lnd.xprv/htlcswitch/link.go

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package htlcswitch
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/sha256"
"fmt"
prand "math/rand"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"github.com/btcsuite/btcd/chaincfg/chainhash"
"github.com/davecgh/go-spew/spew"
"github.com/go-errors/errors"
"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/channeldb"
"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/contractcourt"
"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/htlcswitch/hodl"
"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/lnpeer"
"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/lnwallet"
"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/lnwire"
)
func init() {
prand.Seed(time.Now().UnixNano())
}
const (
// expiryGraceDelta is a grace period that the timeout of incoming
// HTLC's that pay directly to us (i.e we're the "exit node") must up
// hold. We'll reject any HTLC's who's timeout minus this value is less
// that or equal to the current block height. We require this in order
// to ensure that if the extending party goes to the chain, then we'll
// be able to claim the HTLC still.
//
// TODO(roasbeef): must be < default delta
expiryGraceDelta = 2
// minCommitFeePerKw is the smallest fee rate that we should propose
// for a new fee update. We'll use this as a fee floor when proposing
// and accepting updates.
minCommitFeePerKw = 253
// DefaultMinLinkFeeUpdateTimeout and DefaultMaxLinkFeeUpdateTimeout
// represent the default timeout bounds in which a link should propose
// to update its commitment fee rate.
DefaultMinLinkFeeUpdateTimeout = 10 * time.Minute
DefaultMaxLinkFeeUpdateTimeout = 60 * time.Minute
)
// ForwardingPolicy describes the set of constraints that a given ChannelLink
// is to adhere to when forwarding HTLC's. For each incoming HTLC, this set of
// constraints will be consulted in order to ensure that adequate fees are
// paid, and our time-lock parameters are respected. In the event that an
// incoming HTLC violates any of these constraints, it is to be _rejected_ with
// the error possibly carrying along a ChannelUpdate message that includes the
// latest policy.
type ForwardingPolicy struct {
// MinHTLC is the smallest HTLC that is to be forwarded. This is
// set when a channel is first opened, and will be static for the
// lifetime of the channel.
MinHTLC lnwire.MilliSatoshi
// BaseFee is the base fee, expressed in milli-satoshi that must be
// paid for each incoming HTLC. This field, combined with FeeRate is
// used to compute the required fee for a given HTLC.
BaseFee lnwire.MilliSatoshi
// FeeRate is the fee rate, expressed in milli-satoshi that must be
// paid for each incoming HTLC. This field combined with BaseFee is
// used to compute the required fee for a given HTLC.
FeeRate lnwire.MilliSatoshi
// TimeLockDelta is the absolute time-lock value, expressed in blocks,
// that will be subtracted from an incoming HTLC's timelock value to
// create the time-lock value for the forwarded outgoing HTLC. The
// following constraint MUST hold for an HTLC to be forwarded:
//
// * incomingHtlc.timeLock - timeLockDelta = fwdInfo.OutgoingCTLV
//
// where fwdInfo is the forwarding information extracted from the
// per-hop payload of the incoming HTLC's onion packet.
TimeLockDelta uint32
// TODO(roasbeef): add fee module inside of switch
}
// ExpectedFee computes the expected fee for a given htlc amount. The value
// returned from this function is to be used as a sanity check when forwarding
// HTLC's to ensure that an incoming HTLC properly adheres to our propagated
// forwarding policy.
//
// TODO(roasbeef): also add in current available channel bandwidth, inverse
// func
htlcswitch: perform fee related checks at forwarding time In this commit, we fix a very old, lingering bug within the link. When accepting an HTLC we are meant to validate the fee against the constraints of the *outgoing* link. This is due to the fact that we're offering a payment transit service on our outgoing link. Before this commit, we would use the policies of the *incoming* link. This would at times lead to odd routing errors as we would go to route, get an error update and then route again, repeating the process. With this commit, we'll properly use the incoming link for timelock related constraints, and the outgoing link for fee related constraints. We do this by introducing a new HtlcSatisfiesPolicy method in the link. This method should return a non-nil error if the link can carry the HTLC as it satisfies its current forwarding policy. We'll use this method now at *forwarding* time to ensure that we only forward to links that actually accept the policy. This fixes a number of bugs that existed before that could result in a link accepting an HTLC that actually violated its policy. In the case that the policy is violated for *all* links, we take care to return the error returned by the *target* link so the caller can update their sending accordingly. In this commit, we also remove the prior linkControl channel in the channelLink. Instead, of sending a message to update the internal link policy, we'll use a mutex in place. This simplifies the code, and also adds some necessary refactoring in anticipation of the next follow up commit.
2018-04-04 05:51:40 +03:00
func ExpectedFee(f ForwardingPolicy,
htlcAmt lnwire.MilliSatoshi) lnwire.MilliSatoshi {
return f.BaseFee + (htlcAmt*f.FeeRate)/1000000
}
// Ticker is an interface used to wrap a time.Ticker in a struct, making
// mocking it easier.
type Ticker interface {
Start() <-chan time.Time
Stop()
}
// BatchTicker implements the Ticker interface, and wraps a time.Ticker.
type BatchTicker struct {
ticker *time.Ticker
}
// NewBatchTicker returns a new BatchTicker that wraps the passed time.Ticker.
func NewBatchTicker(t *time.Ticker) *BatchTicker {
return &BatchTicker{t}
}
// Start returns the tick channel for the underlying time.Ticker.
func (t *BatchTicker) Start() <-chan time.Time {
return t.ticker.C
}
// Stop stops the underlying time.Ticker.
func (t *BatchTicker) Stop() {
t.ticker.Stop()
}
// ChannelLinkConfig defines the configuration for the channel link. ALL
// elements within the configuration MUST be non-nil for channel link to carry
// out its duties.
type ChannelLinkConfig struct {
// FwrdingPolicy is the initial forwarding policy to be used when
// deciding whether to forwarding incoming HTLC's or not. This value
// can be updated with subsequent calls to UpdateForwardingPolicy
// targeted at a given ChannelLink concrete interface implementation.
