itest: move revocation related tests into one file
This commit creates a new file lnd_revocation_test.go to hold revocation-related tests, further breaking down the lnd_test.go file.
This commit is contained in:
parent
f62cdf7bfc
commit
6ca068660c
1331
lntest/itest/lnd_revocation_test.go
Normal file
1331
lntest/itest/lnd_revocation_test.go
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,1331 @@
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package itest
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"time"
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"github.com/btcsuite/btcd/chaincfg/chainhash"
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"github.com/btcsuite/btcutil"
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"github.com/go-errors/errors"
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"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/funding"
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"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/lnrpc"
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"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/lnrpc/watchtowerrpc"
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"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/lnrpc/wtclientrpc"
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"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/lntest"
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"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/lntest/wait"
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)
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// testRevokedCloseRetribution tests that Carol is able carry out
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// retribution in the event that she fails immediately after detecting Bob's
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// breach txn in the mempool.
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func testRevokedCloseRetribution(net *lntest.NetworkHarness, t *harnessTest) {
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ctxb := context.Background()
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const (
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chanAmt = funding.MaxBtcFundingAmount
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paymentAmt = 10000
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numInvoices = 6
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)
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// Carol will be the breached party. We set --nolisten to ensure Bob
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// won't be able to connect to her and trigger the channel data
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// protection logic automatically. We also can't have Carol
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// automatically re-connect too early, otherwise DLP would be initiated
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// instead of the breach we want to provoke.
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carol := net.NewNode(
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t.t, "Carol",
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[]string{"--hodl.exit-settle", "--nolisten", "--minbackoff=1h"},
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)
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defer shutdownAndAssert(net, t, carol)
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// We must let Bob communicate with Carol before they are able to open
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// channel, so we connect Bob and Carol,
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ctxt, _ := context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
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net.ConnectNodes(ctxt, t.t, carol, net.Bob)
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// Before we make a channel, we'll load up Carol with some coins sent
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// directly from the miner.
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ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
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net.SendCoins(ctxt, t.t, btcutil.SatoshiPerBitcoin, carol)
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// In order to test Carol's response to an uncooperative channel
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// closure by Bob, we'll first open up a channel between them with a
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// 0.5 BTC value.
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ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, channelOpenTimeout)
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chanPoint := openChannelAndAssert(
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ctxt, t, net, carol, net.Bob,
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lntest.OpenChannelParams{
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Amt: chanAmt,
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},
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)
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// With the channel open, we'll create a few invoices for Bob that
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// Carol will pay to in order to advance the state of the channel.
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bobPayReqs, _, _, err := createPayReqs(
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net.Bob, paymentAmt, numInvoices,
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)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unable to create pay reqs: %v", err)
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}
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// Wait for Carol to receive the channel edge from the funding manager.
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ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
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err = carol.WaitForNetworkChannelOpen(ctxt, chanPoint)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("carol didn't see the carol->bob channel before "+
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"timeout: %v", err)
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}
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// Send payments from Carol to Bob using 3 of Bob's payment hashes
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// generated above.
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ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
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err = completePaymentRequests(
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ctxt, carol, carol.RouterClient, bobPayReqs[:numInvoices/2],
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true,
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)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unable to send payments: %v", err)
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}
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// Next query for Bob's channel state, as we sent 3 payments of 10k
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// satoshis each, Bob should now see his balance as being 30k satoshis.
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var bobChan *lnrpc.Channel
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var predErr error
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err = wait.Predicate(func() bool {
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ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
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bChan, err := getChanInfo(ctxt, net.Bob)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unable to get bob's channel info: %v", err)
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}
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if bChan.LocalBalance != 30000 {
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predErr = fmt.Errorf("bob's balance is incorrect, "+
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"got %v, expected %v", bChan.LocalBalance,
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30000)
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return false
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}
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bobChan = bChan
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return true
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}, defaultTimeout)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("%v", predErr)
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}
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// Grab Bob's current commitment height (update number), we'll later
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// revert him to this state after additional updates to force him to
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// broadcast this soon to be revoked state.
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bobStateNumPreCopy := bobChan.NumUpdates
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// With the temporary file created, copy Bob's current state into the
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// temporary file we created above. Later after more updates, we'll
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// restore this state.
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if err := net.BackupDb(net.Bob); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unable to copy database files: %v", err)
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}
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// Finally, send payments from Carol to Bob, consuming Bob's remaining
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// payment hashes.
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ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
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err = completePaymentRequests(
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ctxt, carol, carol.RouterClient, bobPayReqs[numInvoices/2:],
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true,
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)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unable to send payments: %v", err)
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}
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ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
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bobChan, err = getChanInfo(ctxt, net.Bob)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unable to get bob chan info: %v", err)
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}
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// Now we shutdown Bob, copying over the his temporary database state
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// which has the *prior* channel state over his current most up to date
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// state. With this, we essentially force Bob to travel back in time
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// within the channel's history.
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if err = net.RestartNode(net.Bob, func() error {
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return net.RestoreDb(net.Bob)
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}); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unable to restart node: %v", err)
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}
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// Now query for Bob's channel state, it should show that he's at a
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// state number in the past, not the *latest* state.
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ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
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bobChan, err = getChanInfo(ctxt, net.Bob)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unable to get bob chan info: %v", err)
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}
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if bobChan.NumUpdates != bobStateNumPreCopy {
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t.Fatalf("db copy failed: %v", bobChan.NumUpdates)
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}
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// Now force Bob to execute a *force* channel closure by unilaterally
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// broadcasting his current channel state. This is actually the
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// commitment transaction of a prior *revoked* state, so he'll soon
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// feel the wrath of Carol's retribution.
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var closeUpdates lnrpc.Lightning_CloseChannelClient
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force := true
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err = wait.Predicate(func() bool {
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ctxt, _ := context.WithTimeout(ctxb, channelCloseTimeout)
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closeUpdates, _, err = net.CloseChannel(ctxt, net.Bob, chanPoint, force)
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if err != nil {
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predErr = err
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return false
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}
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return true
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}, defaultTimeout)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unable to close channel: %v", predErr)
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}
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// Wait for Bob's breach transaction to show up in the mempool to ensure
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// that Carol's node has started waiting for confirmations.
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_, err = waitForTxInMempool(net.Miner.Client, minerMempoolTimeout)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unable to find Bob's breach tx in mempool: %v", err)
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}
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// Here, Carol sees Bob's breach transaction in the mempool, but is waiting
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// for it to confirm before continuing her retribution. We restart Carol to
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// ensure that she is persisting her retribution state and continues
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// watching for the breach transaction to confirm even after her node
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// restarts.
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if err := net.RestartNode(carol, nil); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unable to restart Carol's node: %v", err)
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}
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// Finally, generate a single block, wait for the final close status
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// update, then ensure that the closing transaction was included in the
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// block.
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block := mineBlocks(t, net, 1, 1)[0]
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ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, channelCloseTimeout)
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breachTXID, err := net.WaitForChannelClose(ctxt, closeUpdates)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("error while waiting for channel close: %v", err)
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}
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assertTxInBlock(t, block, breachTXID)
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// Query the mempool for Carol's justice transaction, this should be
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// broadcast as Bob's contract breaching transaction gets confirmed
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// above.
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justiceTXID, err := waitForTxInMempool(net.Miner.Client, minerMempoolTimeout)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unable to find Carol's justice tx in mempool: %v", err)
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}
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time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
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// Query for the mempool transaction found above. Then assert that all
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// the inputs of this transaction are spending outputs generated by
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// Bob's breach transaction above.
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justiceTx, err := net.Miner.Client.GetRawTransaction(justiceTXID)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unable to query for justice tx: %v", err)
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}
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for _, txIn := range justiceTx.MsgTx().TxIn {
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if !bytes.Equal(txIn.PreviousOutPoint.Hash[:], breachTXID[:]) {
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t.Fatalf("justice tx not spending commitment utxo "+
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"instead is: %v", txIn.PreviousOutPoint)
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}
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}
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// We restart Carol here to ensure that she persists her retribution state
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// and successfully continues exacting retribution after restarting. At
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// this point, Carol has broadcast the justice transaction, but it hasn't
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// been confirmed yet; when Carol restarts, she should start waiting for
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// the justice transaction to confirm again.
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if err := net.RestartNode(carol, nil); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unable to restart Carol's node: %v", err)
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}
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// Now mine a block, this transaction should include Carol's justice
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// transaction which was just accepted into the mempool.
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block = mineBlocks(t, net, 1, 1)[0]
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// The block should have exactly *two* transactions, one of which is
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// the justice transaction.
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if len(block.Transactions) != 2 {
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t.Fatalf("transaction wasn't mined")
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}
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justiceSha := block.Transactions[1].TxHash()
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if !bytes.Equal(justiceTx.Hash()[:], justiceSha[:]) {
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t.Fatalf("justice tx wasn't mined")
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}
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assertNodeNumChannels(t, carol, 0)
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// Mine enough blocks for Bob's channel arbitrator to wrap up the
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// references to the breached channel. The chanarb waits for commitment
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// tx's confHeight+CSV-1 blocks and since we've already mined one that
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// included the justice tx we only need to mine extra DefaultCSV-2
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// blocks to unlock it.
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mineBlocks(t, net, lntest.DefaultCSV-2, 0)
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assertNumPendingChannels(t, net.Bob, 0, 0)
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}
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// testRevokedCloseRetributionZeroValueRemoteOutput tests that Dave is able
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// carry out retribution in the event that she fails in state where the remote
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// commitment output has zero-value.
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func testRevokedCloseRetributionZeroValueRemoteOutput(net *lntest.NetworkHarness,
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t *harnessTest) {
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ctxb := context.Background()
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const (
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chanAmt = funding.MaxBtcFundingAmount
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paymentAmt = 10000
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numInvoices = 6
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)
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// Since we'd like to test some multi-hop failure scenarios, we'll
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// introduce another node into our test network: Carol.
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carol := net.NewNode(t.t, "Carol", []string{"--hodl.exit-settle"})
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defer shutdownAndAssert(net, t, carol)
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// Dave will be the breached party. We set --nolisten to ensure Carol
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// won't be able to connect to him and trigger the channel data
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// protection logic automatically. We also can't have Dave automatically
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// re-connect too early, otherwise DLP would be initiated instead of the
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// breach we want to provoke.
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dave := net.NewNode(
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t.t, "Dave",
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[]string{"--hodl.exit-settle", "--nolisten", "--minbackoff=1h"},
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)
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defer shutdownAndAssert(net, t, dave)
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// We must let Dave have an open channel before she can send a node
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// announcement, so we open a channel with Carol,
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ctxt, _ := context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
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net.ConnectNodes(ctxt, t.t, dave, carol)
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// Before we make a channel, we'll load up Dave with some coins sent
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// directly from the miner.
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ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
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net.SendCoins(ctxt, t.t, btcutil.SatoshiPerBitcoin, dave)
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// In order to test Dave's response to an uncooperative channel
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// closure by Carol, we'll first open up a channel between them with a
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// 0.5 BTC value.
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ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, channelOpenTimeout)
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chanPoint := openChannelAndAssert(
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ctxt, t, net, dave, carol,
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lntest.OpenChannelParams{
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Amt: chanAmt,
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},
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)
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// With the channel open, we'll create a few invoices for Carol that
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// Dave will pay to in order to advance the state of the channel.
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carolPayReqs, _, _, err := createPayReqs(
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carol, paymentAmt, numInvoices,
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)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unable to create pay reqs: %v", err)
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}
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// Wait for Dave to receive the channel edge from the funding manager.
