of the ChannelLink interface.
|
|
func (l *channelLink) ShortChanID() lnwire.ShortChannelID {
|
|
l.RLock()
|
|
defer l.RUnlock()
|
|
return l.shortChanID
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// UpdateShortChanID updates the short channel ID for a link. This may be
|
|
// required in the event that a link is created before the short chan ID for it
|
|
// is known, or a re-org occurs, and the funding transaction changes location
|
|
// within the chain.
|
|
//
|
|
// NOTE: Part of the ChannelLink interface.
|
|
func (l *channelLink) UpdateShortChanID(sid lnwire.ShortChannelID) {
|
|
l.Lock()
|
|
defer l.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
log.Infof("Updating short chan ID for ChannelPoint(%v)", l)
|
|
|
|
l.shortChanID = sid
|
|
|
|
go func() {
|
|
err := l.cfg.UpdateContractSignals(&contractcourt.ContractSignals{
|
|
HtlcUpdates: l.htlcUpdates,
|
|
ShortChanID: l.channel.ShortChanID(),
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Errorf("Unable to update signals for "+
|
|
"ChannelLink(%v)", l)
|
|
}
|
|
}()
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ChanID returns the channel ID for the channel link. The channel ID is a more
|
|
// compact representation of a channel's full outpoint.
|
|
//
|
|
// NOTE: Part of the ChannelLink interface.
|
|
func (l *channelLink) ChanID() lnwire.ChannelID {
|
|
return lnwire.NewChanIDFromOutPoint(l.channel.ChannelPoint())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// getBandwidthCmd is a wrapper for get bandwidth handler.
|
|
type getBandwidthCmd struct {
|
|
resp chan lnwire.MilliSatoshi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Bandwidth returns the total amount that can flow through the channel link at
|
|
// this given instance. The value returned is expressed in millisatoshi and can
|
|
// be used by callers when making forwarding decisions to determine if a link
|
|
// can accept an HTLC.
|
|
//
|
|
// NOTE: Part of the ChannelLink interface.
|
|
func (l *channelLink) Bandwidth() lnwire.MilliSatoshi {
|
|
// TODO(roasbeef): subtract reserve
|
|
channelBandwidth := l.channel.AvailableBalance()
|
|
overflowBandwidth := l.overflowQueue.TotalHtlcAmount()
|
|
|
|
return channelBandwidth - overflowBandwidth
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// policyUpdate is a message sent to a channel link when an outside sub-system
|
|
// wishes to update the current forwarding policy.
|
|
type policyUpdate struct {
|
|
policy ForwardingPolicy
|
|
|
|
done chan struct{}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// UpdateForwardingPolicy updates the forwarding policy for the target
|
|
// ChannelLink. Once updated, the link will use the new forwarding policy to
|
|
// govern if it an incoming HTLC should be forwarded or not. Note that this
|
|
// processing of the new policy will ensure that uninitialized fields in the
|
|
// passed policy won't override already initialized fields in the current
|
|
// policy.
|
|
//
|
|
// NOTE: Part of the ChannelLink interface.
|
|
func (l *channelLink) UpdateForwardingPolicy(newPolicy ForwardingPolicy) {
|
|
cmd := &policyUpdate{
|
|
policy: newPolicy,
|
|
done: make(chan struct{}),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
select {
|
|
case l.linkControl <- cmd:
|
|
case <-l.quit:
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
select {
|
|
case <-cmd.done:
|
|
case <-l.quit:
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Stats returns the statistics of channel link.
|
|
//
|
|
// NOTE: Part of the ChannelLink interface.
|
|
func (l *channelLink) Stats() (uint64, lnwire.MilliSatoshi, lnwire.MilliSatoshi) {
|
|
snapshot := l.channel.StateSnapshot()
|
|
|
|
return snapshot.ChannelCommitment.CommitHeight,
|
|
snapshot.TotalMSatSent,
|
|
snapshot.TotalMSatReceived
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// String returns the string representation of channel link.
|
|
//
|
|
// NOTE: Part of the ChannelLink interface.
|
|
func (l *channelLink) String() string {
|
|
return l.channel.ChannelPoint().String()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// HandleSwitchPacket handles the switch packets. This packets which might be
|
|
// forwarded to us from another channel link in case the htlc update came from
|
|
// another peer or if the update was created by user
|
|
//
|
|
// NOTE: Part of the ChannelLink interface.