FwrdingPolicy ForwardingPolicy
// Circuits provides restricted access to the switch's circuit map,
// allowing the link to open and close circuits.
Circuits CircuitModifier
// Switch provides a reference to the HTLC switch, we only use this in
// testing to access circuit operations not typically exposed by the
// CircuitModifier.
//
// TODO(conner): remove after refactoring htlcswitch testing framework.
Switch *Switch
// ForwardPackets attempts to forward the batch of htlcs through the
// switch. Any failed packets will be returned to the provided
// ChannelLink.
ForwardPackets func(...*htlcPacket) chan error
// DecodeHopIterators facilitates batched decoding of HTLC Sphinx onion
// blobs, which are then used to inform how to forward an HTLC.
//
// NOTE: This function assumes the same set of readers and preimages
// are always presented for the same identifier.
DecodeHopIterators func([]byte, []DecodeHopIteratorRequest) (
[]DecodeHopIteratorResponse, error)
// ExtractErrorEncrypter function is responsible for decoding HTLC
// Sphinx onion blob, and creating onion failure obfuscator.
ExtractErrorEncrypter ErrorEncrypterExtracter
htlcswitch: perform fee related checks at forwarding time In this commit, we fix a very old, lingering bug within the link. When accepting an HTLC we are meant to validate the fee against the constraints of the *outgoing* link. This is due to the fact that we're offering a payment transit service on our outgoing link. Before this commit, we would use the policies of the *incoming* link. This would at times lead to odd routing errors as we would go to route, get an error update and then route again, repeating the process. With this commit, we'll properly use the incoming link for timelock related constraints, and the outgoing link for fee related constraints. We do this by introducing a new HtlcSatisfiesPolicy method in the link. This method should return a non-nil error if the link can carry the HTLC as it satisfies its current forwarding policy. We'll use this method now at *forwarding* time to ensure that we only forward to links that actually accept the policy. This fixes a number of bugs that existed before that could result in a link accepting an HTLC that actually violated its policy. In the case that the policy is violated for *all* links, we take care to return the error returned by the *target* link so the caller can update their sending accordingly. In this commit, we also remove the prior linkControl channel in the channelLink. Instead, of sending a message to update the internal link policy, we'll use a mutex in place. This simplifies the code, and also adds some necessary refactoring in anticipation of the next follow up commit.
2018-04-04 05:51:40 +03:00
// FetchLastChannelUpdate retrieves the latest routing policy for a
// target channel. This channel will typically be the outgoing channel
// specified when we receive an incoming HTLC. This will be used to
// provide payment senders our latest policy when sending encrypted
// error messages.
FetchLastChannelUpdate func(lnwire.ShortChannelID) (*lnwire.ChannelUpdate, error)
// Peer is a lightning network node with which we have the channel link
// opened.
Peer lnpeer.Peer
// Registry is a sub-system which responsible for managing the invoices
// in thread-safe manner.
Registry InvoiceDatabase
// PreimageCache is a global witness beacon that houses any new
// preimages discovered by other links. We'll use this to add new
// witnesses that we discover which will notify any sub-systems
// subscribed to new events.
PreimageCache contractcourt.WitnessBeacon
// OnChannelFailure is a function closure that we'll call if the
// channel failed for some reason. Depending on the severity of the
// error, the closure potentially must force close this channel and
// disconnect the peer.
//
// NOTE: The method must return in order for the ChannelLink to be able
// to shut down properly.
OnChannelFailure func(lnwire.ChannelID, lnwire.ShortChannelID,
LinkFailureError)
// UpdateContractSignals is a function closure that we'll use to update
// outside sub-systems with the latest signals for our inner Lightning
// channel. These signals will notify the caller when the channel has
// been closed, or when the set of active HTLC's is updated.
UpdateContractSignals func(*contractcourt.ContractSignals) error
// ChainEvents is an active subscription to the chain watcher for this
// channel to be notified of any on-chain activity related to this
// channel.
ChainEvents *contractcourt.ChainEventSubscription
// FeeEstimator is an instance of a live fee estimator which will be
// used to dynamically regulate the current fee of the commitment
// transaction to ensure timely confirmation.
FeeEstimator lnwallet.FeeEstimator
// DebugHTLC should be turned on if you want all HTLCs sent to a node
// with the debug htlc R-Hash are immediately settled in the next
// available state transition.
DebugHTLC bool
// hodl.Mask is a bitvector composed of hodl.Flags, specifying breakpoints
// for HTLC forwarding internal to the switch.
//
// NOTE: This should only be used for testing, and should only be used
// simultaneously with DebugHTLC.
HodlMask hodl.Mask
// SyncStates is used to indicate that we need send the channel
// reestablishment message to the remote peer. It should be done if our
// clients have been restarted, or remote peer have been reconnected.
SyncStates bool
// BatchTicker is the ticker that determines the interval that we'll
// use to check the batch to see if there're any updates we should
// flush out. By batching updates into a single commit, we attempt to
// increase throughput by maximizing the number of updates coalesced
// into a single commit.
BatchTicker Ticker
// FwdPkgGCTicker is the ticker determining the frequency at which
// garbage collection of forwarding packages occurs. We use a
// time-based approach, as opposed to block epochs, as to not hinder
// syncing.
FwdPkgGCTicker Ticker
// BatchSize is the max size of a batch of updates done to the link
// before we do a state update.
BatchSize uint32
// UnsafeReplay will cause a link to replay the adds in its latest
// commitment txn after the link is restarted. This should only be used
// in testing, it is here to ensure the sphinx replay detection on the
// receiving node is persistent.
UnsafeReplay bool
// MinFeeUpdateTimeout and MaxFeeUpdateTimeout represent the timeout
// interval bounds in which a link will propose to update its commitment
// fee rate. A random timeout will be selected between these values.