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ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
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err = dave.WaitForNetworkChannelOpen(ctxt, chanPoint)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("dave didn't see the dave->carol channel before "+
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"timeout: %v", err)
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}
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// Next query for Carol's channel state, as we sent 0 payments, Carol
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// should now see her balance as being 0 satoshis.
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ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
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carolChan, err := getChanInfo(ctxt, carol)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unable to get carol's channel info: %v", err)
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}
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if carolChan.LocalBalance != 0 {
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t.Fatalf("carol's balance is incorrect, got %v, expected %v",
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carolChan.LocalBalance, 0)
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}
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// Grab Carol's current commitment height (update number), we'll later
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// revert her to this state after additional updates to force him to
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// broadcast this soon to be revoked state.
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carolStateNumPreCopy := carolChan.NumUpdates
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// With the temporary file created, copy Carol's current state into the
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// temporary file we created above. Later after more updates, we'll
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// restore this state.
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if err := net.BackupDb(carol); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unable to copy database files: %v", err)
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}
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// Finally, send payments from Dave to Carol, consuming Carol's remaining
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// payment hashes.
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ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
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err = completePaymentRequests(
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ctxt, dave, dave.RouterClient, carolPayReqs, false,
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)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unable to send payments: %v", err)
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}
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ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
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_, err = getChanInfo(ctxt, carol)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unable to get carol chan info: %v", err)
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}
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// Now we shutdown Carol, copying over the his temporary database state
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// which has the *prior* channel state over his current most up to date
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// state. With this, we essentially force Carol to travel back in time
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// within the channel's history.
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if err = net.RestartNode(carol, func() error {
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return net.RestoreDb(carol)
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}); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unable to restart node: %v", err)
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}
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// Now query for Carol's channel state, it should show that he's at a
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// state number in the past, not the *latest* state.
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ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
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carolChan, err = getChanInfo(ctxt, carol)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unable to get carol chan info: %v", err)
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}
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if carolChan.NumUpdates != carolStateNumPreCopy {
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t.Fatalf("db copy failed: %v", carolChan.NumUpdates)
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}
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// Now force Carol to execute a *force* channel closure by unilaterally
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// broadcasting his current channel state. This is actually the
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// commitment transaction of a prior *revoked* state, so he'll soon
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// feel the wrath of Dave's retribution.
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var (
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closeUpdates lnrpc.Lightning_CloseChannelClient
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closeTxID *chainhash.Hash
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closeErr error
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)
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force := true
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err = wait.Predicate(func() bool {
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ctxt, _ := context.WithTimeout(ctxb, channelCloseTimeout)
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closeUpdates, closeTxID, closeErr = net.CloseChannel(
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ctxt, carol, chanPoint, force,
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)
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return closeErr == nil
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}, defaultTimeout)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unable to close channel: %v", closeErr)
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}
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// Query the mempool for the breaching closing transaction, this should
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// be broadcast by Carol when she force closes the channel above.
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txid, err := waitForTxInMempool(net.Miner.Client, minerMempoolTimeout)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unable to find Carol's force close tx in mempool: %v",
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err)
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}
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if *txid != *closeTxID {
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t.Fatalf("expected closeTx(%v) in mempool, instead found %v",
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closeTxID, txid)
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}
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// Finally, generate a single block, wait for the final close status
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// update, then ensure that the closing transaction was included in the
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// block.
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block := mineBlocks(t, net, 1, 1)[0]
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|
||||
// Here, Dave receives a confirmation of Carol's breach transaction.
|
||||
// We restart Dave to ensure that she is persisting her retribution
|
||||
// state and continues exacting justice after her node restarts.
|
||||
if err := net.RestartNode(dave, nil); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to stop Dave's node: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, channelCloseTimeout)
|
||||
breachTXID, err := net.WaitForChannelClose(ctxt, closeUpdates)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("error while waiting for channel close: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
assertTxInBlock(t, block, breachTXID)
|
||||
|
||||
// Query the mempool for Dave's justice transaction, this should be
|
||||
// broadcast as Carol's contract breaching transaction gets confirmed
|
||||
// above.
|
||||
justiceTXID, err := waitForTxInMempool(net.Miner.Client, minerMempoolTimeout)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to find Dave's justice tx in mempool: %v",
|
||||
err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
|
||||
|
||||
// Query for the mempool transaction found above. Then assert that all
|
||||
// the inputs of this transaction are spending outputs generated by
|
||||
// Carol's breach transaction above.
|
||||
justiceTx, err := net.Miner.Client.GetRawTransaction(justiceTXID)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to query for justice tx: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, txIn := range justiceTx.MsgTx().TxIn {
|
||||
if !bytes.Equal(txIn.PreviousOutPoint.Hash[:], breachTXID[:]) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("justice tx not spending commitment utxo "+
|
||||
"instead is: %v", txIn.PreviousOutPoint)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// We restart Dave here to ensure that he persists her retribution state
|
||||
// and successfully continues exacting retribution after restarting. At
|
||||
// this point, Dave has broadcast the justice transaction, but it hasn't
|
||||
// been confirmed yet; when Dave restarts, she should start waiting for
|
||||
// the justice transaction to confirm again.
|
||||
if err := net.RestartNode(dave, nil); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to restart Dave's node: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Now mine a block, this transaction should include Dave's justice
|
||||
// transaction which was just accepted into the mempool.
|
||||
block = mineBlocks(t, net, 1, 1)[0]
|
||||
|
||||
// The block should have exactly *two* transactions, one of which is
|
||||
// the justice transaction.
|
||||
if len(block.Transactions) != 2 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("transaction wasn't mined")
|
||||
}
|
||||
justiceSha := block.Transactions[1].TxHash()
|
||||
if !bytes.Equal(justiceTx.Hash()[:], justiceSha[:]) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("justice tx wasn't mined")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
assertNodeNumChannels(t, dave, 0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// testRevokedCloseRetributionRemoteHodl tests that Dave properly responds to a
|
||||
// channel breach made by the remote party, specifically in the case that the
|
||||
// remote party breaches before settling extended HTLCs.
|
||||
func testRevokedCloseRetributionRemoteHodl(net *lntest.NetworkHarness,
|
||||
t *harnessTest) {
|
||||
ctxb := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
chanAmt = funding.MaxBtcFundingAmount
|
||||
pushAmt = 200000
|
||||
paymentAmt = 10000
|
||||
numInvoices = 6
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Since this test will result in the counterparty being left in a
|
||||
// weird state, we will introduce another node into our test network:
|
||||
// Carol.
|
||||
carol := net.NewNode(t.t, "Carol", []string{"--hodl.exit-settle"})
|
||||
defer shutdownAndAssert(net, t, carol)
|
||||
|
||||
// We'll also create a new node Dave, who will have a channel with
|
||||
// Carol, and also use similar settings so we can broadcast a commit
|
||||
// with active HTLCs. Dave will be the breached party. We set
|
||||
// --nolisten to ensure Carol won't be able to connect to him and
|
||||
// trigger the channel data protection logic automatically.
|
||||
dave := net.NewNode(
|
||||
t.t, "Dave",
|
||||
[]string{"--hodl.exit-settle", "--nolisten"},
|
||||
)
|
||||
defer shutdownAndAssert(net, t, dave)
|
||||
|
||||
// We must let Dave communicate with Carol before they are able to open
|
||||
// channel, so we connect Dave and Carol,
|
||||
ctxt, _ := context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
net.ConnectNodes(ctxt, t.t, dave, carol)
|
||||
|
||||
// Before we make a channel, we'll load up Dave with some coins sent
|
||||
// directly from the miner.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
net.SendCoins(ctxt, t.t, btcutil.SatoshiPerBitcoin, dave)
|
||||
|
||||
// In order to test Dave's response to an uncooperative channel closure
|
||||
// by Carol, we'll first open up a channel between them with a
|
||||
// funding.MaxBtcFundingAmount (2^24) satoshis value.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, channelOpenTimeout)
|
||||
chanPoint := openChannelAndAssert(
|
||||
ctxt, t, net, dave, carol,
|
||||
lntest.OpenChannelParams{
|
||||
Amt: chanAmt,
|
||||
PushAmt: pushAmt,
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// With the channel open, we'll create a few invoices for Carol that
|
||||
// Dave will pay to in order to advance the state of the channel.
|
||||
carolPayReqs, _, _, err := createPayReqs(
|
||||
carol, paymentAmt, numInvoices,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to create pay reqs: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// We'll introduce a closure to validate that Carol's current balance
|
||||
// matches the given expected amount.
|
||||
checkCarolBalance := func(expectedAmt int64) {
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
carolChan, err := getChanInfo(ctxt, carol)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to get carol's channel info: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if carolChan.LocalBalance != expectedAmt {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("carol's balance is incorrect, "+
|
||||
"got %v, expected %v", carolChan.LocalBalance,
|
||||
expectedAmt)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// We'll introduce another closure to validate that Carol's current
|
||||
// number of updates is at least as large as the provided minimum
|
||||
// number.
|
||||
checkCarolNumUpdatesAtLeast := func(minimum uint64) {
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
carolChan, err := getChanInfo(ctxt, carol)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to get carol's channel info: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if carolChan.NumUpdates < minimum {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("carol's numupdates is incorrect, want %v "+
|
||||
"to be at least %v", carolChan.NumUpdates,
|
||||
minimum)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Wait for Dave to receive the channel edge from the funding manager.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
err = dave.WaitForNetworkChannelOpen(ctxt, chanPoint)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("dave didn't see the dave->carol channel before "+
|
||||
"timeout: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Ensure that carol's balance starts with the amount we pushed to her.
|
||||
checkCarolBalance(pushAmt)
|
||||
|
||||
// Send payments from Dave to Carol using 3 of Carol's payment hashes
|
||||
// generated above.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
err = completePaymentRequests(
|
||||
ctxt, dave, dave.RouterClient, carolPayReqs[:numInvoices/2],
|
||||
false,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to send payments: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// At this point, we'll also send over a set of HTLC's from Carol to
|
||||
// Dave. This ensures that the final revoked transaction has HTLC's in
|
||||
// both directions.
|
||||
davePayReqs, _, _, err := createPayReqs(
|
||||
dave, paymentAmt, numInvoices,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to create pay reqs: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Send payments from Carol to Dave using 3 of Dave's payment hashes
|
||||
// generated above.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
err = completePaymentRequests(
|
||||
ctxt, carol, carol.RouterClient, davePayReqs[:numInvoices/2],
|
||||
false,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to send payments: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Next query for Carol's channel state, as we sent 3 payments of 10k
|
||||
// satoshis each, however Carol should now see her balance as being
|
||||
// equal to the push amount in satoshis since she has not settled.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
carolChan, err := getChanInfo(ctxt, carol)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to get carol's channel info: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Grab Carol's current commitment height (update number), we'll later
|
||||
// revert her to this state after additional updates to force her to
|
||||
// broadcast this soon to be revoked state.
|
||||
carolStateNumPreCopy := carolChan.NumUpdates
|
||||
|
||||
// Ensure that carol's balance still reflects the original amount we
|
||||
// pushed to her, minus the HTLCs she just sent to Dave.
|
||||
checkCarolBalance(pushAmt - 3*paymentAmt)
|
||||
|
||||
// Since Carol has not settled, she should only see at least one update
|
||||
// to her channel.
