In this commit, we fix a long standing bug within the newly created
`verifyFundingInputs` method. Before this commit, the method would
attempt to derive the pkScript by looking at the last items on the
witness stack, and making a p2wsh output script from that. This is
incorrect as typically non of these scripts will actually be p2wsh, and
instead will be p2wkh. We fix this by using the newly available
`txscript.ComputePkScript` method to derive the proper pkScript.
This resolves an issue w.r.t passing incorrect arguments for all
backends, but an issue still stands for the neutrino backend. As is, we
pass a height hint of zero into the `GetUtxo` method call. With the way
the current utxo scanner is set up for neutrino, this'll cause it to
never find the UTXO, as it takes the height hint as a UTXO birth height,
rather than a lower bound of the birth of the UTXO.
In this commit, we add a new method `RegisterFundingIntent` that allows
a caller to "inject" a pre-populated chanfunding.Intent into a funding
workflow. As an example, if we've already agreed upon the "shape" of the
funding output _outside_ the protocol, then we can use this to pass down
the details of the output, then leverage the normal wire protocol to
carry out the remainder of the funding flow.
In this commit, we start to thread the pending channel ID from wire
protocol all the way down into the reservation context. This change will
allow negotiation to take place _outside_ the protocol that may result
in a particular chanfunding.Assembler being dispatched.
In this commit, we make the wallet aware of the second type of funding
intent: the ShimIntent. If we have one of these, then we don't need to
construct the funding transaction, and can instead just obtain the
outpoint directly from it.
In this commit, we begin to integrate the new channel funding package
into the existing codebase. With this set of changes, we'll no longer
construct and sign the funding transaction within this package, instead
delegating it to the new chanfunding package. We use the new
chanfunding.WalletAssembler to carry out all channel funding, providing
it with an implementation of all its interfaces backed by the wallet.
In this commit, we introduce a series of new abstractions for channel
funding. The end goal is to enable uses cases that construct the funding
transaction externally, eventually handing the funding outpoint to lnd.
An example of such a use case includes channel factories and external
channel funding using a hardware wallet.
We also add a new chanfunding.Assembler meant to allow external channel
funding in contexts similar to how channel factories
can be constructed. With this channel funder, we'll only obtain the
channel point and funding output from it, as this alone is enough to
carry out a funding flow as normal.
In this commit, we make an incremental change to move the existing coin
selection code into a new chanfunding package. In later commits, this
package will grow to serve all the lower level channel funding needs in
the daemon.
Instead of tracking local updates in a separate link variable, query
this state from the channel itself.
This commit also fixes the issue where the commit tx was not updated
anymore after a failed first attempt because the revocation window was
closed. Also those pending updates will be taken into account when the
remote party revokes.
Previously the channel method FullySynced was used to decide whether to
send a new commit sig message. However, it could happen that FullySynced
was false, but that we didn't owe a commitment signature. Instead we
were waiting on the other party to send us a signature. If that
happened, we'd send out an empty commit sig. This commit modifies the
condition that triggers a new commit sig and fixes this deviation from
the spec.
To facilitate the logging, this commit adds a new OweCommitment method.
For the logging, we only need to consider the remote perspective. In a
later commit, we'll also start using the local perspective to support
the decision to send another signature.
In this commit, we create a new chainfee package, that houses all fee
related functionality used within the codebase. The creation of this new
package furthers our long-term goal of extracting functionality from the
bloated `lnwallet` package into new distinct packages. Additionally,
this new packages resolves a class of import cycle that could arise if a
new package that was imported by something in `lnwallet` wanted to use
the existing fee related functions in the prior `lnwallet` package.
In this commit, we convert the existing `channeldb.ChannelType` type
into a _bit field_. This doesn't require us to change the current
serialization or interpretation or the type as it is, since all the
current defined values us a distinct bit. This PR lays the ground work
for any future changes that may introduce new channel types (like anchor
outputs), and also any changes that may modify the existing invariants
around channels (if we're the initiator, we always have the funding
transaction).
Without this, it was possible for a combination of our balance and max
fee allocation to result in a fee rate below the fee floor causing the
remote party to reject the update and close the channel.