MinFeeUpdateTimeout time.Duration
MaxFeeUpdateTimeout time.Duration
}
// channelLink is the service which drives a channel's commitment update
// state-machine. In the event that an HTLC needs to be propagated to another
// link, the forward handler from config is used which sends HTLC to the
// switch. Additionally, the link encapsulate logic of commitment protocol
// message ordering and updates.
type channelLink struct {
// The following fields are only meant to be used *atomically*
started int32
shutdown int32
// failed should be set to true in case a link error happens, making
// sure we don't process any more updates.
failed bool
// batchCounter is the number of updates which we received from remote
// side, but not include in commitment transaction yet and plus the
// current number of settles that have been sent, but not yet committed
// to the commitment.
//
// TODO(andrew.shvv) remove after we add additional BatchNumber()
// method in state machine.
batchCounter uint32
// keystoneBatch represents a volatile list of keystones that must be
// written before attempting to sign the next commitment txn. These
// represent all the HTLC's forwarded to the link from the switch. Once
// we lock them into our outgoing commitment, then the circuit has a
// keystone, and is fully opened.
keystoneBatch []Keystone
// openedCircuits is the set of all payment circuits that will be open
// once we make our next commitment. After making the commitment we'll
// ACK all these from our mailbox to ensure that they don't get
// re-delivered if we reconnect.
openedCircuits []CircuitKey
// closedCircuits is the set of all payment circuits that will be
// closed once we make our next commitment. After taking the commitment
// we'll ACK all these to ensure that they don't get re-delivered if we
// reconnect.
closedCircuits []CircuitKey
// channel is a lightning network channel to which we apply htlc
// updates.
channel *lnwallet.LightningChannel
// shortChanID is the most up to date short channel ID for the link.
shortChanID lnwire.ShortChannelID
// cfg is a structure which carries all dependable fields/handlers
// which may affect behaviour of the service.
cfg ChannelLinkConfig
// overflowQueue is used to store the htlc add updates which haven't
// been processed because of the commitment transaction overflow.
overflowQueue *packetQueue
// startMailBox directs whether or not to start the mailbox when
// starting the link. It may have already been started by the switch.
startMailBox bool
// mailBox is the main interface between the outside world and the
// link. All incoming messages will be sent over this mailBox. Messages
// include new updates from our connected peer, and new packets to be
// forwarded sent by the switch.
mailBox MailBox
// upstream is a channel that new messages sent from the remote peer to
// the local peer will be sent across.
upstream chan lnwire.Message
// downstream is a channel in which new multi-hop HTLC's to be
// forwarded will be sent across. Messages from this channel are sent
// by the HTLC switch.
downstream chan *htlcPacket
// htlcUpdates is a channel that we'll use to update outside
// sub-systems with the latest set of active HTLC's on our channel.
htlcUpdates chan []channeldb.HTLC
// logCommitTimer is a timer which is sent upon if we go an interval
// without receiving/sending a commitment update. It's role is to
// ensure both chains converge to identical state in a timely manner.
//
// TODO(roasbeef): timer should be >> then RTT
logCommitTimer *time.Timer
logCommitTick <-chan time.Time
// updateFeeTimer is the timer responsible for updating the link's
// commitment fee every time it fires.
updateFeeTimer *time.Timer
sync.RWMutex
wg sync.WaitGroup
quit chan struct{}
}
// NewChannelLink creates a new instance of a ChannelLink given a configuration
// and active channel that will be used to verify/apply updates to.
func NewChannelLink(cfg ChannelLinkConfig,
channel *lnwallet.LightningChannel) ChannelLink {
return &channelLink{
cfg: cfg,
channel: channel,
shortChanID: channel.ShortChanID(),
// TODO(roasbeef): just do reserve here?
logCommitTimer: time.NewTimer(300 * time.Millisecond),
overflowQueue: newPacketQueue(lnwallet.MaxHTLCNumber / 2),
htlcUpdates: make(chan []channeldb.HTLC),
quit: make(chan struct{}),
}
}
// A compile time check to ensure channelLink implements the ChannelLink
// interface.
var _ ChannelLink = (*channelLink)(nil)
// Start starts all helper goroutines required for the operation of the channel
// link.
//
// NOTE: Part of the ChannelLink interface.
func (l *channelLink) Start() error {
if !atomic.CompareAndSwapInt32(&l.started, 0, 1) {
err := errors.Errorf("channel link(%v): already started", l)
log.Warn(err)
return err
}
log.Infof("ChannelLink(%v) is starting", l)
// Before we start the link, we'll update the ChainArbitrator with the
// set of new channel signals for this channel.
//
// TODO(roasbeef): split goroutines within channel arb to avoid
go func() {
err := l.cfg.UpdateContractSignals(&contractcourt.ContractSignals{
HtlcUpdates: l.htlcUpdates,
ShortChanID: l.channel.ShortChanID(),
})
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("Unable to update signals for "+
"ChannelLink(%v)", l)
}
}()
l.mailBox.ResetMessages()
l.overflowQueue.Start()
// Before launching the htlcManager messages, revert any circuits that
// were marked open in the switch's circuit map, but did not make it
// into a commitment txn. We use the next local htlc index as the cut
// off point, since all indexes below that are committed. This action
// is only performed if the link's final short channel ID has been
// assigned, otherwise we would try to trim the htlcs belonging to the
// all-zero, sourceHop ID.
if l.ShortChanID() != sourceHop {
localHtlcIndex, err := l.channel.NextLocalHtlcIndex()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("unable to retrieve next local "+
"htlc index: %v", err)
}
// NOTE: This is automatically done by the switch when it
// starts up, but is necessary to prevent inconsistencies in
// the case that the link flaps. This is a result of a link's
// life-cycle being shorter than that of the switch.
chanID := l.ShortChanID()
err = l.cfg.Circuits.TrimOpenCircuits(chanID, localHtlcIndex)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("unable to trim circuits above "+
"local htlc index %d: %v", localHtlcIndex, err)
}
}
l.updateFeeTimer = time.NewTimer(l.randomFeeUpdateTimeout())
l.wg.Add(1)
go l.htlcManager()
return nil
}
// Stop gracefully stops all active helper goroutines, then waits until they've
// exited.