|
|
func (l *channelLink) HandleSwitchPacket(packet *htlcPacket) {
|
|
l.mailBox.AddPacket(packet)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// HandleChannelUpdate handles the htlc requests as settle/add/fail which sent
|
|
// to us from remote peer we have a channel with.
|
|
//
|
|
// NOTE: Part of the ChannelLink interface.
|
|
func (l *channelLink) HandleChannelUpdate(message lnwire.Message) {
|
|
l.mailBox.AddMessage(message)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// updateChannelFee updates the commitment fee-per-kw on this channel by
|
|
// committing to an update_fee message.
|
|
func (l *channelLink) updateChannelFee(feePerKw btcutil.Amount) error {
|
|
|
|
log.Infof("ChannelPoint(%v): updating commit fee to %v sat/kw", l,
|
|
feePerKw)
|
|
|
|
// We skip sending the UpdateFee message if the channel is not
|
|
// currently eligable to forward messages.
|
|
if !l.EligibleToForward() {
|
|
log.Debugf("ChannelPoint(%v): skipping fee update for " +
|
|
"inactive channel")
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// First, we'll update the local fee on our commitment.
|
|
if err := l.channel.UpdateFee(feePerKw); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We'll then attempt to send a new UpdateFee message, and also lock it
|
|
// in immediately by triggering a commitment update.
|
|
msg := lnwire.NewUpdateFee(l.ChanID(), uint32(feePerKw))
|
|
if err := l.cfg.Peer.SendMessage(msg); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
return l.updateCommitTx()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// processLockedInHtlcs serially processes each of the log updates which have
|
|
// been "locked-in". An HTLC is considered locked-in once it has been fully
|
|
// committed to in both the remote and local commitment state. Once a channel
|
|
// updates is locked-in, then it can be acted upon, meaning: settling HTLCs,
|
|
// cancelling them, or forwarding new HTLCs to the next hop.
|
|
func (l *channelLink) processLockedInHtlcs(
|
|
paymentDescriptors []*lnwallet.PaymentDescriptor) []*htlcPacket {
|
|
|
|
var (
|
|
needUpdate bool
|
|
packetsToForward []*htlcPacket
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
for _, pd := range paymentDescriptors {
|
|
// TODO(roasbeef): rework log entries to a shared
|
|
// interface.
|
|
switch pd.EntryType {
|
|
|
|
// A settle for an HTLC we previously forwarded HTLC has been
|
|
// received. So we'll forward the HTLC to the switch which
|
|
// will handle propagating the settle to the prior hop.
|
|
case lnwallet.Settle:
|
|
settlePacket := &htlcPacket{
|
|
outgoingChanID: l.ShortChanID(),
|
|
outgoingHTLCID: pd.ParentIndex,
|
|
amount: pd.Amount,
|
|
htlc: &lnwire.UpdateFufillHTLC{
|
|
PaymentPreimage: pd.RPreimage,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Add the packet to the batch to be forwarded, and
|
|
// notify the overflow queue that a spare spot has been
|
|
// freed up within the commitment state.
|
|
packetsToForward = append(packetsToForward, settlePacket)
|
|
l.overflowQueue.SignalFreeSlot()
|
|
|
|
// A failureCode message for a previously forwarded HTLC has been
|
|
// received. As a result a new slot will be freed up in our
|
|
// commitment state, so we'll forward this to the switch so the
|
|
// backwards undo can continue.
|
|
case lnwallet.Fail:
|
|
// Fetch the reason the HTLC was cancelled so we can
|
|
// continue to propagate it.
|
|
failPacket := &htlcPacket{
|
|
outgoingChanID: l.ShortChanID(),
|
|
outgoingHTLCID: pd.ParentIndex,
|
|
amount: pd.Amount,
|
|
htlc: &lnwire.UpdateFailHTLC{
|
|
Reason: lnwire.OpaqueReason(pd.FailReason),
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Add the packet to the batch to be forwarded, and
|
|
// notify the overflow queue that a spare spot has been
|
|
// freed up within the commitment state.
|
|
packetsToForward = append(packetsToForward, failPacket)
|
|
l.overflowQueue.SignalFreeSlot()
|
|
|
|
// An incoming HTLC add has been full-locked in. As a result we
|
|
// can now examine the forwarding details of the HTLC, and the
|
|
// HTLC itself to decide if: we should forward it, cancel it,
|
|
// or are able to settle it (and it adheres to our fee related
|
|
// constraints).