|
||||
checkCarolNumUpdatesAtLeast(1)
|
||||
|
||||
// With the temporary file created, copy Carol's current state into the
|
||||
// temporary file we created above. Later after more updates, we'll
|
||||
// restore this state.
|
||||
if err := net.BackupDb(carol); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to copy database files: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Finally, send payments from Dave to Carol, consuming Carol's
|
||||
// remaining payment hashes.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
err = completePaymentRequests(
|
||||
ctxt, dave, dave.RouterClient, carolPayReqs[numInvoices/2:],
|
||||
false,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to send payments: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Ensure that carol's balance still shows the amount we originally
|
||||
// pushed to her (minus the HTLCs she sent to Bob), and that at least
|
||||
// one more update has occurred.
|
||||
time.Sleep(500 * time.Millisecond)
|
||||
checkCarolBalance(pushAmt - 3*paymentAmt)
|
||||
checkCarolNumUpdatesAtLeast(carolStateNumPreCopy + 1)
|
||||
|
||||
// Suspend Dave, such that Carol won't reconnect at startup, triggering
|
||||
// the data loss protection.
|
||||
restartDave, err := net.SuspendNode(dave)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to suspend Dave: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Now we shutdown Carol, copying over the her temporary database state
|
||||
// which has the *prior* channel state over her current most up to date
|
||||
// state. With this, we essentially force Carol to travel back in time
|
||||
// within the channel's history.
|
||||
if err = net.RestartNode(carol, func() error {
|
||||
return net.RestoreDb(carol)
|
||||
}); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to restart node: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
time.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond)
|
||||
|
||||
// Ensure that Carol's view of the channel is consistent with the state
|
||||
// of the channel just before it was snapshotted.
|
||||
checkCarolBalance(pushAmt - 3*paymentAmt)
|
||||
checkCarolNumUpdatesAtLeast(1)
|
||||
|
||||
// Now query for Carol's channel state, it should show that she's at a
|
||||
// state number in the past, *not* the latest state.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
carolChan, err = getChanInfo(ctxt, carol)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to get carol chan info: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if carolChan.NumUpdates != carolStateNumPreCopy {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("db copy failed: %v", carolChan.NumUpdates)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Now force Carol to execute a *force* channel closure by unilaterally
|
||||
// broadcasting her current channel state. This is actually the
|
||||
// commitment transaction of a prior *revoked* state, so she'll soon
|
||||
// feel the wrath of Dave's retribution.
|
||||
force := true
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, channelCloseTimeout)
|
||||
closeUpdates, closeTxID, err := net.CloseChannel(ctxt, carol,
|
||||
chanPoint, force)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to close channel: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Query the mempool for the breaching closing transaction, this should
|
||||
// be broadcast by Carol when she force closes the channel above.
|
||||
txid, err := waitForTxInMempool(net.Miner.Client, minerMempoolTimeout)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to find Carol's force close tx in mempool: %v",
|
||||
err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if *txid != *closeTxID {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected closeTx(%v) in mempool, instead found %v",
|
||||
closeTxID, txid)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Generate a single block to mine the breach transaction.
|
||||
block := mineBlocks(t, net, 1, 1)[0]
|
||||
|
||||
// We resurrect Dave to ensure he will be exacting justice after his
|
||||
// node restarts.
|
||||
if err := restartDave(); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to stop Dave's node: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Finally, wait for the final close status update, then ensure that
|
||||
// the closing transaction was included in the block.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, channelCloseTimeout)
|
||||
breachTXID, err := net.WaitForChannelClose(ctxt, closeUpdates)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("error while waiting for channel close: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if *breachTXID != *closeTxID {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected breach ID(%v) to be equal to close ID (%v)",
|
||||
breachTXID, closeTxID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
assertTxInBlock(t, block, breachTXID)
|
||||
|
||||
// Query the mempool for Dave's justice transaction, this should be
|
||||
// broadcast as Carol's contract breaching transaction gets confirmed
|
||||
// above. Since Carol might have had the time to take some of the HTLC
|
||||
// outputs to the second level before Dave broadcasts his justice tx,
|
||||
// we'll search through the mempool for a tx that matches the number of
|
||||
// expected inputs in the justice tx.
|
||||
var predErr error
|
||||
var justiceTxid *chainhash.Hash
|
||||
errNotFound := errors.New("justice tx not found")
|
||||
findJusticeTx := func() (*chainhash.Hash, error) {
|
||||
mempool, err := net.Miner.Client.GetRawMempool()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to get mempool from "+
|
||||
"miner: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for _, txid := range mempool {
|
||||
// Check that the justice tx has the appropriate number
|
||||
// of inputs.
|
||||
tx, err := net.Miner.Client.GetRawTransaction(txid)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to query for "+
|
||||
"txs: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
exNumInputs := 2 + numInvoices
|
||||
if len(tx.MsgTx().TxIn) == exNumInputs {
|
||||
return txid, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil, errNotFound
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
err = wait.Predicate(func() bool {
|
||||
txid, err := findJusticeTx()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
predErr = err
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
justiceTxid = txid
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
if err != nil && predErr == errNotFound {
|
||||
// If Dave is unable to broadcast his justice tx on first
|
||||
// attempt because of the second layer transactions, he will
|
||||
// wait until the next block epoch before trying again. Because
|
||||
// of this, we'll mine a block if we cannot find the justice tx
|
||||
// immediately. Since we cannot tell for sure how many
|
||||
// transactions will be in the mempool at this point, we pass 0
|
||||
// as the last argument, indicating we don't care what's in the
|
||||
// mempool.
|
||||
mineBlocks(t, net, 1, 0)
|
||||
err = wait.Predicate(func() bool {
|
||||
txid, err := findJusticeTx()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
predErr = err
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
justiceTxid = txid
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf(predErr.Error())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
justiceTx, err := net.Miner.Client.GetRawTransaction(justiceTxid)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to query for justice tx: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// isSecondLevelSpend checks that the passed secondLevelTxid is a
|
||||
// potentitial second level spend spending from the commit tx.
|
||||
isSecondLevelSpend := func(commitTxid, secondLevelTxid *chainhash.Hash) bool {
|
||||
secondLevel, err := net.Miner.Client.GetRawTransaction(
|
||||
secondLevelTxid)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to query for tx: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A second level spend should have only one input, and one
|
||||
// output.
|
||||
if len(secondLevel.MsgTx().TxIn) != 1 {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(secondLevel.MsgTx().TxOut) != 1 {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The sole input should be spending from the commit tx.
|
||||
txIn := secondLevel.MsgTx().TxIn[0]
|
||||
|
||||
return bytes.Equal(txIn.PreviousOutPoint.Hash[:], commitTxid[:])
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Check that all the inputs of this transaction are spending outputs
|
||||
// generated by Carol's breach transaction above.
|
||||
for _, txIn := range justiceTx.MsgTx().TxIn {
|
||||
if bytes.Equal(txIn.PreviousOutPoint.Hash[:], breachTXID[:]) {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// If the justice tx is spending from an output that was not on
|
||||
// the breach tx, Carol might have had the time to take an
|
||||
// output to the second level. In that case, check that the
|
||||
// justice tx is spending this second level output.
|
||||
if isSecondLevelSpend(breachTXID, &txIn.PreviousOutPoint.Hash) {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
t.Fatalf("justice tx not spending commitment utxo "+
|
||||
"instead is: %v", txIn.PreviousOutPoint)
|
||||
}
|
||||
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
|
||||
|
||||
// We restart Dave here to ensure that he persists he retribution state
|
||||
// and successfully continues exacting retribution after restarting. At
|
||||
// this point, Dave has broadcast the justice transaction, but it
|
||||
// hasn't been confirmed yet; when Dave restarts, he should start
|
||||
// waiting for the justice transaction to confirm again.
|
||||
if err := net.RestartNode(dave, nil); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to restart Dave's node: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Now mine a block, this transaction should include Dave's justice
|
||||
// transaction which was just accepted into the mempool.
|
||||
block = mineBlocks(t, net, 1, 1)[0]
|
||||
assertTxInBlock(t, block, justiceTxid)
|
||||
|
||||
// Dave should have no open channels.
|
||||
assertNodeNumChannels(t, dave, 0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// testRevokedCloseRetributionAltruistWatchtower establishes a channel between
|
||||
// Carol and Dave, where Carol is using a third node Willy as her watchtower.
|
||||
// After sending some payments, Dave reverts his state and force closes to
|
||||
// trigger a breach. Carol is kept offline throughout the process and the test
|
||||
// asserts that Willy responds by broadcasting the justice transaction on
|
||||
// Carol's behalf sweeping her funds without a reward.
|
||||
func testRevokedCloseRetributionAltruistWatchtower(net *lntest.NetworkHarness,
|
||||
t *harnessTest) {
|
||||
|
||||
testCases := []struct {
|
||||
name string
|
||||
anchors bool
|
||||
}{{
|
||||
name: "anchors",
|
||||
anchors: true,
|
||||
}, {
|
||||
name: "legacy",
|
||||
anchors: false,
|
||||
}}
|
||||
|
||||
for _, tc := range testCases {
|
||||
tc := tc
|
||||
|
||||
success := t.t.Run(tc.name, func(tt *testing.T) {
|
||||
ht := newHarnessTest(tt, net)
|
||||
ht.RunTestCase(&testCase{
|
||||
name: tc.name,
|
||||
test: func(net1 *lntest.NetworkHarness, t1 *harnessTest) {
|
||||
testRevokedCloseRetributionAltruistWatchtowerCase(
|
||||
net1, t1, tc.anchors,
|
||||
)
|
||||
},
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
if !success {
|
||||
// Log failure time to help relate the lnd logs to the
|
||||
// failure.
|
||||
t.Logf("Failure time: %v", time.Now().Format(
|
||||
"2006-01-02 15:04:05.000",
|
||||
))
|
||||
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func testRevokedCloseRetributionAltruistWatchtowerCase(
|
||||
net *lntest.NetworkHarness, t *harnessTest, anchors bool) {
|
||||
|
||||
ctxb := context.Background()
|
||||
const (
|
||||
chanAmt = funding.MaxBtcFundingAmount
|
||||
paymentAmt = 10000
|
||||
numInvoices = 6
|
||||
externalIP = "1.2.3.4"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Since we'd like to test some multi-hop failure scenarios, we'll
|
||||
// introduce another node into our test network: Carol.
|
||||
carolArgs := []string{"--hodl.exit-settle"}
|
||||
if anchors {
|
||||
carolArgs = append(carolArgs, "--protocol.anchors")
|
||||
}
|
||||
carol := net.NewNode(t.t, "Carol", carolArgs)
|
||||
defer shutdownAndAssert(net, t, carol)
|
||||
|
||||
// Willy the watchtower will protect Dave from Carol's breach. He will
|
||||
// remain online in order to punish Carol on Dave's behalf, since the
|
||||
// breach will happen while Dave is offline.
|
||||
willy := net.NewNode(t.t, "Willy", []string{
|
||||
"--watchtower.active",
|
||||
"--watchtower.externalip=" + externalIP,
|
||||
})
|
||||
defer shutdownAndAssert(net, t, willy)
|
||||
|
||||
ctxt, _ := context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
willyInfo, err := willy.Watchtower.GetInfo(
|
||||
ctxt, &watchtowerrpc.GetInfoRequest{},
|
||||
)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to getinfo from willy: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Assert that Willy has one listener and it is 0.0.0.0:9911 or
|
||||
// [::]:9911. Since no listener is explicitly specified, one of these
|
||||
// should be the default depending on whether the host supports IPv6 or
|
||||
// not.