//
// NOTE: Part of the ChannelLink interface.
func (l *channelLink) Stop() {
if !atomic.CompareAndSwapInt32(&l.shutdown, 0, 1) {
log.Warnf("channel link(%v): already stopped", l)
return
}
log.Infof("ChannelLink(%v) is stopping", l)
if l.cfg.ChainEvents.Cancel != nil {
l.cfg.ChainEvents.Cancel()
}
l.updateFeeTimer.Stop()
l.channel.Stop()
l.overflowQueue.Stop()
close(l.quit)
l.wg.Wait()
}
// WaitForShutdown blocks until the link finishes shutting down, which includes
// termination of all dependent goroutines.
func (l *channelLink) WaitForShutdown() {
l.wg.Wait()
}
// EligibleToForward returns a bool indicating if the channel is able to
// actively accept requests to forward HTLC's. We're able to forward HTLC's if
// we know the remote party's next revocation point. Otherwise, we can't
2018-05-02 02:29:47 +03:00
// initiate new channel state. We also require that the short channel ID not be
// the all-zero source ID, meaning that the channel has had its ID finalized.
func (l *channelLink) EligibleToForward() bool {
2018-05-02 02:29:47 +03:00
return l.channel.RemoteNextRevocation() != nil &&
l.ShortChanID() != sourceHop
}
// sampleNetworkFee samples the current fee rate on the network to get into the
// chain in a timely manner. The returned value is expressed in fee-per-kw, as
// this is the native rate used when computing the fee for commitment
// transactions, and the second-level HTLC transactions.
func (l *channelLink) sampleNetworkFee() (lnwallet.SatPerKWeight, error) {
// We'll first query for the sat/vbyte recommended to be confirmed
// within 3 blocks.
feePerVSize, err := l.cfg.FeeEstimator.EstimateFeePerVSize(3)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
// Once we have this fee rate, we'll convert to sat-per-kw.
feePerKw := feePerVSize.FeePerKWeight()
// If the returned feePerKw is less than the current widely used
// policy, then we'll use that instead as a floor.
if feePerKw < minCommitFeePerKw {
log.Debugf("Proposed fee rate of %v sat/kw is below min "+
"of %v sat/kw, using fee floor", int64(feePerKw),
int64(minCommitFeePerKw))
feePerKw = minCommitFeePerKw
}
log.Debugf("ChannelLink(%v): sampled fee rate for 3 block conf: %v "+
"sat/kw", l, int64(feePerKw))
return feePerKw, nil
}
// shouldAdjustCommitFee returns true if we should update our commitment fee to
// match that of the network fee. We'll only update our commitment fee if the
// network fee is +/- 10% to our network fee.
func shouldAdjustCommitFee(netFee, chanFee lnwallet.SatPerKWeight) bool {
switch {
// If the network fee is greater than the commitment fee, then we'll
// switch to it if it's at least 10% greater than the commit fee.
case netFee > chanFee && netFee >= (chanFee+(chanFee*10)/100):
return true
// If the network fee is less than our commitment fee, then we'll
// switch to it if it's at least 10% less than the commitment fee.
case netFee < chanFee && netFee <= (chanFee-(chanFee*10)/100):
return true
// Otherwise, we won't modify our fee.
default:
return false
}
}
// syncChanState attempts to synchronize channel states with the remote party.
// This method is to be called upon reconnection after the initial funding
// flow. We'll compare out commitment chains with the remote party, and re-send
// either a danging commit signature, a revocation, or both.
func (l *channelLink) syncChanStates() error {
log.Infof("Attempting to re-resynchronize ChannelPoint(%v)",
l.channel.ChannelPoint())
// First, we'll generate our ChanSync message to send to the other
// side. Based on this message, the remote party will decide if they
// need to retransmit any data or not.
localChanSyncMsg, err := l.channel.ChanSyncMsg()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("unable to generate chan sync message for "+
"ChannelPoint(%v)", l.channel.ChannelPoint())
}
if err := l.cfg.Peer.SendMessage(false, localChanSyncMsg); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Unable to send chan sync message for "+
"ChannelPoint(%v)", l.channel.ChannelPoint())
}
var msgsToReSend []lnwire.Message
// Next, we'll wait to receive the ChanSync message with a timeout
// period. The first message sent MUST be the ChanSync message,
// otherwise, we'll terminate the connection.
chanSyncDeadline := time.After(time.Second * 30)
select {
case msg := <-l.upstream:
remoteChanSyncMsg, ok := msg.(*lnwire.ChannelReestablish)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("first message sent to sync "+
"should be ChannelReestablish, instead "+
"received: %T", msg)
}
// If the remote party indicates that they think we haven't
// done any state updates yet, then we'll retransmit the
// funding locked message first. We do this, as at this point
// we can't be sure if they've really received the
// FundingLocked message.
if remoteChanSyncMsg.NextLocalCommitHeight == 1 &&
localChanSyncMsg.NextLocalCommitHeight == 1 &&
!l.channel.IsPending() {
log.Infof("ChannelPoint(%v): resending "+
"FundingLocked message to peer",
l.channel.ChannelPoint())
nextRevocation, err := l.channel.NextRevocationKey()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("unable to create next "+
"revocation: %v", err)
}
fundingLockedMsg := lnwire.NewFundingLocked(
l.ChanID(), nextRevocation,
)
err = l.cfg.Peer.SendMessage(false, fundingLockedMsg)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("unable to re-send "+
"FundingLocked: %v", err)
}
}
// In any case, we'll then process their ChanSync message.
log.Infof("Received re-establishment message from remote side "+
"for channel(%v)", l.channel.ChannelPoint())
var (
openedCircuits []CircuitKey
closedCircuits []CircuitKey
)
// We've just received a ChanSync message from the remote
// party, so we'll process the message in order to determine
// if we need to re-transmit any messages to the remote party.
msgsToReSend, openedCircuits, closedCircuits, err =
l.channel.ProcessChanSyncMsg(remoteChanSyncMsg)
if err != nil {
// TODO(roasbeef): check concrete type of error, act
// accordingly
return fmt.Errorf("unable to handle upstream reestablish "+
"message: %v", err)
}
// Repopulate any identifiers for circuits that may have been
// opened or unclosed. This may happen if we needed to
// retransmit a commitment signature message.