|
|
case lnwallet.Add:
|
|
// Fetch the onion blob that was included within this
|
|
// processed payment descriptor.
|
|
var onionBlob [lnwire.OnionPacketSize]byte
|
|
copy(onionBlob[:], pd.OnionBlob)
|
|
|
|
// Retrieve onion obfuscator from onion blob in order
|
|
// to produce initial obfuscation of the onion
|
|
// failureCode.
|
|
onionReader := bytes.NewReader(onionBlob[:])
|
|
obfuscator, failureCode := l.cfg.DecodeOnionObfuscator(
|
|
onionReader,
|
|
)
|
|
if failureCode != lnwire.CodeNone {
|
|
// If we're unable to process the onion blob
|
|
// than we should send the malformed htlc error
|
|
// to payment sender.
|
|
l.sendMalformedHTLCError(pd.HtlcIndex, failureCode,
|
|
onionBlob[:])
|
|
needUpdate = true
|
|
|
|
log.Errorf("unable to decode onion "+
|
|
"obfuscator: %v", failureCode)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Before adding the new htlc to the state machine,
|
|
// parse the onion object in order to obtain the
|
|
// routing information with DecodeHopIterator function
|
|
// which process the Sphinx packet.
|
|
//
|
|
// We include the payment hash of the htlc as it's
|
|
// authenticated within the Sphinx packet itself as
|
|
// associated data in order to thwart attempts a replay
|
|
// attacks. In the case of a replay, an attacker is
|
|
// *forced* to use the same payment hash twice, thereby
|
|
// losing their money entirely.
|
|
onionReader = bytes.NewReader(onionBlob[:])
|
|
chanIterator, failureCode := l.cfg.DecodeHopIterator(
|
|
onionReader, pd.RHash[:],
|
|
)
|
|
if failureCode != lnwire.CodeNone {
|
|
// If we're unable to process the onion blob
|
|
// than we should send the malformed htlc error
|
|
// to payment sender.
|
|
l.sendMalformedHTLCError(pd.HtlcIndex, failureCode,
|
|
onionBlob[:])
|
|
needUpdate = true
|
|
|
|
log.Errorf("unable to decode onion hop "+
|
|
"iterator: %v", failureCode)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
heightNow := l.bestHeight
|
|
|
|
fwdInfo := chanIterator.ForwardingInstructions()
|
|
switch fwdInfo.NextHop {
|
|
case exitHop:
|
|
if l.cfg.DebugHTLC && l.cfg.HodlHTLC {
|
|
log.Warnf("hodl HTLC mode enabled, " +
|
|
"will not attempt to settle " +
|
|
"HTLC with sender")
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// First, we'll check the expiry of the HTLC
|
|
// itself against, the current block height. If
|
|
// the timeout is too soon, then we'll reject
|
|
// the HTLC.
|
|
if pd.Timeout-expiryGraceDelta <= heightNow {
|
|
log.Errorf("htlc(%x) has an expiry "+
|
|
"that's too soon: expiry=%v, "+
|
|
"best_height=%v", pd.RHash[:],
|
|
pd.Timeout, heightNow)
|
|
|
|
failure := lnwire.FailFinalIncorrectCltvExpiry{}
|
|
l.sendHTLCError(pd.HtlcIndex, &failure, obfuscator)
|
|
needUpdate = true
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We're the designated payment destination.
|
|
// Therefore we attempt to see if we have an
|
|
// invoice locally which'll allow us to settle
|
|
// this htlc.
|
|
invoiceHash := chainhash.Hash(pd.RHash)
|
|
invoice, err := l.cfg.Registry.LookupInvoice(invoiceHash)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Errorf("unable to query invoice registry: "+
|
|
" %v", err)
|
|
failure := lnwire.FailUnknownPaymentHash{}
|
|
l.sendHTLCError(pd.HtlcIndex, failure, obfuscator)
|
|
needUpdate = true
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If this invoice has already been settled,
|
|
// then we'll reject it as we don't allow an
|
|
// invoice to be paid twice.
|
|
if invoice.Terms.Settled == true {
|
|
log.Warnf("Rejecting duplicate "+
|
|
"payment for hash=%x", pd.RHash[:])
|
|
failure := lnwire.FailUnknownPaymentHash{}
|
|
l.sendHTLCError(
|
|
pd.HtlcIndex, failure, obfuscator,
|
|
)
|
|
needUpdate = true
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If we're not currently in debug mode, and
|
|
// the extended htlc doesn't meet the value
|
|
// requested, then we'll fail the htlc.
