Commit Graph

69 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Andrey Samokhvalov
ee2379775c lnd: fix golint warning which requires to add additional comments 2017-03-13 16:30:23 -07:00
Andrey Samokhvalov
fd97a4bd19 lnd: partially fix golint warnings 2017-03-13 16:30:23 -07:00
Andrey Samokhvalov
8fb54782e2 lnd: fix gosimple warnings 2017-03-13 16:30:23 -07:00
Olaoluwa Osuntokun
fdaeab7c9b
brontide: refer directly to the curve object in btcec's global namespace
This commit modifies the `ecdh` function within the `brontide` package
to refer directly to the global curve params object in the `bcec`
package rather than reference it from the target public key. This
changes fixes a class of panics that have been uncovered recently but
*doesn’t* yet fix the root cause.
2017-02-28 17:44:32 -06:00
Trevin Hofmann
a13ac90d46 multi: add link to LICENSE in README license badges (#100) 2017-01-12 16:31:08 -08:00
Olaoluwa Osuntokun
4ccdad0d66
multi: add README's for all sub-packages 2017-01-10 15:02:37 -08:00
Olaoluwa Osuntokun
bc885f5f27
brontide: modify key rotation to match test vectors in spec
This commit modifies our key rotation slightly to match the test
vectors within the BOLT08 specifications. Before this commit, we were
rotating one message before the rest of the implementers. This
implementation divergence was possibly due to the section of the spec
describing the rotations being a bit ambiguous.

A future PR to the lightning-rfc repo will make the spec more explicit
to avoid situations like this in the future.
2017-01-09 19:12:48 -08:00
Olaoluwa Osuntokun
d046efb502
brontide: exclude MAC length from cipher text packet length prefix
Pervasively we would include the length of the MAC in the length prefix
for cipher text packets. As a result, the MAC would eat into the total
payload size. To remedy this, we now exclude the MAC from the length
prefix for cipher text packets, and instead account for the length of
the MAC on the packet when reading messages.
2017-01-07 21:21:52 -08:00
Olaoluwa Osuntokun
ad180b4fba
brontide: fix bug in final sender/receiver key derivation
This commit fixes a bug in our key derivation for the final step of the
key exchange. In our code we were swapping the order of the salt and
input keyeing material to the HKDF function. This was triggered by the
argument order of the golang implementation we’re currently using has
the “secret” of IKM argument first, instead of second as defined within
rfc5869.

To fix this, we simply need to swap function arguments in two places:
within the split() function and during key rotation.

This bug was discovered by Rusty Russell, thanks!
2016-12-13 11:32:02 -08:00
Olaoluwa Osuntokun
61ddd48255
brontide: set the prologue value as specified within BOLT0008 2016-12-12 15:56:50 -08:00
Olaoluwa Osuntokun
b1d28426d5
brontide: properly pack nonce as 96-bit little endian value 2016-12-12 15:56:46 -08:00
Olaoluwa Osuntokun
fdb111e867
brontide: switch to using libsecp256k1's public ECDH API
This commit modifies the opening brontide handshake to use
libsecp256k1's public ECDH API throughout the handshake rather than the
current method which just returns the x-coordinate of the generated
point.

This change was made in order to align the current spec draft with the
aforementioned library since it’s very popular within the pace and
strives to only expose safe API’s to end users.
2016-12-12 15:56:42 -08:00
Olaoluwa Osuntokun
60f66fe2d7
brontide: implement handshake versioning enforcement per the spec 2016-11-30 19:11:58 -08:00
Olaoluwa Osuntokun
75ea05aef6
brontide: the encrypted packet length is no longer the associated data
This commit modifies the current implementation to more closely match
what’s currently specified within the spec.

The encrypted+MAC’d packet length is no longer included as the
associated data for the encryption/decryption of transport messages.
This isn’t required as if an active attacker swaps out the encrypted
length in the byte string, the decryption+MAC check will simply fail as
the nonce won’t be in proper sequence.
2016-11-14 15:10:54 -08:00
Olaoluwa Osuntokun
ae84b6197b
brontide: implement cipher stream key rotation
This commit implements key rotation for brontide as-per the current
draft of the LN p2p crypto spec. Key rotation is currently performed
every 1000 messages encrypted/decrypted with a cipherState object. Key
rotation is performed by evaluating the HKDF (extracting exactly 64
bytes) with the current chaining key, and cipher key. The key rotation
is to attempted after each nonce increment making implementation easy
as the current nonce value will already be within the local scope.
2016-11-10 17:29:13 -08:00
Olaoluwa Osuntokun
767c550d65
brontide: implement message chunking for the net.Conn implementation
This commit implements message chunking within the implementation of
net.Conn which implements our initial handshake, then uses the crypto
to read/write messages.

With this change it’s now possible to send message larger than 65535
bytes over a p2p crypto connection by properly chunking the messages on
the side of the connection that’s writing.
2016-11-07 19:45:06 -08:00
Olaoluwa Osuntokun
49f9f496fb
brontide: modify the max payload length to be 65535 bytes total
This commit modifies the current implementation of the p2p crypto
protocol to further constrain the max allowed payload size. With this
change we now use 16-bits (2-bytes) for the maximum payload length.
This change puts us closer to strict adherence of the Noise spec, and
simplifies the memory management w.r.t implementing the current version
of our scheme.

Note that this doesn’t restrict the size of messages that are able to
be sent over the wire within the LN p2p protocol. Larger message can
safely be encapsulated within the crypt messages via fragmentation that
will detected take place if a larger message is detected.
2016-11-07 18:50:26 -08:00
Olaoluwa Osuntokun
9850e8667e
brontide: modify the Dial function to take a *lnwire.NetAddress 2016-10-26 19:04:27 -07:00
Olaoluwa Osuntokun
ab97d9693f
brontide: an authenticated key agreement protocol in three acts
This commit introduces Brontide: an authenticated key agreement
protocol in three acts. Brontide is the successor to lndc within lnd,
and ultimately within the greater Lighting Network. Brontide uses the
Noise_XK handshake for initial key agreement, then implements an AEAD
scheme which encrypts+authenticates both packets, and the lengths of
the packets on the wire. The initial authentication handshake preserves
the responder’s identity by never transmitting it to the initiator and
performing mutual authentication via an incremental Triple-DH based on
ECDH of secp256k1 and an HKDF which uses SHA-256.

Bronzed isn’t yet integrated within the wider daemon yet. Full
integration will land in a future pull request.
2016-10-17 19:41:29 -07:00