l.openedCircuits = openedCircuits
l.closedCircuits = closedCircuits
// Ensure that all packets have been have been removed from the
// link's mailbox.
if err := l.ackDownStreamPackets(true); err != nil {
return err
}
if len(msgsToReSend) > 0 {
log.Infof("Sending %v updates to synchronize the "+
"state for ChannelPoint(%v)", len(msgsToReSend),
l.channel.ChannelPoint())
}
// If we have any messages to retransmit, we'll do so
// immediately so we return to a synchronized state as soon as
// possible.
for _, msg := range msgsToReSend {
l.cfg.Peer.SendMessage(false, msg)
}
case <-l.quit:
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return ErrLinkShuttingDown
case <-chanSyncDeadline:
return fmt.Errorf("didn't receive ChannelReestablish before " +
"deadline")
}
return nil
}
// resolveFwdPkgs loads any forwarding packages for this link from disk, and
// reprocesses them in order. The primary goal is to make sure that any HTLCs
// we previously received are reinstated in memory, and forwarded to the switch
// if necessary. After a restart, this will also delete any previously
// completed packages.
func (l *channelLink) resolveFwdPkgs() error {
fwdPkgs, err := l.channel.LoadFwdPkgs()
if err != nil {
return err
}
l.debugf("loaded %d fwd pks", len(fwdPkgs))
var needUpdate bool
for _, fwdPkg := range fwdPkgs {
hasUpdate, err := l.resolveFwdPkg(fwdPkg)
if err != nil {
return err
}
needUpdate = needUpdate || hasUpdate
}
// If any of our reprocessing steps require an update to the commitment
// txn, we initiate a state transition to capture all relevant changes.
if needUpdate {
return l.updateCommitTx()
}
return nil
}
// resolveFwdPkg interprets the FwdState of the provided package, either
// reprocesses any outstanding htlcs in the package, or performs garbage
// collection on the package.
func (l *channelLink) resolveFwdPkg(fwdPkg *channeldb.FwdPkg) (bool, error) {
// Remove any completed packages to clear up space.
if fwdPkg.State == channeldb.FwdStateCompleted {
l.debugf("removing completed fwd pkg for height=%d",
fwdPkg.Height)
err := l.channel.RemoveFwdPkg(fwdPkg.Height)
if err != nil {
l.errorf("unable to remove fwd pkg for height=%d: %v",
fwdPkg.Height, err)
return false, err
}
}
// Otherwise this is either a new package or one has gone through
// processing, but contains htlcs that need to be restored in memory.
// We replay this forwarding package to make sure our local mem state
// is resurrected, we mimic any original responses back to the remote
// party, and re-forward the relevant HTLCs to the switch.
// If the package is fully acked but not completed, it must still have
// settles and fails to propagate.
if !fwdPkg.SettleFailFilter.IsFull() {
settleFails := lnwallet.PayDescsFromRemoteLogUpdates(
fwdPkg.Source, fwdPkg.Height, fwdPkg.SettleFails,
)
l.processRemoteSettleFails(fwdPkg, settleFails)
}
// Finally, replay *ALL ADDS* in this forwarding package. The
// downstream logic is able to filter out any duplicates, but we must
// shove the entire, original set of adds down the pipeline so that the
// batch of adds presented to the sphinx router does not ever change.
var needUpdate bool
if !fwdPkg.AckFilter.IsFull() {
adds := lnwallet.PayDescsFromRemoteLogUpdates(
fwdPkg.Source, fwdPkg.Height, fwdPkg.Adds,
)
needUpdate = l.processRemoteAdds(fwdPkg, adds)
// If the link failed during processing the adds, we must
// return to ensure we won't attempted to update the state
// further.
if l.failed {
return false, fmt.Errorf("link failed while " +
"processing remote adds")
}
}
return needUpdate, nil
}
// fwdPkgGarbager periodically reads all forwarding packages from disk and
// removes those that can be discarded. It is safe to do this entirely in the
// background, since all state is coordinated on disk. This also ensures the
// link can continue to process messages and interleave database accesses.
//
// NOTE: This MUST be run as a goroutine.
func (l *channelLink) fwdPkgGarbager() {
defer l.wg.Done()
fwdPkgGcTick := l.cfg.FwdPkgGCTicker.Start()
defer l.cfg.FwdPkgGCTicker.Stop()
for {
select {
case <-fwdPkgGcTick:
fwdPkgs, err := l.channel.LoadFwdPkgs()
if err != nil {
l.warnf("unable to load fwdpkgs for gc: %v", err)
continue
}
// TODO(conner): batch removal of forward packages.
for _, fwdPkg := range fwdPkgs {
if fwdPkg.State != channeldb.FwdStateCompleted {
continue
}
err = l.channel.RemoveFwdPkg(fwdPkg.Height)
if err != nil {
l.warnf("unable to remove fwd pkg "+
"for height=%d: %v",
fwdPkg.Height, err)
}
}
case <-l.quit:
return
}
}
}
// htlcManager is the primary goroutine which drives a channel's commitment
// update state-machine in response to messages received via several channels.
// This goroutine reads messages from the upstream (remote) peer, and also from
// downstream channel managed by the channel link. In the event that an htlc
// needs to be forwarded, then send-only forward handler is used which sends
// htlc packets to the switch. Additionally, the this goroutine handles acting
// upon all timeouts for any active HTLCs, manages the channel's revocation
// window, and also the htlc trickle queue+timer for this active channels.
//
// NOTE: This MUST be run as a goroutine.
func (l *channelLink) htlcManager() {
defer func() {
l.wg.Done()
log.Infof("ChannelLink(%v) has exited", l)
}()
log.Infof("HTLC manager for ChannelPoint(%v) started, "+
"bandwidth=%v", l.channel.ChannelPoint(), l.Bandwidth())
// TODO(roasbeef): need to call wipe chan whenever D/C?