|
|
// Otherwise, we settle this htlc within our
|
|
// local state update log, then send the update
|
|
// entry to the remote party.
|
|
//
|
|
// NOTE: We make an exception when the value
|
|
// requested by the invoice is zero. This means
|
|
// the invoice allows the payee to specify the
|
|
// amount of satoshis they wish to send.
|
|
// So since we expect the htlc to have a
|
|
// different amount, we should not fail.
|
|
if !l.cfg.DebugHTLC && invoice.Terms.Value > 0 &&
|
|
pd.Amount < invoice.Terms.Value {
|
|
log.Errorf("rejecting htlc due to incorrect "+
|
|
"amount: expected %v, received %v",
|
|
invoice.Terms.Value, pd.Amount)
|
|
failure := lnwire.FailIncorrectPaymentAmount{}
|
|
l.sendHTLCError(pd.HtlcIndex, failure, obfuscator)
|
|
needUpdate = true
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// As we're the exit hop, we'll double check
|
|
// the hop-payload included in the HTLC to
|
|
// ensure that it was crafted correctly by the
|
|
// sender and matches the HTLC we were
|
|
// extended.
|
|
//
|
|
// NOTE: We make an exception when the value
|
|
// requested by the invoice is zero. This means
|
|
// the invoice allows the payee to specify the
|
|
// amount of satoshis they wish to send.
|
|
// So since we expect the htlc to have a
|
|
// different amount, we should not fail.
|
|
if !l.cfg.DebugHTLC && invoice.Terms.Value > 0 &&
|
|
fwdInfo.AmountToForward != invoice.Terms.Value {
|
|
|
|
log.Errorf("Onion payload of incoming "+
|
|
"htlc(%x) has incorrect value: "+
|
|
"expected %v, got %v", pd.RHash,
|
|
invoice.Terms.Value,
|
|
fwdInfo.AmountToForward)
|
|
|
|
failure := lnwire.FailIncorrectPaymentAmount{}
|
|
l.sendHTLCError(pd.HtlcIndex, failure, obfuscator)
|
|
needUpdate = true
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We'll also ensure that our time-lock value
|
|
// has been computed correctly.
|
|
//
|
|
// TODO(roasbeef): also accept global default?
|
|
expectedHeight := heightNow + l.cfg.FwrdingPolicy.TimeLockDelta
|
|
if !l.cfg.DebugHTLC {
|
|
switch {
|
|
case fwdInfo.OutgoingCTLV < expectedHeight:
|
|
log.Errorf("Onion payload of incoming "+
|
|
"htlc(%x) has incorrect time-lock: "+
|
|
"expected %v, got %v",
|
|
pd.RHash[:], expectedHeight,
|
|
fwdInfo.OutgoingCTLV)
|
|
|
|
failure := lnwire.NewFinalIncorrectCltvExpiry(
|
|
fwdInfo.OutgoingCTLV,
|
|
)
|
|
l.sendHTLCError(pd.HtlcIndex, failure, obfuscator)
|
|
needUpdate = true
|
|
continue
|
|
case pd.Timeout != fwdInfo.OutgoingCTLV:
|
|
log.Errorf("HTLC(%x) has incorrect "+
|
|
"time-lock: expected %v, got %v",
|
|
pd.RHash[:], pd.Timeout,
|
|
fwdInfo.OutgoingCTLV)
|
|
|
|
failure := lnwire.NewFinalIncorrectCltvExpiry(
|
|
fwdInfo.OutgoingCTLV,
|
|
)
|
|
l.sendHTLCError(pd.HtlcIndex, failure, obfuscator)
|
|
needUpdate = true
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
preimage := invoice.Terms.PaymentPreimage
|
|
err = l.channel.SettleHTLC(preimage, pd.HtlcIndex)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
l.fail("unable to settle htlc: %v", err)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Notify the invoiceRegistry of the invoices
|
|
// we just settled with this latest commitment
|
|
// update.
|
|
err = l.cfg.Registry.SettleInvoice(invoiceHash)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
l.fail("unable to settle invoice: %v", err)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// HTLC was successfully settled locally send
|
|
// notification about it remote peer.