In this commit, we use the recently added `chanvalidate` package to
verify channels once they have been confirmed in the funding manager. We
expose a new method on the `LightningWallet` struct: `ValidateChannels`
which calls the new shared 1st party verification code.
After the channel is fully confirmed in the funding manager, we'll now
use this newly exposed method to handle all validation. As a result, we
can remove the existing validation code in the funding manager, and rely
on the new code in isolation.
In this commit, we create a new `chanvalidate` package which it to house
all logic required for 1st and 3rd party channel verification. 1st party
verification occurs when we find a channel in the chain that is
allegedly ours, while 3rd party verification will occur when a peer
sends us a channel proof of a new channel.
In the scope of the recent CVE, we actually fully verified 3rd party
channels, but failed to also include those checks in our 1st party
verification code. In order to unify this logic, and prevent future
issues, in this PR we move to concentrate all validation logic into a
single function. Both 1st and 3rd party validation will then use this
function. Additionally, having all the logic in a single place makes it
easier to audit, and also write tests against.
In this commit, we move to make a full deep copy of the commitment
transaction in `getSignedCommitTx` to ensure that we don't mutate the
commitment on disk, possibly resulting in a "hot commitment".
In this commit, we consolidate the number of areas where we derive our
commitment keys. Before this commit, the `isOurCommitment` function in
the chain watcher used a custom routine to derive the expected
scripts/keys for our commitment at that height. With the recent changes,
we now have additional logic in `DeriveCommitmentKeys` that wasn't
copied over to this area. As a result, the prior logic would erroneously
detect if it was our commitment that had hit the chain or not.
In this commit, we remove the old custom code, and use
`DeriveCommitmentKeys` wihtin the chain watcher as well. This ensures
that we only need to maintain the key derivation code in a single place,
preventing future bugs of this nature.
In this commit, we update the brar logic in the channel state machine,
and also the brar itself to be aware of the new commitment format.
Similar to the unilateral close summary, we'll now blank out the
SingleTweak field in `NewBreachRetribution` if it's a tweakless
commitment. The brar will then use this to properly identify the
commitment type, to ensure we use the proper witness generation function
when we're handling our own breach.
In this commit, we update the funding workflow to be aware of the new
channel type that doesn't tweak the remote party's output within the
non-delay script on their commitment transaction. To do this, we now
allow the caller of `InnitChannelReservation` to signal if they want the
old or new (tweakless) commitment style.
The funding tests are also updated to test both funding variants, as
we'll still need to understand the legacy format for older nodes.
In this commit, we update the channel state machine to be aware of
tweakless commits. In several areas, we'll now check the channel's type
to see if it's `SingleFunderTweakless`. If so, then we'll opt to use the
remote party's non-delay based point directly in the script, skipping
any additional cryptographic operations. Along the way we move the
`validateCommitmentSanity` method to be defined _before_ it's used as is
cutomary within the codebase.
Notably, within the `NewUnilateralCloseSummary` method, we'll now _blank
out_ the `SingleTweak` value if the commitment is tweakless. This
indicates to callers the witness type they should map to, as the value
isn't needed at all any longer when sweeping a non-delay output.
We also update the signing+verification tests to also test that we're
able to properly generate a valid witness for the new tweakless
commitment format.
Instead of marking the database state when processing the channel
reestablishment message, we wait for the result of this processing to
arrive in the link, and mark it accordingly in the database here.
We do this move the logic determining whether we should force close the
channel or not, and what state to mark it in the DB, to the same place,
as these need to be consistent.
This commit converts the ErrCommitSyncLocalDataLoss error into a struct,
that also holds the received last unrevoked commit point from the remote
party.
Checks that we get ErrDoubleSpend as expected when publishing a
conflicting mempool transaction with the same fee as the existing one,
and that we can publish a replacement with a higher fee successfully.
error
Since btcwallet will return typed errors now, we can simplify the
matching logic in order to return ErrDoubleSpend.
In case a transaction cannot be published since it did not satisfy the
requirements for a valid replacement, return ErrDoubleSpend to indicate
it was not propagated.