// If this isn't the first time that this channel link has been
// created, then we'll need to check to see if we need to
// re-synchronize state with the remote peer. settledHtlcs is a map of
// HTLC's that we re-settled as part of the channel state sync.
if l.cfg.SyncStates {
2018-05-02 02:29:47 +03:00
err := l.syncChanStates()
if err != nil {
l.errorf("unable to synchronize channel states: %v", err)
2018-05-02 02:29:47 +03:00
if err != ErrLinkShuttingDown {
// TODO(halseth): must be revisted when
// data-loss protection is in.
l.fail(LinkFailureError{code: ErrSyncError},
err.Error())
2018-05-02 02:29:47 +03:00
}
return
}
}
// With the channel states synced, we now reset the mailbox to ensure
// we start processing all unacked packets in order. This is done here
// to ensure that all acknowledgments that occur during channel
// resynchronization have taken affect, causing us only to pull unacked
// packets after starting to read from the downstream mailbox.
l.mailBox.ResetPackets()
// After cleaning up any memory pertaining to incoming packets, we now
// replay our forwarding packages to handle any htlcs that can be
// processed locally, or need to be forwarded out to the switch.
if err := l.resolveFwdPkgs(); err != nil {
l.fail(LinkFailureError{code: ErrInternalError},
"unable to resolve fwd pkgs: %v", err)
return
}
// With our link's in-memory state fully reconstructed, spawn a
// goroutine to manage the reclamation of disk space occupied by
// completed forwarding packages.
l.wg.Add(1)
go l.fwdPkgGarbager()
batchTick := l.cfg.BatchTicker.Start()
defer l.cfg.BatchTicker.Stop()
out:
for {
// We must always check if we failed at some point processing
// the last update before processing the next.
if l.failed {
l.errorf("link failed, exiting htlcManager")
break out
}
select {
// Our update fee timer has fired, so we'll check the network
// fee to see if we should adjust our commitment fee.
case <-l.updateFeeTimer.C:
l.updateFeeTimer.Reset(l.randomFeeUpdateTimeout())
// If we're not the initiator of the channel, don't we
// don't control the fees, so we can ignore this.
if !l.channel.IsInitiator() {
continue
}
// If we are the initiator, then we'll sample the
// current fee rate to get into the chain within 3
// blocks.
feePerKw, err := l.sampleNetworkFee()
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("unable to sample network fee: %v", err)
continue
}
// We'll check to see if we should update the fee rate
// based on our current set fee rate.
commitFee := l.channel.CommitFeeRate()
if !shouldAdjustCommitFee(feePerKw, commitFee) {
continue
}
// If we do, then we'll send a new UpdateFee message to
// the remote party, to be locked in with a new update.
if err := l.updateChannelFee(feePerKw); err != nil {
log.Errorf("unable to update fee rate: %v", err)
continue
}
// The underlying channel has notified us of a unilateral close
// carried out by the remote peer. In the case of such an
// event, we'll wipe the channel state from the peer, and mark
// the contract as fully settled. Afterwards we can exit.
//
// TODO(roasbeef): add force closure? also breach?
case <-l.cfg.ChainEvents.RemoteUnilateralClosure:
log.Warnf("Remote peer has closed ChannelPoint(%v) on-chain",
l.channel.ChannelPoint())
// TODO(roasbeef): remove all together
go func() {
chanPoint := l.channel.ChannelPoint()
err := l.cfg.Peer.WipeChannel(chanPoint)
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("unable to wipe channel %v", err)
}
}()
break out
case <-l.logCommitTick:
// If we haven't sent or received a new commitment
// update in some time, check to see if we have any
// pending updates we need to commit due to our
// commitment chains being desynchronized.
if l.channel.FullySynced() {
continue
}
if err := l.updateCommitTx(); err != nil {
l.fail(LinkFailureError{code: ErrInternalError},
"unable to update commitment: %v", err)
break out
}
case <-batchTick:
// If the current batch is empty, then we have no work
// here.
if l.batchCounter == 0 {
continue
}
// Otherwise, attempt to extend the remote commitment
// chain including all the currently pending entries.
// If the send was unsuccessful, then abandon the
// update, waiting for the revocation window to open
// up.
if err := l.updateCommitTx(); err != nil {
l.fail(LinkFailureError{code: ErrInternalError},
"unable to update commitment: %v", err)
break out
}
// A packet that previously overflowed the commitment
// transaction is now eligible for processing once again. So
// we'll attempt to re-process the packet in order to allow it
// to continue propagating within the network.
case packet := <-l.overflowQueue.outgoingPkts:
msg := packet.htlc.(*lnwire.UpdateAddHTLC)
log.Tracef("Reprocessing downstream add update "+
"with payment hash(%x)", msg.PaymentHash[:])
l.handleDownStreamPkt(packet, true)
// A message from the switch was just received. This indicates
// that the link is an intermediate hop in a multi-hop HTLC
// circuit.
case pkt := <-l.downstream:
// If we have non empty processing queue then we'll add
// this to the overflow rather than processing it
// directly. Once an active HTLC is either settled or
// failed, then we'll free up a new slot.
htlc, ok := pkt.htlc.(*lnwire.UpdateAddHTLC)
if ok && l.overflowQueue.Length() != 0 {
log.Infof("Downstream htlc add update with "+
"payment hash(%x) have been added to "+
"reprocessing queue, batch_size=%v",
htlc.PaymentHash[:],
l.batchCounter)
l.overflowQueue.AddPkt(pkt)
continue
}
l.handleDownStreamPkt(pkt, false)
// A message from the connected peer was just received. This
// indicates that we have a new incoming HTLC, either directly
// for us, or part of a multi-hop HTLC circuit.
case msg := <-l.upstream:
l.handleUpstreamMsg(msg)
case <-l.quit:
break out
}
}
}
// randomFeeUpdateTimeout returns a random timeout between the bounds defined
// within the link's configuration that will be used to determine when the link
// should propose an update to its commitment fee rate.
func (l *channelLink) randomFeeUpdateTimeout() time.Duration {
lower := int64(l.cfg.MinFeeUpdateTimeout)
upper := int64(l.cfg.MaxFeeUpdateTimeout)
return time.Duration(prand.Int63n(upper-lower) + lower)
}
// handleDownStreamPkt processes an HTLC packet sent from the downstream HTLC
// Switch. Possible messages sent by the switch include requests to forward new
// HTLCs, timeout previously cleared HTLCs, and finally to settle currently
// cleared HTLCs with the upstream peer.