|
|
l.cfg.Peer.SendMessage(&lnwire.UpdateFufillHTLC{
|
|
ChanID: l.ChanID(),
|
|
ID: pd.HtlcIndex,
|
|
PaymentPreimage: preimage,
|
|
})
|
|
needUpdate = true
|
|
|
|
// There are additional channels left within this
|
|
// route. So we'll verify that our forwarding
|
|
// constraints have been properly met by by this
|
|
// incoming HTLC.
|
|
default:
|
|
// We want to avoid forwarding an HTLC which
|
|
// will expire in the near future, so we'll
|
|
// reject an HTLC if its expiration time is too
|
|
// close to the current height.
|
|
timeDelta := l.cfg.FwrdingPolicy.TimeLockDelta
|
|
if pd.Timeout-timeDelta <= heightNow {
|
|
log.Errorf("htlc(%x) has an expiry "+
|
|
"that's too soon: outgoing_expiry=%v, "+
|
|
"best_height=%v", pd.RHash[:],
|
|
pd.Timeout-timeDelta, heightNow)
|
|
|
|
var failure lnwire.FailureMessage
|
|
update, err := l.cfg.GetLastChannelUpdate()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
failure = lnwire.NewTemporaryChannelFailure(nil)
|
|
} else {
|
|
failure = lnwire.NewExpiryTooSoon(*update)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
l.sendHTLCError(pd.HtlcIndex, failure, obfuscator)
|
|
needUpdate = true
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// As our second sanity check, we'll ensure that
|
|
// the passed HTLC isn't too small. If so, then
|
|
// we'll cancel the HTLC directly.
|
|
if pd.Amount < l.cfg.FwrdingPolicy.MinHTLC {
|
|
log.Errorf("Incoming htlc(%x) is too "+
|
|
"small: min_htlc=%v, htlc_value=%v",
|
|
pd.RHash[:], l.cfg.FwrdingPolicy.MinHTLC,
|
|
pd.Amount)
|
|
|
|
// As part of the returned error, we'll
|
|
// send our latest routing policy so
|
|
// the sending node obtains the most up
|
|
// to date data.
|
|
var failure lnwire.FailureMessage
|
|
update, err := l.cfg.GetLastChannelUpdate()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
failure = lnwire.NewTemporaryChannelFailure(nil)
|
|
} else {
|
|
failure = lnwire.NewAmountBelowMinimum(
|
|
pd.Amount, *update)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
l.sendHTLCError(pd.HtlcIndex, failure, obfuscator)
|
|
needUpdate = true
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Next, using the amount of the incoming HTLC,
|
|
// we'll calculate the expected fee this
|
|
// incoming HTLC must carry in order to be
|
|
// accepted.
|
|
expectedFee := ExpectedFee(
|
|
l.cfg.FwrdingPolicy,
|
|
fwdInfo.AmountToForward,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// If the amount of the incoming HTLC, minus
|
|
// our expected fee isn't equal to the
|
|
// forwarding instructions, then either the
|
|
// values have been tampered with, or the send
|
|
// used incorrect/dated information to
|
|
// construct the forwarding information for
|
|
// this hop. In any case, we'll cancel this
|
|
// HTLC.
|
|
if pd.Amount-expectedFee < fwdInfo.AmountToForward {
|
|
log.Errorf("Incoming htlc(%x) has "+
|
|
"insufficient fee: expected "+
|
|
"%v, got %v", pd.RHash[:],
|
|
int64(expectedFee),
|
|
int64(pd.Amount-fwdInfo.AmountToForward))
|
|
|
|
// As part of the returned error, we'll
|
|
// send our latest routing policy so
|
|
// the sending node obtains the most up
|
|
// to date data.
|
|
var failure lnwire.FailureMessage
|
|
update, err := l.cfg.GetLastChannelUpdate()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
failure = lnwire.NewTemporaryChannelFailure(nil)
|
|
} else {
|
|
failure = lnwire.NewFeeInsufficient(pd.Amount,
|
|
*update)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
l.sendHTLCError(pd.HtlcIndex, failure, obfuscator)
|
|
needUpdate = true
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Finally, we'll ensure that the time-lock on
|
|
// the outgoing HTLC meets the following
|
|
// constraint: the incoming time-lock minus our
|
|
// time-lock delta should equal the outgoing
|
|
// time lock. Otherwise, whether the sender
|
|
// messed up, or an intermediate node tampered
|
|
// with the HTLC.