|
||||
if len(willyInfo.Listeners) != 1 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("Willy should have 1 listener, has %d",
|
||||
len(willyInfo.Listeners))
|
||||
}
|
||||
listener := willyInfo.Listeners[0]
|
||||
if listener != "0.0.0.0:9911" && listener != "[::]:9911" {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected listener on 0.0.0.0:9911 or [::]:9911, "+
|
||||
"got %v", listener)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Assert the Willy's URIs properly display the chosen external IP.
|
||||
if len(willyInfo.Uris) != 1 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("Willy should have 1 uri, has %d",
|
||||
len(willyInfo.Uris))
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(willyInfo.Uris[0], externalIP) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected uri with %v, got %v",
|
||||
externalIP, willyInfo.Uris[0])
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Dave will be the breached party. We set --nolisten to ensure Carol
|
||||
// won't be able to connect to him and trigger the channel data
|
||||
// protection logic automatically.
|
||||
daveArgs := []string{
|
||||
"--nolisten",
|
||||
"--wtclient.active",
|
||||
}
|
||||
if anchors {
|
||||
daveArgs = append(daveArgs, "--protocol.anchors")
|
||||
}
|
||||
dave := net.NewNode(t.t, "Dave", daveArgs)
|
||||
defer shutdownAndAssert(net, t, dave)
|
||||
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
addTowerReq := &wtclientrpc.AddTowerRequest{
|
||||
Pubkey: willyInfo.Pubkey,
|
||||
Address: listener,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := dave.WatchtowerClient.AddTower(ctxt, addTowerReq); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to add willy's watchtower: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// We must let Dave have an open channel before she can send a node
|
||||
// announcement, so we open a channel with Carol,
|
||||
net.ConnectNodes(ctxb, t.t, dave, carol)
|
||||
|
||||
// Before we make a channel, we'll load up Dave with some coins sent
|
||||
// directly from the miner.
|
||||
net.SendCoins(ctxb, t.t, btcutil.SatoshiPerBitcoin, dave)
|
||||
|
||||
// In order to test Dave's response to an uncooperative channel
|
||||
// closure by Carol, we'll first open up a channel between them with a
|
||||
// 0.5 BTC value.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, channelOpenTimeout)
|
||||
chanPoint := openChannelAndAssert(
|
||||
ctxt, t, net, dave, carol,
|
||||
lntest.OpenChannelParams{
|
||||
Amt: 3 * (chanAmt / 4),
|
||||
PushAmt: chanAmt / 4,
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// With the channel open, we'll create a few invoices for Carol that
|
||||
// Dave will pay to in order to advance the state of the channel.
|
||||
carolPayReqs, _, _, err := createPayReqs(
|
||||
carol, paymentAmt, numInvoices,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to create pay reqs: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Wait for Dave to receive the channel edge from the funding manager.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
err = dave.WaitForNetworkChannelOpen(ctxt, chanPoint)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("dave didn't see the dave->carol channel before "+
|
||||
"timeout: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Next query for Carol's channel state, as we sent 0 payments, Carol
|
||||
// should still see her balance as the push amount, which is 1/4 of the
|
||||
// capacity.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
carolChan, err := getChanInfo(ctxt, carol)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to get carol's channel info: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if carolChan.LocalBalance != int64(chanAmt/4) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("carol's balance is incorrect, got %v, expected %v",
|
||||
carolChan.LocalBalance, chanAmt/4)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Grab Carol's current commitment height (update number), we'll later
|
||||
// revert her to this state after additional updates to force him to
|
||||
// broadcast this soon to be revoked state.
|
||||
carolStateNumPreCopy := carolChan.NumUpdates
|
||||
|
||||
// With the temporary file created, copy Carol's current state into the
|
||||
// temporary file we created above. Later after more updates, we'll
|
||||
// restore this state.
|
||||
if err := net.BackupDb(carol); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to copy database files: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Finally, send payments from Dave to Carol, consuming Carol's remaining
|
||||
// payment hashes.
|
||||
err = completePaymentRequests(
|
||||
ctxb, dave, dave.RouterClient, carolPayReqs, false,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to send payments: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
daveBalReq := &lnrpc.WalletBalanceRequest{}
|
||||
daveBalResp, err := dave.WalletBalance(ctxt, daveBalReq)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to get dave's balance: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
davePreSweepBalance := daveBalResp.ConfirmedBalance
|
||||
|
||||
// Wait until the backup has been accepted by the watchtower before
|
||||
// shutting down Dave.
|
||||
err = wait.NoError(func() error {
|
||||
ctxt, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
defer cancel()
|
||||
bkpStats, err := dave.WatchtowerClient.Stats(ctxt,
|
||||
&wtclientrpc.StatsRequest{},
|
||||
)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
if bkpStats == nil {
|
||||
return errors.New("no active backup sessions")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if bkpStats.NumBackups == 0 {
|
||||
return errors.New("no backups accepted")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to verify backup task completed: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Shutdown Dave to simulate going offline for an extended period of
|
||||
// time. Once he's not watching, Carol will try to breach the channel.
|
||||
restart, err := net.SuspendNode(dave)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to suspend Dave: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Now we shutdown Carol, copying over the his temporary database state
|
||||
// which has the *prior* channel state over his current most up to date
|
||||
// state. With this, we essentially force Carol to travel back in time
|
||||
// within the channel's history.
|
||||
if err = net.RestartNode(carol, func() error {
|
||||
return net.RestoreDb(carol)
|
||||
}); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to restart node: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Now query for Carol's channel state, it should show that he's at a
|
||||
// state number in the past, not the *latest* state.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
carolChan, err = getChanInfo(ctxt, carol)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to get carol chan info: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if carolChan.NumUpdates != carolStateNumPreCopy {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("db copy failed: %v", carolChan.NumUpdates)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Now force Carol to execute a *force* channel closure by unilaterally
|
||||
// broadcasting his current channel state. This is actually the
|
||||
// commitment transaction of a prior *revoked* state, so he'll soon
|
||||
// feel the wrath of Dave's retribution.
|
||||
closeUpdates, closeTxID, err := net.CloseChannel(
|
||||
ctxb, carol, chanPoint, true,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to close channel: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Query the mempool for the breaching closing transaction, this should
|
||||
// be broadcast by Carol when she force closes the channel above.
|
||||
txid, err := waitForTxInMempool(net.Miner.Client, minerMempoolTimeout)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to find Carol's force close tx in mempool: %v",
|
||||
err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if *txid != *closeTxID {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected closeTx(%v) in mempool, instead found %v",
|
||||
closeTxID, txid)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Finally, generate a single block, wait for the final close status
|
||||
// update, then ensure that the closing transaction was included in the
|
||||
// block.
|
||||
block := mineBlocks(t, net, 1, 1)[0]
|
||||
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
breachTXID, err := net.WaitForChannelClose(ctxt, closeUpdates)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("error while waiting for channel close: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
assertTxInBlock(t, block, breachTXID)
|
||||
|
||||
// Query the mempool for Dave's justice transaction, this should be
|
||||
// broadcast as Carol's contract breaching transaction gets confirmed
|
||||
// above.
|
||||
justiceTXID, err := waitForTxInMempool(net.Miner.Client, minerMempoolTimeout)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to find Dave's justice tx in mempool: %v",
|
||||
err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
|
||||
|
||||
// Query for the mempool transaction found above. Then assert that all
|
||||
// the inputs of this transaction are spending outputs generated by
|
||||
// Carol's breach transaction above.
|
||||
justiceTx, err := net.Miner.Client.GetRawTransaction(justiceTXID)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to query for justice tx: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, txIn := range justiceTx.MsgTx().TxIn {
|
||||
if !bytes.Equal(txIn.PreviousOutPoint.Hash[:], breachTXID[:]) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("justice tx not spending commitment utxo "+
|
||||
"instead is: %v", txIn.PreviousOutPoint)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
willyBalReq := &lnrpc.WalletBalanceRequest{}
|
||||
willyBalResp, err := willy.WalletBalance(ctxt, willyBalReq)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to get willy's balance: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if willyBalResp.ConfirmedBalance != 0 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("willy should have 0 balance before mining "+
|
||||
"justice transaction, instead has %d",
|
||||
willyBalResp.ConfirmedBalance)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Now mine a block, this transaction should include Dave's justice
|
||||
// transaction which was just accepted into the mempool.
|
||||
block = mineBlocks(t, net, 1, 1)[0]
|
||||
|
||||
// The block should have exactly *two* transactions, one of which is
|
||||
// the justice transaction.
|
||||
if len(block.Transactions) != 2 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("transaction wasn't mined")
|
||||
}
|
||||
justiceSha := block.Transactions[1].TxHash()
|
||||
if !bytes.Equal(justiceTx.Hash()[:], justiceSha[:]) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("justice tx wasn't mined")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Ensure that Willy doesn't get any funds, as he is acting as an
|
||||
// altruist watchtower.
|
||||
var predErr error
|
||||
err = wait.Invariant(func() bool {
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
willyBalReq := &lnrpc.WalletBalanceRequest{}
|
||||
willyBalResp, err := willy.WalletBalance(ctxt, willyBalReq)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to get willy's balance: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if willyBalResp.ConfirmedBalance != 0 {
|
||||
predErr = fmt.Errorf("Expected Willy to have no funds "+
|
||||
"after justice transaction was mined, found %v",
|
||||
willyBalResp)
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}, time.Second*5)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("%v", predErr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Restart Dave, who will still think his channel with Carol is open.
|
||||
// We should him to detect the breach, but realize that the funds have
|
||||
// then been swept to his wallet by Willy.
|
||||
err = restart()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to restart dave: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
err = wait.Predicate(func() bool {
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
daveBalReq := &lnrpc.ChannelBalanceRequest{}
|
||||
daveBalResp, err := dave.ChannelBalance(ctxt, daveBalReq)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to get dave's balance: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if daveBalResp.LocalBalance.Sat != 0 {
|
||||
predErr = fmt.Errorf("Dave should end up with zero "+
|
||||
"channel balance, instead has %d",
|
||||
daveBalResp.LocalBalance.Sat)
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("%v", predErr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
assertNumPendingChannels(t, dave, 0, 0)
|
||||
|
||||
err = wait.Predicate(func() bool {
|
||||
ctxt, _ := context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
daveBalReq := &lnrpc.WalletBalanceRequest{}
|
||||
daveBalResp, err := dave.WalletBalance(ctxt, daveBalReq)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to get dave's balance: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if daveBalResp.ConfirmedBalance <= davePreSweepBalance {
|
||||
predErr = fmt.Errorf("Dave should have more than %d "+
|
||||
"after sweep, instead has %d",
|
||||
davePreSweepBalance,
|
||||
daveBalResp.ConfirmedBalance)
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("%v", predErr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Dave should have no open channels.
|
||||
assertNodeNumChannels(t, dave, 0)
|
||||
}
|
@ -34,8 +34,6 @@ import (
|
||||
"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/lnrpc/routerrpc"
|
||||
"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/lnrpc/signrpc"
|
||||
"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/lnrpc/walletrpc"
|
||||
"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/lnrpc/watchtowerrpc"
|
||||
"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/lnrpc/wtclientrpc"
|
||||
"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/lntest"
|
||||
"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/lntest/wait"
|
||||
"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/lnwallet"
|
||||
@ -4863,1317 +4861,6 @@ func testGarbageCollectLinkNodes(net *lntest.NetworkHarness, t *harnessTest) {
|
||||
closeChannelAndAssert(ctxt, t, net, net.Alice, persistentChanPoint, false)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// testRevokedCloseRetribution tests that Carol is able carry out
|
||||
// retribution in the event that she fails immediately after detecting Bob's
|
||||
// breach txn in the mempool.