//
// TODO(roasbeef): add sync ntfn to ensure switch always has consistent view?
func (l *channelLink) handleDownStreamPkt(pkt *htlcPacket, isReProcess bool) {
var isSettle bool
switch htlc := pkt.htlc.(type) {
case *lnwire.UpdateAddHTLC:
// If hodl.AddOutgoing mode is active, we exit early to simulate
// arbitrary delays between the switch adding an ADD to the
// mailbox, and the HTLC being added to the commitment state.
if l.cfg.DebugHTLC && l.cfg.HodlMask.Active(hodl.AddOutgoing) {
l.warnf(hodl.AddOutgoing.Warning())
return
}
// A new payment has been initiated via the downstream channel,
// so we add the new HTLC to our local log, then update the
// commitment chains.
htlc.ChanID = l.ChanID()
openCircuitRef := pkt.inKey()
index, err := l.channel.AddHTLC(htlc, &openCircuitRef)
if err != nil {
switch err {
// The channels spare bandwidth is fully allocated, so
// we'll put this HTLC into the overflow queue.
case lnwallet.ErrMaxHTLCNumber:
l.infof("Downstream htlc add update with "+
"payment hash(%x) have been added to "+
"reprocessing queue, batch: %v",
htlc.PaymentHash[:],
l.batchCounter)
l.overflowQueue.AddPkt(pkt)
return
// The HTLC was unable to be added to the state
// machine, as a result, we'll signal the switch to
// cancel the pending payment.
default:
l.warnf("Unable to handle downstream add HTLC: %v", err)
var (
localFailure = false
reason lnwire.OpaqueReason
)
var failure lnwire.FailureMessage
update, err := l.cfg.FetchLastChannelUpdate(
l.ShortChanID(),
)
if err != nil {
failure = &lnwire.FailTemporaryNodeFailure{}
} else {
failure = lnwire.NewTemporaryChannelFailure(
update,
)
}
// Encrypt the error back to the source unless
// the payment was generated locally.
if pkt.obfuscator == nil {
var b bytes.Buffer
err := lnwire.EncodeFailure(&b, failure, 0)
if err != nil {
l.errorf("unable to encode failure: %v", err)
return
}
reason = lnwire.OpaqueReason(b.Bytes())
localFailure = true
} else {
var err error
reason, err = pkt.obfuscator.EncryptFirstHop(failure)
if err != nil {
l.errorf("unable to obfuscate error: %v", err)
return
}
}
failPkt := &htlcPacket{
incomingChanID: pkt.incomingChanID,
incomingHTLCID: pkt.incomingHTLCID,
circuit: pkt.circuit,
sourceRef: pkt.sourceRef,
hasSource: true,
localFailure: localFailure,
htlc: &lnwire.UpdateFailHTLC{
Reason: reason,
},
}
go l.forwardBatch(failPkt)
// Remove this packet from the link's mailbox,
// this prevents it from being reprocessed if
// the link restarts and resets it mailbox. If
// this response doesn't make it back to the
// originating link, it will be rejected upon
// attempting to reforward the Add to the
// switch, since the circuit was never fully
// opened, and the forwarding package shows it
// as unacknowledged.
l.mailBox.AckPacket(pkt.inKey())
return
}
}
l.tracef("Received downstream htlc: payment_hash=%x, "+
"local_log_index=%v, batch_size=%v",
htlc.PaymentHash[:], index, l.batchCounter+1)
pkt.outgoingChanID = l.ShortChanID()
pkt.outgoingHTLCID = index
htlc.ID = index
l.debugf("Queueing keystone of ADD open circuit: %s->%s",
pkt.inKey(), pkt.outKey())
l.openedCircuits = append(l.openedCircuits, pkt.inKey())
l.keystoneBatch = append(l.keystoneBatch, pkt.keystone())
l.cfg.Peer.SendMessage(false, htlc)
case *lnwire.UpdateFulfillHTLC:
// If hodl.SettleOutgoing mode is active, we exit early to
// simulate arbitrary delays between the switch adding the
// SETTLE to the mailbox, and the HTLC being added to the
// commitment state.
if l.cfg.DebugHTLC && l.cfg.HodlMask.Active(hodl.SettleOutgoing) {
l.warnf(hodl.SettleOutgoing.Warning())
return
}
// An HTLC we forward to the switch has just settled somewhere
// upstream. Therefore we settle the HTLC within the our local
// state machine.
closedCircuitRef := pkt.inKey()
if err := l.channel.SettleHTLC(
htlc.PaymentPreimage,
pkt.incomingHTLCID,
pkt.sourceRef,
pkt.destRef,
&closedCircuitRef,
); err != nil {
l.fail(LinkFailureError{code: ErrInternalError},
"unable to settle incoming HTLC: %v", err)
return
}
l.debugf("Queueing removal of SETTLE closed circuit: %s->%s",
pkt.inKey(), pkt.outKey())
l.closedCircuits = append(l.closedCircuits, pkt.inKey())
// With the HTLC settled, we'll need to populate the wire
// message to target the specific channel and HTLC to be
// cancelled.
htlc.ChanID = l.ChanID()
htlc.ID = pkt.incomingHTLCID
// Then we send the HTLC settle message to the connected peer
// so we can continue the propagation of the settle message.
l.cfg.Peer.SendMessage(false, htlc)
isSettle = true
case *lnwire.UpdateFailHTLC:
// If hodl.FailOutgoing mode is active, we exit early to
// simulate arbitrary delays between the switch adding a FAIL to
// the mailbox, and the HTLC being added to the commitment
// state.
if l.cfg.DebugHTLC && l.cfg.HodlMask.Active(hodl.FailOutgoing) {
l.warnf(hodl.FailOutgoing.Warning())
return
}
// An HTLC cancellation has been triggered somewhere upstream,
// we'll remove then HTLC from our local state machine.