|
|
if pd.Timeout-timeDelta < fwdInfo.OutgoingCTLV {
|
|
log.Errorf("Incoming htlc(%x) has "+
|
|
"incorrect time-lock value: "+
|
|
"expected at least %v block delta, "+
|
|
"got %v block delta", pd.RHash[:],
|
|
timeDelta,
|
|
pd.Timeout-fwdInfo.OutgoingCTLV)
|
|
|
|
// Grab the latest routing policy so
|
|
// the sending node is up to date with
|
|
// our current policy.
|
|
update, err := l.cfg.GetLastChannelUpdate()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
l.fail("unable to create channel update "+
|
|
"while handling the error: %v", err)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
failure := lnwire.NewIncorrectCltvExpiry(
|
|
pd.Timeout, *update)
|
|
l.sendHTLCError(pd.HtlcIndex, failure, obfuscator)
|
|
needUpdate = true
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TODO(roasbeef): also add max timeout value
|
|
|
|
// With all our forwarding constraints met,
|
|
// we'll create the outgoing HTLC using the
|
|
// parameters as specified in the forwarding
|
|
// info.
|
|
addMsg := &lnwire.UpdateAddHTLC{
|
|
Expiry: fwdInfo.OutgoingCTLV,
|
|
Amount: fwdInfo.AmountToForward,
|
|
PaymentHash: pd.RHash,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Finally, we'll encode the onion packet for
|
|
// the _next_ hop using the hop iterator
|
|
// decoded for the current hop.
|
|
buf := bytes.NewBuffer(addMsg.OnionBlob[0:0])
|
|
err := chanIterator.EncodeNextHop(buf)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Errorf("unable to encode the "+
|
|
"remaining route %v", err)
|
|
|
|
failure := lnwire.NewTemporaryChannelFailure(nil)
|
|
l.sendHTLCError(pd.HtlcIndex, failure, obfuscator)
|
|
needUpdate = true
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
updatePacket := &htlcPacket{
|
|
incomingChanID: l.ShortChanID(),
|
|
incomingHTLCID: pd.HtlcIndex,
|
|
outgoingChanID: fwdInfo.NextHop,
|
|
amount: addMsg.Amount,
|
|
htlc: addMsg,
|
|
obfuscator: obfuscator,
|
|
}
|
|
packetsToForward = append(packetsToForward, updatePacket)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if needUpdate {
|
|
// With all the settle/cancel updates added to the local and
|
|
// remote HTLC logs, initiate a state transition by updating
|
|
// the remote commitment chain.
|
|
if err := l.updateCommitTx(); err != nil {
|
|
l.fail("unable to update commitment: %v", err)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return packetsToForward
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// sendHTLCError functions cancels HTLC and send cancel message back to the
|
|
// peer from which HTLC was received.
|
|
func (l *channelLink) sendHTLCError(htlcIndex uint64,
|
|
failure lnwire.FailureMessage, e ErrorEncrypter) {
|
|
|
|
reason, err := e.EncryptFirstHop(failure)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Errorf("unable to obfuscate error: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err = l.channel.FailHTLC(htlcIndex, reason)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Errorf("unable cancel htlc: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
l.cfg.Peer.SendMessage(&lnwire.UpdateFailHTLC{
|
|
ChanID: l.ChanID(),
|
|
ID: htlcIndex,
|
|
Reason: reason,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// sendMalformedHTLCError helper function which sends the malformed HTLC update
|
|
// to the payment sender.
|
|
func (l *channelLink) sendMalformedHTLCError(htlcIndex uint64,
|
|
code lnwire.FailCode, onionBlob []byte) {
|
|
|
|
shaOnionBlob := sha256.Sum256(onionBlob)
|
|
err := l.channel.MalformedFailHTLC(htlcIndex, code, shaOnionBlob)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Errorf("unable cancel htlc: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
l.cfg.Peer.SendMessage(&lnwire.UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
|
|
ChanID: l.ChanID(),
|
|
ID: htlcIndex,
|
|
ShaOnionBlob: shaOnionBlob,
|
|
FailureCode: code,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// fail helper function which is used to encapsulate the action necessary for
|
|
// proper disconnect.
|
|
func (l *channelLink) fail(format string, a ...interface{}) {
|
|
reason := errors.Errorf(format, a...)
|
|
log.Error(reason)
|
|
go l.cfg.Peer.Disconnect(reason)
|
|
}
|