|
||||
func testRevokedCloseRetribution(net *lntest.NetworkHarness, t *harnessTest) {
|
||||
ctxb := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
chanAmt = funding.MaxBtcFundingAmount
|
||||
paymentAmt = 10000
|
||||
numInvoices = 6
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Carol will be the breached party. We set --nolisten to ensure Bob
|
||||
// won't be able to connect to her and trigger the channel data
|
||||
// protection logic automatically. We also can't have Carol
|
||||
// automatically re-connect too early, otherwise DLP would be initiated
|
||||
// instead of the breach we want to provoke.
|
||||
carol := net.NewNode(
|
||||
t.t, "Carol",
|
||||
[]string{"--hodl.exit-settle", "--nolisten", "--minbackoff=1h"},
|
||||
)
|
||||
defer shutdownAndAssert(net, t, carol)
|
||||
|
||||
// We must let Bob communicate with Carol before they are able to open
|
||||
// channel, so we connect Bob and Carol,
|
||||
ctxt, _ := context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
net.ConnectNodes(ctxt, t.t, carol, net.Bob)
|
||||
|
||||
// Before we make a channel, we'll load up Carol with some coins sent
|
||||
// directly from the miner.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
net.SendCoins(ctxt, t.t, btcutil.SatoshiPerBitcoin, carol)
|
||||
|
||||
// In order to test Carol's response to an uncooperative channel
|
||||
// closure by Bob, we'll first open up a channel between them with a
|
||||
// 0.5 BTC value.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, channelOpenTimeout)
|
||||
chanPoint := openChannelAndAssert(
|
||||
ctxt, t, net, carol, net.Bob,
|
||||
lntest.OpenChannelParams{
|
||||
Amt: chanAmt,
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// With the channel open, we'll create a few invoices for Bob that
|
||||
// Carol will pay to in order to advance the state of the channel.
|
||||
bobPayReqs, _, _, err := createPayReqs(
|
||||
net.Bob, paymentAmt, numInvoices,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to create pay reqs: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Wait for Carol to receive the channel edge from the funding manager.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
err = carol.WaitForNetworkChannelOpen(ctxt, chanPoint)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("carol didn't see the carol->bob channel before "+
|
||||
"timeout: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Send payments from Carol to Bob using 3 of Bob's payment hashes
|
||||
// generated above.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
err = completePaymentRequests(
|
||||
ctxt, carol, carol.RouterClient, bobPayReqs[:numInvoices/2],
|
||||
true,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to send payments: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Next query for Bob's channel state, as we sent 3 payments of 10k
|
||||
// satoshis each, Bob should now see his balance as being 30k satoshis.
|
||||
var bobChan *lnrpc.Channel
|
||||
var predErr error
|
||||
err = wait.Predicate(func() bool {
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
bChan, err := getChanInfo(ctxt, net.Bob)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to get bob's channel info: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if bChan.LocalBalance != 30000 {
|
||||
predErr = fmt.Errorf("bob's balance is incorrect, "+
|
||||
"got %v, expected %v", bChan.LocalBalance,
|
||||
30000)
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bobChan = bChan
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("%v", predErr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Grab Bob's current commitment height (update number), we'll later
|
||||
// revert him to this state after additional updates to force him to
|
||||
// broadcast this soon to be revoked state.
|
||||
bobStateNumPreCopy := bobChan.NumUpdates
|
||||
|
||||
// With the temporary file created, copy Bob's current state into the
|
||||
// temporary file we created above. Later after more updates, we'll
|
||||
// restore this state.
|
||||
if err := net.BackupDb(net.Bob); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to copy database files: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Finally, send payments from Carol to Bob, consuming Bob's remaining
|
||||
// payment hashes.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
err = completePaymentRequests(
|
||||
ctxt, carol, carol.RouterClient, bobPayReqs[numInvoices/2:],
|
||||
true,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to send payments: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
bobChan, err = getChanInfo(ctxt, net.Bob)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to get bob chan info: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Now we shutdown Bob, copying over the his temporary database state
|
||||
// which has the *prior* channel state over his current most up to date
|
||||
// state. With this, we essentially force Bob to travel back in time
|
||||
// within the channel's history.
|
||||
if err = net.RestartNode(net.Bob, func() error {
|
||||
return net.RestoreDb(net.Bob)
|
||||
}); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to restart node: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Now query for Bob's channel state, it should show that he's at a
|
||||
// state number in the past, not the *latest* state.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
bobChan, err = getChanInfo(ctxt, net.Bob)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to get bob chan info: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if bobChan.NumUpdates != bobStateNumPreCopy {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("db copy failed: %v", bobChan.NumUpdates)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Now force Bob to execute a *force* channel closure by unilaterally
|
||||
// broadcasting his current channel state. This is actually the
|
||||
// commitment transaction of a prior *revoked* state, so he'll soon
|
||||
// feel the wrath of Carol's retribution.
|
||||
var closeUpdates lnrpc.Lightning_CloseChannelClient
|
||||
force := true
|
||||
err = wait.Predicate(func() bool {
|
||||
ctxt, _ := context.WithTimeout(ctxb, channelCloseTimeout)
|
||||
closeUpdates, _, err = net.CloseChannel(ctxt, net.Bob, chanPoint, force)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
predErr = err
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to close channel: %v", predErr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Wait for Bob's breach transaction to show up in the mempool to ensure
|
||||
// that Carol's node has started waiting for confirmations.
|
||||
_, err = waitForTxInMempool(net.Miner.Client, minerMempoolTimeout)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to find Bob's breach tx in mempool: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Here, Carol sees Bob's breach transaction in the mempool, but is waiting
|
||||
// for it to confirm before continuing her retribution. We restart Carol to
|
||||
// ensure that she is persisting her retribution state and continues
|
||||
// watching for the breach transaction to confirm even after her node
|
||||
// restarts.
|
||||
if err := net.RestartNode(carol, nil); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to restart Carol's node: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Finally, generate a single block, wait for the final close status
|
||||
// update, then ensure that the closing transaction was included in the
|
||||
// block.
|
||||
block := mineBlocks(t, net, 1, 1)[0]
|
||||
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, channelCloseTimeout)
|
||||
breachTXID, err := net.WaitForChannelClose(ctxt, closeUpdates)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("error while waiting for channel close: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
assertTxInBlock(t, block, breachTXID)
|
||||
|
||||
// Query the mempool for Carol's justice transaction, this should be
|
||||
// broadcast as Bob's contract breaching transaction gets confirmed
|
||||
// above.
|
||||
justiceTXID, err := waitForTxInMempool(net.Miner.Client, minerMempoolTimeout)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to find Carol's justice tx in mempool: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
|
||||
|
||||
// Query for the mempool transaction found above. Then assert that all
|
||||
// the inputs of this transaction are spending outputs generated by
|
||||
// Bob's breach transaction above.
|
||||
justiceTx, err := net.Miner.Client.GetRawTransaction(justiceTXID)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to query for justice tx: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, txIn := range justiceTx.MsgTx().TxIn {
|
||||
if !bytes.Equal(txIn.PreviousOutPoint.Hash[:], breachTXID[:]) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("justice tx not spending commitment utxo "+
|
||||
"instead is: %v", txIn.PreviousOutPoint)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// We restart Carol here to ensure that she persists her retribution state
|
||||
// and successfully continues exacting retribution after restarting. At
|
||||
// this point, Carol has broadcast the justice transaction, but it hasn't
|
||||
// been confirmed yet; when Carol restarts, she should start waiting for
|
||||
// the justice transaction to confirm again.
|
||||
if err := net.RestartNode(carol, nil); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to restart Carol's node: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Now mine a block, this transaction should include Carol's justice
|
||||
// transaction which was just accepted into the mempool.
|
||||
block = mineBlocks(t, net, 1, 1)[0]
|
||||
|
||||
// The block should have exactly *two* transactions, one of which is
|
||||
// the justice transaction.
|
||||
if len(block.Transactions) != 2 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("transaction wasn't mined")
|
||||
}
|
||||
justiceSha := block.Transactions[1].TxHash()
|
||||
if !bytes.Equal(justiceTx.Hash()[:], justiceSha[:]) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("justice tx wasn't mined")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
assertNodeNumChannels(t, carol, 0)
|
||||
|
||||
// Mine enough blocks for Bob's channel arbitrator to wrap up the
|
||||
// references to the breached channel. The chanarb waits for commitment
|
||||
// tx's confHeight+CSV-1 blocks and since we've already mined one that
|
||||
// included the justice tx we only need to mine extra DefaultCSV-2
|
||||
// blocks to unlock it.
|
||||
mineBlocks(t, net, lntest.DefaultCSV-2, 0)
|
||||
|
||||
assertNumPendingChannels(t, net.Bob, 0, 0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// testRevokedCloseRetributionZeroValueRemoteOutput tests that Dave is able
|
||||
// carry out retribution in the event that she fails in state where the remote
|
||||
// commitment output has zero-value.
|
||||
func testRevokedCloseRetributionZeroValueRemoteOutput(net *lntest.NetworkHarness,
|
||||
t *harnessTest) {
|
||||
ctxb := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
chanAmt = funding.MaxBtcFundingAmount
|
||||
paymentAmt = 10000
|
||||
numInvoices = 6
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Since we'd like to test some multi-hop failure scenarios, we'll
|
||||
// introduce another node into our test network: Carol.
|
||||
carol := net.NewNode(t.t, "Carol", []string{"--hodl.exit-settle"})
|
||||
defer shutdownAndAssert(net, t, carol)
|
||||
|
||||
// Dave will be the breached party. We set --nolisten to ensure Carol
|
||||
// won't be able to connect to him and trigger the channel data
|
||||
// protection logic automatically. We also can't have Dave automatically
|
||||
// re-connect too early, otherwise DLP would be initiated instead of the
|
||||
// breach we want to provoke.
|
||||
dave := net.NewNode(
|
||||
t.t, "Dave",
|
||||
[]string{"--hodl.exit-settle", "--nolisten", "--minbackoff=1h"},
|
||||
)
|
||||
defer shutdownAndAssert(net, t, dave)
|
||||
|
||||
// We must let Dave have an open channel before she can send a node
|
||||
// announcement, so we open a channel with Carol,
|
||||
ctxt, _ := context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
net.ConnectNodes(ctxt, t.t, dave, carol)
|
||||
|
||||
// Before we make a channel, we'll load up Dave with some coins sent
|
||||
// directly from the miner.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
net.SendCoins(ctxt, t.t, btcutil.SatoshiPerBitcoin, dave)
|
||||
|
||||
// In order to test Dave's response to an uncooperative channel
|
||||
// closure by Carol, we'll first open up a channel between them with a
|
||||
// 0.5 BTC value.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, channelOpenTimeout)
|
||||
chanPoint := openChannelAndAssert(
|
||||
ctxt, t, net, dave, carol,
|
||||
lntest.OpenChannelParams{
|
||||
Amt: chanAmt,
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// With the channel open, we'll create a few invoices for Carol that
|
||||
// Dave will pay to in order to advance the state of the channel.
