This commit caps the update fee the initiator will send when the anchors
channel type is used. We do not limit anything on the receiver side.
10 sat/vbyte is the current default max fee rate we use. This should be
enough to ensure propagation before anchoring down the commitment
transaction.
outdated local state
This commit fixes a bug that would cause us to not sweep our local
output in case we force closed, then lost state or attempted recovery.
The reason being that we would use or local commit height when deriving
our scripts, which would be incorrect. Instead we use the extracted
state number to derive the correct scripts, allowing us to sweep the
output.
Allthough being an unlikely scenario, we would leave money on chain in
this case without any warning (since we would just end up with an empty
delay script) and forget about the spend.
Similar to the previous commit, we fix a bug resulting in the wrong
commit weight being calculated when an HTLC just above the remote's
duslimit was added from the remote. This was a result of using the
successFee instead of the timeoutFee when checking whether it was dust,
making us consider it dust when it shouldn't have been.
In this commit we fix a bug resulting in the wrong commit weight being
calculated when an HTLC just below the remote's duslimit was added. This
was a result of using the timeoutFee instead of the successFee when
checking whether it was dust, making us consider it non-dust when it
should have been.
For unconfirmed commit tx anchors, supply the sweeper with cpfp info and
a confirmation target fee estimate.
The sweeper will try to pay for the parent commit tx as long as the
current fee estimate exceeds the pre-signed commit tx fee rate.
This fixes a long-standing force close bug. When we receive a
revocation, store the updates that the remote should sign next under
a new database key. Previously, these were not persisted which would
lead to force closure.
Previously, we could sign a pending commitment for the remote party,
disconnect, and not restore these signed remote updates as having been
removed at the pending commitment height. This commit fixes that to
look up whether the update under the unsigned acked updates key is
present on the pending commitment or not and appropriately set
the remove commit heights.
The `restoreStateLogs` function now properly restores the
`addCommitHeightLocal` field of a settle or fail's parent add.
Previously, any updates' parent in unsignedAckedUpdates would have
the field set to the default value of 0. This would cause a force
closure when receiving a commitment due to our belt-and-suspenders
checks for update logs during commitment validation.
The bug in question occurs because the `addCommitHeightLocal` field
is only populated for a restored add if the add is on the local
commitment. `TestChannelRestoreCommitHeight` is expanded in
`lnwallet/channel_test.go` to demonstrate restoration now works.
The faulty state transition:
```
<----fail----
<----sig-----
-----rev----> (add no longer on Alice's commitment)
*Alice restores* (addCommitHeightLocal of failed htlc is 0)
```
NOTE: Alice dies after sending a revocation but before signing a
commitment. This is possible because there is a select block in the link
that can potentially exit after sending over the revocation but before
signing the next commitment state for the counterparty.
This enforces the _actualized_ fee rate of the commitment transaction,
rather than the fee floor used for estimation. The new value of 250
sat/kw corresponds to 1 sat/byte, rather than 253 which is only rounded
up during estimation to account for the fact that BOLT 3 rounds down to
the nearest satoshi and that the vbyte fee estimation is lossy.
Previously we would incorrectly fail to sign the next commitment even
though the fee was technically high enough. Restarting with this commit
should solve the issue as long as the channel hasn't already gone to
chain.
This commit introduces the Signature interface which will be used by our
witness construction methods instead of passing in raw byte slices. This
will be used later to inject various kinds of mock signatures, e.g.
73-byte signatures for simulating worst-case witness weight.
This commit adds an additional santity check that rejects zero-value
HTLCs, preventing them from being added to the channel state even if the
channel config's minhtlc value is zero.
This commit fixes#4118 by properly sorting the HTLC signatures sent
over the wire to match the BOLT3 BIP69+CLTV sorting of the commitment
outputs.
To do so, we expose the slice of cltv deltas for HTLCs on the unsigned
commitment after applying the commitment sorting. This will be used to
locate the proper output index, as the CLTV serves as a tie breaker
between HTLCs that otherwise have the same payment hash and amount.
Note that #3412 fixed the issue partially by ensuring the commitment was
constructed properly (and the second-level prev outpoint's txid was
correct), but failed to address that the HTLC signatures were still sent
out in the incorrect order. With this, we pass the test case introduce
in the next commit.
We currently write each HTLCs OutputIndex to disk, but we don't use it
when restoring. The restoration is modified to use these directly, since
we will have lost access to the sorting of CLTVs after the initial
signing process.
This commit adds two new channel statuses which indicate the party that
initatited closing the channel. These statuses are set in conjunction
with the existing commit broadcast status so that we do not need to
migrate existing logic to handle multiple types of closes. This status
is set for locally initiated force closes in this commit because they
follow a similar pattern to cooparative closes, marking the commitment
broadcast then proceeding with tx broadcast. Remote force closes are
added in the following commit, as they are handled differently.
Since our HTLC must also be added to the remote commitment, we do the
balance caluclation also from the remote chain perspective and report
our minimum balance from the two commit views as our available balance.
When we send non-dust HTLCs as the non-initiator, the remote party will
have to pay the extra commitment fee. To account for this we figure out
if they can afford paying this fee, if not we report that we only have
balance available for dust HTLCs, since these HTLCs won't increase the
commitment fee.
Since we want to handle the edge case where paying the HTLC fee would
take the initiator below the reserve, we move the subtraction of the
reserve into availableBalance where this calculation will be performed.
This commit adds an extra validation step when adding HTLCs. Previously
we would only validate the remote commitment resulting from adding an
HTLC, which in most cases is enough. However, there are situations where
the dustlimits are different, which could lead to the resulting remote
commitment from adding the HTLC being valid, but not the local
commitment.
Now we also validate the local commitment. A test to trigger the case is
added.
add
To ba able to validate the commitment sanity both for remote and local
commitments, and at the same time predict both our and their add, we let
validateCommitmentSanity take an extra payment descriptor to make this
possible.
This commit checks the commitment sanity when receiving an HTLC so
that if a commitment transaction will overflow from an ADD, it is
caught earlier rather than in ReceiveNewCommitment.
