In this commit, we fix a minor deviation in our implementation from the
specification. Before if we encountered an unknown error type, we would
disconnect the peer. Instead, we’ll now just continue along parsing the
remainder of the messages. This was flared up recently by some
c-lightning related incompatibilities that emerged on main net.
This commit fixes a broadcast loop within the breach arbiter, that would
occur when HTLC outputs had been taken to the second level. The breach
arbiter would register for a spend event, but would immediately go on to
create and publish the justice, without waiting for the response to be
received on the spend channel. This lead to a race, where the outpoint
could actually already have been spent, but the notification would
arrive after the breach arbiter checked the channel, and publishing the
justice TX would fail because it was a double spend. This would create a
"broadcast loop", as seen in the logs from the integration test
revoked_uncooperative_close_retribution_remote_hodl.
This is fixed by reusing an existing spend event for the outputs,
meaning we will actually receive on the first channel we initiated,
making the broadcast loop more likely to terminate.
This commit adds a check that will make LightningChannel reject a
received commitment if it is accompanied with too many HTLC signatures.
This enforces the requirement in BOLT-2, saying:
if num_htlcs is not equal to the number of HTLC outputs in the local commitment transaction:
* MUST fail the channel.
A test exercising the behaviour is added.
This commit fixes an issue which would arise in some cases when the
local and remote dust limits would differ, resulting in lnd not
producing the expected number of HTLC signatures. This was a result of
checking dust against the local instead of the remote dust limit.
A test exercising the scenario is added.
This commit fixes an issue where we would blindly accept a commitment
which came without any accompanying HTLC signatures. A test exercising
the scenario is added.
This commit fixes an out of bounds error that would occur in the case
where we received a new commitment where the accompanying HTLC sigs were
too few. Now we'll just reject such an commitment.
A test exercising the behavior is also added.
In this commit, we address a number of edge cases that were unaccounted
for when responding to errors that can be sent back due to an HTLC
routing failure. Namely:
* We’ll no longer stop payment attempts if we’re unable to apply a
channel update, instead, we’ll log the error, prune the channel and
continue.
* We’ll no remember which channels were pruned due to insufficient
fee errors. If we ever get a repeat fee error from a channel, then we
prune it. This ensure that we don’t get stuck in a loop due to a node
continually advertising the same fees.
* We also correct an error in which node we’d prune due to a
temporary or permanent node failure. Before this commit, we would prune
the next node, when we should actually be pruning the node that sent us
the error.
Finally, we also add a new test to exercise the fee insufficient error
handling and channel pruning.
Fixes#865.
In this commit, we add a new field to the LightningPayment struct:
PayAttemptTimeout. This new field allows the caller to control exactly
how much time should be spent attempting to route a payment to the
destination. The default value we’ll use is 60 seconds, but callers are
able to specify a diff value. Once the timeout has passed, we’ll
abandon th e payment attempt, and return an error back to the original
caller.
In this commit, we wrap up the prior ones and introduce config
settings, as well as proper generation for a new invoice-only macaroon.
All prior invoice path rules are also properly enforced of this new
invoice.macaroon.
In this commit, we modify the existing invoice RPC macaroon permissions
to target a more specific entity: “invoices”. As a result of this
commit, once node operators update, they’ll need to regenerate their
readonly.macaroon as it now needs this additional entity encoded within
it.
In the prior commit, we added a new set of permissions and also a new
entity: “invoices”. We’ll add this set of entities to the read and
write permissions accordingly as well to ensure that the existing
macaroons have access to all the items that the invoice.macaroon does.
In this commit, we add a new invoicePermissions slice. This contains
all the permission that a holder of an invoice.macaroon is able to
access, and no others. We also include read and write access to
addresses as this may be useful from the PoV of a merchant or exchange.
In this commit, we fix a goroutine leak that could occur if while we
were loading an error occurred in any of the steps after we created the
channel object, but before it was actually loaded in to the script. If
an error occurs at any step, we ensure that we’ll stop toe channel.
Otherwise, the sigPool goroutines would still be lingering and never be
stopped.
In this commit, we add two new configuration parameters to allow users
to specify the min and max size that the autopilot agent will create.
This is useful as now users can set the values to more or less the same
size, which will allow them to control the size of each created
channel.
Before this commit, if this wasn’t set, then the agent would try to
shove as much money into a channel up until the max chan size. This was
nice on testnet, but on main net, users will likely not want all their
funds to be in a single channel, and instead be distributed across many
channels. With things like AMP, have more channels becomes more
desirable.
In this commit, we raise the min channel size to 20k satoshis. This
will be evaluated before we check for dusty commitments. The goal of
this is to ensure ample room for fees at current, and future fee
levels.
Since https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/pull/506, `defaultchanconfs` is nested under `bitcoin`. Using this parameter at the top level generates a warning message:
```
2018-03-17 23:07:08.273 [WRN] LTND: /home/bitcoin/.lnd/lnd.conf:7: unknown option: defaultchanconfs
```
and using it nested under `bitcoin` does not.
In this commit, fix the inability of some users to connect to the DNS
seed using our direct TCP fallback. We do this as some resolvers filter
out our large SRV requests due to their size (they also include public
keys). Instead, we’ll use a direct TCP resolution in this case.
However, after a recent change, we forgot the period at the end of the
target DNS host. This is an issue as the domain needs to be fully
qualified.
The fix is easy, add a period within our string formatting to target
the proper sub-domain and SRV target.
Fixes#854.
The port numbers used in the ZMQ examples are inconsistent between:
- The initial explanation of ZMQ
```
They must be combined in the same ZMQ socket
address (e.g. `--zmqpubrawblock=tcp://127.0.0.1:28332` and
`--zmqpubrawtx=tcp://127.0.0.1:28332`).
```
- The sample bitcoin.conf
```
zmqpubrawblock=tcp://127.0.0.1:18501
zmqpubrawtx=tcp://127.0.0.1:18501
```
- The lnd command-line example:
```
lnd --bitcoin.active --bitcoin.testnet --debuglevel=debug --bitcoin.node=bitcoind --bitcoind.rpcuser=REPLACEME --bitcoind.rpcpass=REPLACEME --bitcoind.zmqpath=tcp://127.0.0.1:28332 --externalip=X.X.X.X
```
I changed the sample bitcoin.conf port numbers to 28332 so they match the rest of the examples.