|
||||
carolPayReqs, _, _, err := createPayReqs(
|
||||
carol, paymentAmt, numInvoices,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to create pay reqs: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Wait for Dave to receive the channel edge from the funding manager.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
err = dave.WaitForNetworkChannelOpen(ctxt, chanPoint)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("dave didn't see the dave->carol channel before "+
|
||||
"timeout: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Next query for Carol's channel state, as we sent 0 payments, Carol
|
||||
// should now see her balance as being 0 satoshis.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
carolChan, err := getChanInfo(ctxt, carol)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to get carol's channel info: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if carolChan.LocalBalance != 0 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("carol's balance is incorrect, got %v, expected %v",
|
||||
carolChan.LocalBalance, 0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Grab Carol's current commitment height (update number), we'll later
|
||||
// revert her to this state after additional updates to force him to
|
||||
// broadcast this soon to be revoked state.
|
||||
carolStateNumPreCopy := carolChan.NumUpdates
|
||||
|
||||
// With the temporary file created, copy Carol's current state into the
|
||||
// temporary file we created above. Later after more updates, we'll
|
||||
// restore this state.
|
||||
if err := net.BackupDb(carol); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to copy database files: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Finally, send payments from Dave to Carol, consuming Carol's remaining
|
||||
// payment hashes.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
err = completePaymentRequests(
|
||||
ctxt, dave, dave.RouterClient, carolPayReqs, false,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to send payments: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
_, err = getChanInfo(ctxt, carol)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to get carol chan info: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Now we shutdown Carol, copying over the his temporary database state
|
||||
// which has the *prior* channel state over his current most up to date
|
||||
// state. With this, we essentially force Carol to travel back in time
|
||||
// within the channel's history.
|
||||
if err = net.RestartNode(carol, func() error {
|
||||
return net.RestoreDb(carol)
|
||||
}); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to restart node: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Now query for Carol's channel state, it should show that he's at a
|
||||
// state number in the past, not the *latest* state.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
carolChan, err = getChanInfo(ctxt, carol)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to get carol chan info: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if carolChan.NumUpdates != carolStateNumPreCopy {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("db copy failed: %v", carolChan.NumUpdates)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Now force Carol to execute a *force* channel closure by unilaterally
|
||||
// broadcasting his current channel state. This is actually the
|
||||
// commitment transaction of a prior *revoked* state, so he'll soon
|
||||
// feel the wrath of Dave's retribution.
|
||||
var (
|
||||
closeUpdates lnrpc.Lightning_CloseChannelClient
|
||||
closeTxID *chainhash.Hash
|
||||
closeErr error
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
force := true
|
||||
err = wait.Predicate(func() bool {
|
||||
ctxt, _ := context.WithTimeout(ctxb, channelCloseTimeout)
|
||||
closeUpdates, closeTxID, closeErr = net.CloseChannel(
|
||||
ctxt, carol, chanPoint, force,
|
||||
)
|
||||
return closeErr == nil
|
||||
}, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to close channel: %v", closeErr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Query the mempool for the breaching closing transaction, this should
|
||||
// be broadcast by Carol when she force closes the channel above.
|
||||
txid, err := waitForTxInMempool(net.Miner.Client, minerMempoolTimeout)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to find Carol's force close tx in mempool: %v",
|
||||
err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if *txid != *closeTxID {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected closeTx(%v) in mempool, instead found %v",
|
||||
closeTxID, txid)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Finally, generate a single block, wait for the final close status
|
||||
// update, then ensure that the closing transaction was included in the
|
||||
// block.
|
||||
block := mineBlocks(t, net, 1, 1)[0]
|
||||
|
||||
// Here, Dave receives a confirmation of Carol's breach transaction.
|
||||
// We restart Dave to ensure that she is persisting her retribution
|
||||
// state and continues exacting justice after her node restarts.
|
||||
if err := net.RestartNode(dave, nil); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to stop Dave's node: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, channelCloseTimeout)
|
||||
breachTXID, err := net.WaitForChannelClose(ctxt, closeUpdates)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("error while waiting for channel close: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
assertTxInBlock(t, block, breachTXID)
|
||||
|
||||
// Query the mempool for Dave's justice transaction, this should be
|
||||
// broadcast as Carol's contract breaching transaction gets confirmed
|
||||
// above.
|
||||
justiceTXID, err := waitForTxInMempool(net.Miner.Client, minerMempoolTimeout)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to find Dave's justice tx in mempool: %v",
|
||||
err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
|
||||
|
||||
// Query for the mempool transaction found above. Then assert that all
|
||||
// the inputs of this transaction are spending outputs generated by
|
||||
// Carol's breach transaction above.
|
||||
justiceTx, err := net.Miner.Client.GetRawTransaction(justiceTXID)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to query for justice tx: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, txIn := range justiceTx.MsgTx().TxIn {
|
||||
if !bytes.Equal(txIn.PreviousOutPoint.Hash[:], breachTXID[:]) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("justice tx not spending commitment utxo "+
|
||||
"instead is: %v", txIn.PreviousOutPoint)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// We restart Dave here to ensure that he persists her retribution state
|
||||
// and successfully continues exacting retribution after restarting. At
|
||||
// this point, Dave has broadcast the justice transaction, but it hasn't
|
||||
// been confirmed yet; when Dave restarts, she should start waiting for
|
||||
// the justice transaction to confirm again.
|
||||
if err := net.RestartNode(dave, nil); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to restart Dave's node: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Now mine a block, this transaction should include Dave's justice
|
||||
// transaction which was just accepted into the mempool.
|
||||
block = mineBlocks(t, net, 1, 1)[0]
|
||||
|
||||
// The block should have exactly *two* transactions, one of which is
|
||||
// the justice transaction.
|
||||
if len(block.Transactions) != 2 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("transaction wasn't mined")
|
||||
}
|
||||
justiceSha := block.Transactions[1].TxHash()
|
||||
if !bytes.Equal(justiceTx.Hash()[:], justiceSha[:]) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("justice tx wasn't mined")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
assertNodeNumChannels(t, dave, 0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// testRevokedCloseRetributionRemoteHodl tests that Dave properly responds to a
|
||||
// channel breach made by the remote party, specifically in the case that the
|
||||
// remote party breaches before settling extended HTLCs.
|
||||
func testRevokedCloseRetributionRemoteHodl(net *lntest.NetworkHarness,
|
||||
t *harnessTest) {
|
||||
ctxb := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
chanAmt = funding.MaxBtcFundingAmount
|
||||
pushAmt = 200000
|
||||
paymentAmt = 10000
|
||||
numInvoices = 6
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Since this test will result in the counterparty being left in a
|
||||
// weird state, we will introduce another node into our test network:
|
||||
// Carol.
|
||||
carol := net.NewNode(t.t, "Carol", []string{"--hodl.exit-settle"})
|
||||
defer shutdownAndAssert(net, t, carol)
|
||||
|
||||
// We'll also create a new node Dave, who will have a channel with
|
||||
// Carol, and also use similar settings so we can broadcast a commit
|
||||
// with active HTLCs. Dave will be the breached party. We set
|
||||
// --nolisten to ensure Carol won't be able to connect to him and
|
||||
// trigger the channel data protection logic automatically.
|
||||
dave := net.NewNode(
|
||||
t.t, "Dave",
|
||||
[]string{"--hodl.exit-settle", "--nolisten"},
|
||||
)
|
||||
defer shutdownAndAssert(net, t, dave)
|
||||
|
||||
// We must let Dave communicate with Carol before they are able to open
|
||||
// channel, so we connect Dave and Carol,
|
||||
ctxt, _ := context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
net.ConnectNodes(ctxt, t.t, dave, carol)
|
||||
|
||||
// Before we make a channel, we'll load up Dave with some coins sent
|
||||
// directly from the miner.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
net.SendCoins(ctxt, t.t, btcutil.SatoshiPerBitcoin, dave)
|
||||
|
||||
// In order to test Dave's response to an uncooperative channel closure
|
||||
// by Carol, we'll first open up a channel between them with a
|
||||
// funding.MaxBtcFundingAmount (2^24) satoshis value.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, channelOpenTimeout)
|
||||
chanPoint := openChannelAndAssert(
|
||||
ctxt, t, net, dave, carol,
|
||||
lntest.OpenChannelParams{
|
||||
Amt: chanAmt,
|
||||
PushAmt: pushAmt,
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// With the channel open, we'll create a few invoices for Carol that
|
||||
// Dave will pay to in order to advance the state of the channel.
|
||||
carolPayReqs, _, _, err := createPayReqs(
|
||||
carol, paymentAmt, numInvoices,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to create pay reqs: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// We'll introduce a closure to validate that Carol's current balance
|
||||
// matches the given expected amount.
|
||||
checkCarolBalance := func(expectedAmt int64) {
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
carolChan, err := getChanInfo(ctxt, carol)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to get carol's channel info: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if carolChan.LocalBalance != expectedAmt {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("carol's balance is incorrect, "+
|
||||
"got %v, expected %v", carolChan.LocalBalance,
|
||||
expectedAmt)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// We'll introduce another closure to validate that Carol's current
|
||||
// number of updates is at least as large as the provided minimum
|
||||
// number.
|
||||
checkCarolNumUpdatesAtLeast := func(minimum uint64) {
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
carolChan, err := getChanInfo(ctxt, carol)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to get carol's channel info: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if carolChan.NumUpdates < minimum {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("carol's numupdates is incorrect, want %v "+
|
||||
"to be at least %v", carolChan.NumUpdates,
|
||||
minimum)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Wait for Dave to receive the channel edge from the funding manager.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
err = dave.WaitForNetworkChannelOpen(ctxt, chanPoint)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("dave didn't see the dave->carol channel before "+
|
||||
"timeout: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Ensure that carol's balance starts with the amount we pushed to her.
|
||||
checkCarolBalance(pushAmt)
|
||||
|
||||
// Send payments from Dave to Carol using 3 of Carol's payment hashes
|
||||
// generated above.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
err = completePaymentRequests(
|
||||
ctxt, dave, dave.RouterClient, carolPayReqs[:numInvoices/2],
|
||||
false,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to send payments: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// At this point, we'll also send over a set of HTLC's from Carol to
|
||||
// Dave. This ensures that the final revoked transaction has HTLC's in
|
||||
// both directions.
|
||||
davePayReqs, _, _, err := createPayReqs(
|
||||
dave, paymentAmt, numInvoices,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to create pay reqs: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Send payments from Carol to Dave using 3 of Dave's payment hashes
|
||||
// generated above.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
err = completePaymentRequests(
|
||||
ctxt, carol, carol.RouterClient, davePayReqs[:numInvoices/2],
|
||||
false,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to send payments: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Next query for Carol's channel state, as we sent 3 payments of 10k
|
||||
// satoshis each, however Carol should now see her balance as being
|
||||
// equal to the push amount in satoshis since she has not settled.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
carolChan, err := getChanInfo(ctxt, carol)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to get carol's channel info: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Grab Carol's current commitment height (update number), we'll later
|
||||
// revert her to this state after additional updates to force her to
|
||||
// broadcast this soon to be revoked state.
|
||||
carolStateNumPreCopy := carolChan.NumUpdates
|
||||
|
||||
// Ensure that carol's balance still reflects the original amount we
|
||||
// pushed to her, minus the HTLCs she just sent to Dave.
|
||||
checkCarolBalance(pushAmt - 3*paymentAmt)
|
||||
|
||||
// Since Carol has not settled, she should only see at least one update
|
||||
// to her channel.
|
||||
checkCarolNumUpdatesAtLeast(1)
|
||||
|
||||
// With the temporary file created, copy Carol's current state into the
|
||||
// temporary file we created above. Later after more updates, we'll
|
||||
// restore this state.
|
||||
if err := net.BackupDb(carol); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to copy database files: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Finally, send payments from Dave to Carol, consuming Carol's
|
||||
// remaining payment hashes.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
err = completePaymentRequests(
|
||||
ctxt, dave, dave.RouterClient, carolPayReqs[numInvoices/2:],
|
||||
false,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to send payments: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Ensure that carol's balance still shows the amount we originally
|
||||
// pushed to her (minus the HTLCs she sent to Bob), and that at least
|
||||
// one more update has occurred.
|
||||
time.Sleep(500 * time.Millisecond)
|
||||
checkCarolBalance(pushAmt - 3*paymentAmt)
|
||||
checkCarolNumUpdatesAtLeast(carolStateNumPreCopy + 1)
|
||||
|
||||
// Suspend Dave, such that Carol won't reconnect at startup, triggering
|
||||
// the data loss protection.
|
||||
restartDave, err := net.SuspendNode(dave)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to suspend Dave: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Now we shutdown Carol, copying over the her temporary database state
|
||||
// which has the *prior* channel state over her current most up to date
|
||||
// state. With this, we essentially force Carol to travel back in time
|
||||
// within the channel's history.
|
||||
if err = net.RestartNode(carol, func() error {
|
||||
return net.RestoreDb(carol)
|
||||
}); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to restart node: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
time.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond)
|
||||
|
||||
// Ensure that Carol's view of the channel is consistent with the state
|
||||
// of the channel just before it was snapshotted.
|
||||
checkCarolBalance(pushAmt - 3*paymentAmt)
|
||||
checkCarolNumUpdatesAtLeast(1)
|
||||
|
||||
// Now query for Carol's channel state, it should show that she's at a
|
||||
// state number in the past, *not* the latest state.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
carolChan, err = getChanInfo(ctxt, carol)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to get carol chan info: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if carolChan.NumUpdates != carolStateNumPreCopy {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("db copy failed: %v", carolChan.NumUpdates)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Now force Carol to execute a *force* channel closure by unilaterally
|
||||
// broadcasting her current channel state. This is actually the
|
||||
// commitment transaction of a prior *revoked* state, so she'll soon
|
||||
// feel the wrath of Dave's retribution.
|
||||
force := true
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, channelCloseTimeout)
|
||||
closeUpdates, closeTxID, err := net.CloseChannel(ctxt, carol,
|
||||
chanPoint, force)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to close channel: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Query the mempool for the breaching closing transaction, this should
|
||||
// be broadcast by Carol when she force closes the channel above.
|
||||
txid, err := waitForTxInMempool(net.Miner.Client, minerMempoolTimeout)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to find Carol's force close tx in mempool: %v",
|
||||
err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if *txid != *closeTxID {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected closeTx(%v) in mempool, instead found %v",
|
||||
closeTxID, txid)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Generate a single block to mine the breach transaction.
|
||||
block := mineBlocks(t, net, 1, 1)[0]
|
||||
|
||||
// We resurrect Dave to ensure he will be exacting justice after his
|
||||
// node restarts.
|
||||
if err := restartDave(); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to stop Dave's node: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Finally, wait for the final close status update, then ensure that
|
||||
// the closing transaction was included in the block.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, channelCloseTimeout)
|
||||
breachTXID, err := net.WaitForChannelClose(ctxt, closeUpdates)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("error while waiting for channel close: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if *breachTXID != *closeTxID {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected breach ID(%v) to be equal to close ID (%v)",
|
||||
breachTXID, closeTxID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
assertTxInBlock(t, block, breachTXID)
|
||||
|
||||
// Query the mempool for Dave's justice transaction, this should be
|
||||
// broadcast as Carol's contract breaching transaction gets confirmed
|
||||
// above. Since Carol might have had the time to take some of the HTLC
|
||||
// outputs to the second level before Dave broadcasts his justice tx,
|
||||
// we'll search through the mempool for a tx that matches the number of
|
||||
// expected inputs in the justice tx.
|
||||
var predErr error
|
||||
var justiceTxid *chainhash.Hash
|
||||
errNotFound := errors.New("justice tx not found")
|
||||
findJusticeTx := func() (*chainhash.Hash, error) {
|
||||
mempool, err := net.Miner.Client.GetRawMempool()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to get mempool from "+
|
||||
"miner: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for _, txid := range mempool {
|
||||
// Check that the justice tx has the appropriate number
|
||||
// of inputs.
|
||||
tx, err := net.Miner.Client.GetRawTransaction(txid)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to query for "+
|
||||
"txs: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
exNumInputs := 2 + numInvoices
|
||||
if len(tx.MsgTx().TxIn) == exNumInputs {
|
||||
return txid, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil, errNotFound
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
err = wait.Predicate(func() bool {
|
||||
txid, err := findJusticeTx()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
predErr = err
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
justiceTxid = txid
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
if err != nil && predErr == errNotFound {
|
||||
// If Dave is unable to broadcast his justice tx on first
|
||||
// attempt because of the second layer transactions, he will
|
||||
// wait until the next block epoch before trying again. Because
|
||||
// of this, we'll mine a block if we cannot find the justice tx
|
||||
// immediately. Since we cannot tell for sure how many
|
||||
// transactions will be in the mempool at this point, we pass 0
|
||||
// as the last argument, indicating we don't care what's in the
|
||||
// mempool.
|
||||
mineBlocks(t, net, 1, 0)
|
||||
err = wait.Predicate(func() bool {
|
||||
txid, err := findJusticeTx()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
predErr = err
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
justiceTxid = txid
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf(predErr.Error())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
justiceTx, err := net.Miner.Client.GetRawTransaction(justiceTxid)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to query for justice tx: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// isSecondLevelSpend checks that the passed secondLevelTxid is a
|
||||
// potentitial second level spend spending from the commit tx.
|
||||
isSecondLevelSpend := func(commitTxid, secondLevelTxid *chainhash.Hash) bool {
|
||||
secondLevel, err := net.Miner.Client.GetRawTransaction(
|
||||
secondLevelTxid)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to query for tx: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A second level spend should have only one input, and one
|
||||
// output.
|
||||
if len(secondLevel.MsgTx().TxIn) != 1 {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(secondLevel.MsgTx().TxOut) != 1 {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The sole input should be spending from the commit tx.
|
||||
txIn := secondLevel.MsgTx().TxIn[0]
|
||||
|
||||
return bytes.Equal(txIn.PreviousOutPoint.Hash[:], commitTxid[:])
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Check that all the inputs of this transaction are spending outputs
|
||||
// generated by Carol's breach transaction above.
|
||||
for _, txIn := range justiceTx.MsgTx().TxIn {
|
||||
if bytes.Equal(txIn.PreviousOutPoint.Hash[:], breachTXID[:]) {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// If the justice tx is spending from an output that was not on
|
||||
// the breach tx, Carol might have had the time to take an
|
||||
// output to the second level. In that case, check that the
|
||||
// justice tx is spending this second level output.
|
||||
if isSecondLevelSpend(breachTXID, &txIn.PreviousOutPoint.Hash) {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
t.Fatalf("justice tx not spending commitment utxo "+
|
||||
"instead is: %v", txIn.PreviousOutPoint)
|
||||
}
|
||||
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
|
||||
|
||||
// We restart Dave here to ensure that he persists he retribution state
|
||||
// and successfully continues exacting retribution after restarting. At
|
||||
// this point, Dave has broadcast the justice transaction, but it
|
||||
// hasn't been confirmed yet; when Dave restarts, he should start
|
||||
// waiting for the justice transaction to confirm again.
|
||||
if err := net.RestartNode(dave, nil); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to restart Dave's node: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Now mine a block, this transaction should include Dave's justice
|
||||
// transaction which was just accepted into the mempool.
|
||||
block = mineBlocks(t, net, 1, 1)[0]
|
||||
assertTxInBlock(t, block, justiceTxid)
|
||||
|
||||
// Dave should have no open channels.
|
||||
assertNodeNumChannels(t, dave, 0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// testRevokedCloseRetributionAltruistWatchtower establishes a channel between
|
||||
// Carol and Dave, where Carol is using a third node Willy as her watchtower.
|
||||
// After sending some payments, Dave reverts his state and force closes to
|
||||
// trigger a breach. Carol is kept offline throughout the process and the test
|
||||
// asserts that Willy responds by broadcasting the justice transaction on
|
||||
// Carol's behalf sweeping her funds without a reward.
|
||||
func testRevokedCloseRetributionAltruistWatchtower(net *lntest.NetworkHarness,
|
||||
t *harnessTest) {
|
||||
|
||||
testCases := []struct {
|
||||
name string
|
||||
anchors bool
|
||||
}{{
|
||||
name: "anchors",
|
||||
anchors: true,
|
||||
}, {
|
||||
name: "legacy",
|
||||
anchors: false,
|
||||
}}
|
||||
|
||||
for _, tc := range testCases {
|
||||
tc := tc
|
||||
|
||||
success := t.t.Run(tc.name, func(tt *testing.T) {
|
||||
ht := newHarnessTest(tt, net)
|
||||
ht.RunTestCase(&testCase{
|
||||
name: tc.name,
|
||||
test: func(net1 *lntest.NetworkHarness, t1 *harnessTest) {
|
||||
testRevokedCloseRetributionAltruistWatchtowerCase(
|
||||
net1, t1, tc.anchors,
|
||||
)
|
||||
},
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
if !success {
|
||||
// Log failure time to help relate the lnd logs to the
|
||||
// failure.
|
||||
t.Logf("Failure time: %v", time.Now().Format(
|
||||
"2006-01-02 15:04:05.000",
|
||||
))
|
||||
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func testRevokedCloseRetributionAltruistWatchtowerCase(
|
||||
net *lntest.NetworkHarness, t *harnessTest, anchors bool) {
|
||||
|
||||
ctxb := context.Background()
|
||||
const (
|
||||
chanAmt = funding.MaxBtcFundingAmount
|
||||
paymentAmt = 10000
|
||||
numInvoices = 6
|
||||
externalIP = "1.2.3.4"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Since we'd like to test some multi-hop failure scenarios, we'll
|
||||
// introduce another node into our test network: Carol.
|
||||
carolArgs := []string{"--hodl.exit-settle"}
|
||||
if anchors {
|
||||
carolArgs = append(carolArgs, "--protocol.anchors")
|
||||
}
|
||||
carol := net.NewNode(t.t, "Carol", carolArgs)
|
||||
defer shutdownAndAssert(net, t, carol)
|
||||
|
||||
// Willy the watchtower will protect Dave from Carol's breach. He will
|
||||
// remain online in order to punish Carol on Dave's behalf, since the
|
||||
// breach will happen while Dave is offline.
|
||||
willy := net.NewNode(t.t, "Willy", []string{
|
||||
"--watchtower.active",
|
||||
"--watchtower.externalip=" + externalIP,
|
||||
})
|
||||
defer shutdownAndAssert(net, t, willy)
|
||||
|
||||
ctxt, _ := context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
willyInfo, err := willy.Watchtower.GetInfo(
|
||||
ctxt, &watchtowerrpc.GetInfoRequest{},
|
||||
)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to getinfo from willy: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Assert that Willy has one listener and it is 0.0.0.0:9911 or
|
||||
// [::]:9911. Since no listener is explicitly specified, one of these
|
||||
// should be the default depending on whether the host supports IPv6 or
|
||||
// not.
|
||||
if len(willyInfo.Listeners) != 1 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("Willy should have 1 listener, has %d",
|
||||
len(willyInfo.Listeners))
|
||||
}
|
||||
listener := willyInfo.Listeners[0]
|
||||
if listener != "0.0.0.0:9911" && listener != "[::]:9911" {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected listener on 0.0.0.0:9911 or [::]:9911, "+
|
||||
"got %v", listener)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Assert the Willy's URIs properly display the chosen external IP.
|
||||
if len(willyInfo.Uris) != 1 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("Willy should have 1 uri, has %d",
|
||||
len(willyInfo.Uris))
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(willyInfo.Uris[0], externalIP) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected uri with %v, got %v",
|
||||
externalIP, willyInfo.Uris[0])
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Dave will be the breached party. We set --nolisten to ensure Carol
|
||||
// won't be able to connect to him and trigger the channel data
|
||||
// protection logic automatically.
|
||||
daveArgs := []string{
|
||||
"--nolisten",
|
||||
"--wtclient.active",
|
||||
}
|
||||
if anchors {
|
||||
daveArgs = append(daveArgs, "--protocol.anchors")
|
||||
}
|
||||
dave := net.NewNode(t.t, "Dave", daveArgs)
|
||||
defer shutdownAndAssert(net, t, dave)
|
||||
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
addTowerReq := &wtclientrpc.AddTowerRequest{
|
||||
Pubkey: willyInfo.Pubkey,
|
||||
Address: listener,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := dave.WatchtowerClient.AddTower(ctxt, addTowerReq); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to add willy's watchtower: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// We must let Dave have an open channel before she can send a node
|
||||
// announcement, so we open a channel with Carol,
|
||||
net.ConnectNodes(ctxb, t.t, dave, carol)
|
||||
|
||||
// Before we make a channel, we'll load up Dave with some coins sent
|
||||
// directly from the miner.
|
||||
net.SendCoins(ctxb, t.t, btcutil.SatoshiPerBitcoin, dave)
|
||||
|
||||
// In order to test Dave's response to an uncooperative channel
|
||||
// closure by Carol, we'll first open up a channel between them with a
|
||||
// 0.5 BTC value.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, channelOpenTimeout)
|
||||
chanPoint := openChannelAndAssert(
|
||||
ctxt, t, net, dave, carol,
|
||||
lntest.OpenChannelParams{
|
||||
Amt: 3 * (chanAmt / 4),
|
||||
PushAmt: chanAmt / 4,
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// With the channel open, we'll create a few invoices for Carol that
|
||||
// Dave will pay to in order to advance the state of the channel.
|
||||
carolPayReqs, _, _, err := createPayReqs(
|
||||
carol, paymentAmt, numInvoices,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to create pay reqs: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Wait for Dave to receive the channel edge from the funding manager.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
err = dave.WaitForNetworkChannelOpen(ctxt, chanPoint)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("dave didn't see the dave->carol channel before "+
|
||||
"timeout: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Next query for Carol's channel state, as we sent 0 payments, Carol
|
||||
// should still see her balance as the push amount, which is 1/4 of the
|
||||
// capacity.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
carolChan, err := getChanInfo(ctxt, carol)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to get carol's channel info: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if carolChan.LocalBalance != int64(chanAmt/4) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("carol's balance is incorrect, got %v, expected %v",
|
||||
carolChan.LocalBalance, chanAmt/4)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Grab Carol's current commitment height (update number), we'll later
|
||||
// revert her to this state after additional updates to force him to
|
||||
// broadcast this soon to be revoked state.
|
||||
carolStateNumPreCopy := carolChan.NumUpdates
|
||||
|
||||
// With the temporary file created, copy Carol's current state into the
|
||||
// temporary file we created above. Later after more updates, we'll
|
||||
// restore this state.
|
||||
if err := net.BackupDb(carol); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to copy database files: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Finally, send payments from Dave to Carol, consuming Carol's remaining
|
||||
// payment hashes.
|
||||
err = completePaymentRequests(
|
||||
ctxb, dave, dave.RouterClient, carolPayReqs, false,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to send payments: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
daveBalReq := &lnrpc.WalletBalanceRequest{}
|
||||
daveBalResp, err := dave.WalletBalance(ctxt, daveBalReq)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to get dave's balance: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
davePreSweepBalance := daveBalResp.ConfirmedBalance
|
||||
|
||||
// Wait until the backup has been accepted by the watchtower before
|
||||
// shutting down Dave.
|
||||
err = wait.NoError(func() error {
|
||||
ctxt, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
defer cancel()
|
||||
bkpStats, err := dave.WatchtowerClient.Stats(ctxt,
|
||||
&wtclientrpc.StatsRequest{},
|
||||
)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
if bkpStats == nil {
|
||||
return errors.New("no active backup sessions")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if bkpStats.NumBackups == 0 {
|
||||
return errors.New("no backups accepted")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to verify backup task completed: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Shutdown Dave to simulate going offline for an extended period of
|
||||
// time. Once he's not watching, Carol will try to breach the channel.
|
||||
restart, err := net.SuspendNode(dave)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to suspend Dave: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Now we shutdown Carol, copying over the his temporary database state
|
||||
// which has the *prior* channel state over his current most up to date
|
||||
// state. With this, we essentially force Carol to travel back in time
|
||||
// within the channel's history.
|
||||
if err = net.RestartNode(carol, func() error {
|
||||
return net.RestoreDb(carol)
|
||||
}); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to restart node: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Now query for Carol's channel state, it should show that he's at a
|
||||
// state number in the past, not the *latest* state.
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
carolChan, err = getChanInfo(ctxt, carol)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to get carol chan info: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if carolChan.NumUpdates != carolStateNumPreCopy {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("db copy failed: %v", carolChan.NumUpdates)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Now force Carol to execute a *force* channel closure by unilaterally
|
||||
// broadcasting his current channel state. This is actually the
|
||||
// commitment transaction of a prior *revoked* state, so he'll soon
|
||||
// feel the wrath of Dave's retribution.
|
||||
closeUpdates, closeTxID, err := net.CloseChannel(
|
||||
ctxb, carol, chanPoint, true,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to close channel: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Query the mempool for the breaching closing transaction, this should
|
||||
// be broadcast by Carol when she force closes the channel above.
|
||||
txid, err := waitForTxInMempool(net.Miner.Client, minerMempoolTimeout)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to find Carol's force close tx in mempool: %v",
|
||||
err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if *txid != *closeTxID {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("expected closeTx(%v) in mempool, instead found %v",
|
||||
closeTxID, txid)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Finally, generate a single block, wait for the final close status
|
||||
// update, then ensure that the closing transaction was included in the
|
||||
// block.
|
||||
block := mineBlocks(t, net, 1, 1)[0]
|
||||
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
breachTXID, err := net.WaitForChannelClose(ctxt, closeUpdates)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("error while waiting for channel close: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
assertTxInBlock(t, block, breachTXID)
|
||||
|
||||
// Query the mempool for Dave's justice transaction, this should be
|
||||
// broadcast as Carol's contract breaching transaction gets confirmed
|
||||
// above.
|
||||
justiceTXID, err := waitForTxInMempool(net.Miner.Client, minerMempoolTimeout)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to find Dave's justice tx in mempool: %v",
|
||||
err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
|
||||
|
||||
// Query for the mempool transaction found above. Then assert that all
|
||||
// the inputs of this transaction are spending outputs generated by
|
||||
// Carol's breach transaction above.
|
||||
justiceTx, err := net.Miner.Client.GetRawTransaction(justiceTXID)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to query for justice tx: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, txIn := range justiceTx.MsgTx().TxIn {
|
||||
if !bytes.Equal(txIn.PreviousOutPoint.Hash[:], breachTXID[:]) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("justice tx not spending commitment utxo "+
|
||||
"instead is: %v", txIn.PreviousOutPoint)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
willyBalReq := &lnrpc.WalletBalanceRequest{}
|
||||
willyBalResp, err := willy.WalletBalance(ctxt, willyBalReq)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to get willy's balance: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if willyBalResp.ConfirmedBalance != 0 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("willy should have 0 balance before mining "+
|
||||
"justice transaction, instead has %d",
|
||||
willyBalResp.ConfirmedBalance)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Now mine a block, this transaction should include Dave's justice
|
||||
// transaction which was just accepted into the mempool.
|
||||
block = mineBlocks(t, net, 1, 1)[0]
|
||||
|
||||
// The block should have exactly *two* transactions, one of which is
|
||||
// the justice transaction.
|
||||
if len(block.Transactions) != 2 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("transaction wasn't mined")
|
||||
}
|
||||
justiceSha := block.Transactions[1].TxHash()
|
||||
if !bytes.Equal(justiceTx.Hash()[:], justiceSha[:]) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("justice tx wasn't mined")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Ensure that Willy doesn't get any funds, as he is acting as an
|
||||
// altruist watchtower.
|
||||
var predErr error
|
||||
err = wait.Invariant(func() bool {
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
willyBalReq := &lnrpc.WalletBalanceRequest{}
|
||||
willyBalResp, err := willy.WalletBalance(ctxt, willyBalReq)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to get willy's balance: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if willyBalResp.ConfirmedBalance != 0 {
|
||||
predErr = fmt.Errorf("Expected Willy to have no funds "+
|
||||
"after justice transaction was mined, found %v",
|
||||
willyBalResp)
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}, time.Second*5)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("%v", predErr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Restart Dave, who will still think his channel with Carol is open.
|
||||
// We should him to detect the breach, but realize that the funds have
|
||||
// then been swept to his wallet by Willy.
|
||||
err = restart()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to restart dave: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
err = wait.Predicate(func() bool {
|
||||
ctxt, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
daveBalReq := &lnrpc.ChannelBalanceRequest{}
|
||||
daveBalResp, err := dave.ChannelBalance(ctxt, daveBalReq)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to get dave's balance: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if daveBalResp.LocalBalance.Sat != 0 {
|
||||
predErr = fmt.Errorf("Dave should end up with zero "+
|
||||
"channel balance, instead has %d",
|
||||
daveBalResp.LocalBalance.Sat)
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("%v", predErr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
assertNumPendingChannels(t, dave, 0, 0)
|
||||
|
||||
err = wait.Predicate(func() bool {
|
||||
ctxt, _ := context.WithTimeout(ctxb, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
daveBalReq := &lnrpc.WalletBalanceRequest{}
|
||||
daveBalResp, err := dave.WalletBalance(ctxt, daveBalReq)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("unable to get dave's balance: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if daveBalResp.ConfirmedBalance <= davePreSweepBalance {
|
||||
predErr = fmt.Errorf("Dave should have more than %d "+
|
||||
"after sweep, instead has %d",
|
||||
davePreSweepBalance,
|
||||
daveBalResp.ConfirmedBalance)
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}, defaultTimeout)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("%v", predErr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Dave should have no open channels.
|
||||
assertNodeNumChannels(t, dave, 0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// testDataLossProtection tests that if one of the nodes in a channel
|
||||
// relationship lost state, they will detect this during channel sync, and the
|
||||
// up-to-date party will force close the channel, giving the outdated party the
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user