closedCircuitRef := pkt.inKey()
if err := l.channel.FailHTLC(
pkt.incomingHTLCID,
htlc.Reason,
pkt.sourceRef,
pkt.destRef,
&closedCircuitRef,
); err != nil {
log.Errorf("unable to cancel HTLC: %v", err)
return
}
l.debugf("Queueing removal of FAIL closed circuit: %s->%s",
pkt.inKey(), pkt.outKey())
l.closedCircuits = append(l.closedCircuits, pkt.inKey())
// With the HTLC removed, we'll need to populate the wire
// message to target the specific channel and HTLC to be
// cancelled. The "Reason" field will have already been set
// within the switch.
htlc.ChanID = l.ChanID()
htlc.ID = pkt.incomingHTLCID
// Finally, we send the HTLC message to the peer which
// initially created the HTLC.
l.cfg.Peer.SendMessage(false, htlc)
isSettle = true
}
l.batchCounter++
// If this newly added update exceeds the min batch size for adds, or
// this is a settle request, then initiate an update.
if l.batchCounter >= l.cfg.BatchSize || isSettle {
if err := l.updateCommitTx(); err != nil {
l.fail(LinkFailureError{code: ErrInternalError},
"unable to update commitment: %v", err)
return
}
}
}
// handleUpstreamMsg processes wire messages related to commitment state
// updates from the upstream peer. The upstream peer is the peer whom we have a
// direct channel with, updating our respective commitment chains.
func (l *channelLink) handleUpstreamMsg(msg lnwire.Message) {
switch msg := msg.(type) {
case *lnwire.UpdateAddHTLC:
// We just received an add request from an upstream peer, so we
// add it to our state machine, then add the HTLC to our
// "settle" list in the event that we know the preimage.
index, err := l.channel.ReceiveHTLC(msg)
if err != nil {
l.fail(LinkFailureError{code: ErrInvalidUpdate},
"unable to handle upstream add HTLC: %v", err)
return
}
l.tracef("Receive upstream htlc with payment hash(%x), "+
"assigning index: %v", msg.PaymentHash[:], index)
case *lnwire.UpdateFulfillHTLC:
pre := msg.PaymentPreimage
idx := msg.ID
if err := l.channel.ReceiveHTLCSettle(pre, idx); err != nil {
l.fail(
LinkFailureError{
code: ErrInvalidUpdate,
ForceClose: true,
},
"unable to handle upstream settle HTLC: %v", err,
)
return
}
// TODO(roasbeef): pipeline to switch
// As we've learned of a new preimage for the first time, we'll
2018-04-18 05:03:27 +03:00
// add it to our preimage cache. By doing this, we ensure
// any contested contracts watched by any on-chain arbitrators
// can now sweep this HTLC on-chain.
go func() {
err := l.cfg.PreimageCache.AddPreimage(pre[:])
if err != nil {
l.errorf("unable to add preimage=%x to "+
"cache", pre[:])
}
}()
case *lnwire.UpdateFailMalformedHTLC:
// Convert the failure type encoded within the HTLC fail
// message to the proper generic lnwire error code.
var failure lnwire.FailureMessage
switch msg.FailureCode {
case lnwire.CodeInvalidOnionVersion:
failure = &lnwire.FailInvalidOnionVersion{
OnionSHA256: msg.ShaOnionBlob,
}
case lnwire.CodeInvalidOnionHmac:
failure = &lnwire.FailInvalidOnionHmac{
OnionSHA256: msg.ShaOnionBlob,
}
case lnwire.CodeInvalidOnionKey:
failure = &lnwire.FailInvalidOnionKey{
OnionSHA256: msg.ShaOnionBlob,
}
default:
log.Errorf("Unknown failure code: %v", msg.FailureCode)
failure = &lnwire.FailTemporaryChannelFailure{}
}
// With the error parsed, we'll convert the into it's opaque
// form.
var b bytes.Buffer
if err := lnwire.EncodeFailure(&b, failure, 0); err != nil {
l.errorf("unable to encode malformed error: %v", err)
return
}
// If remote side have been unable to parse the onion blob we
// have sent to it, than we should transform the malformed HTLC
// message to the usual HTLC fail message.
err := l.channel.ReceiveFailHTLC(msg.ID, b.Bytes())
if err != nil {
l.fail(LinkFailureError{code: ErrInvalidUpdate},
"unable to handle upstream fail HTLC: %v", err)
return
}
case *lnwire.UpdateFailHTLC:
idx := msg.ID
err := l.channel.ReceiveFailHTLC(idx, msg.Reason[:])
if err != nil {
l.fail(LinkFailureError{code: ErrInvalidUpdate},
"unable to handle upstream fail HTLC: %v", err)
return
}
case *lnwire.CommitSig:
// We just received a new updates to our local commitment
// chain, validate this new commitment, closing the link if
// invalid.
err := l.channel.ReceiveNewCommitment(msg.CommitSig, msg.HtlcSigs)
if err != nil {
// If we were unable to reconstruct their proposed
// commitment, then we'll examine the type of error. If
// it's an InvalidCommitSigError, then we'll send a
// direct error.
var sendData []byte
switch err.(type) {
case *lnwallet.InvalidCommitSigError:
sendData = []byte(err.Error())
case *lnwallet.InvalidHtlcSigError:
sendData = []byte(err.Error())
}
l.fail(
LinkFailureError{
code: ErrInvalidCommitment,
ForceClose: true,
SendData: sendData,
},
"ChannelPoint(%v): unable to accept new "+
"commitment: %v",
l.channel.ChannelPoint(), err,
)
return
}
2018-04-18 05:03:27 +03:00
// As we've just accepted a new state, we'll now
// immediately send the remote peer a revocation for our prior
// state.
nextRevocation, currentHtlcs, err := l.channel.RevokeCurrentCommitment()
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("unable to revoke commitment: %v", err)
return
}
l.cfg.Peer.SendMessage(false, nextRevocation)
// Since we just revoked our commitment, we may have a new set
// of HTLC's on our commitment, so we'll send them over our
// HTLC update channel so any callers can be notified.
select {
case l.htlcUpdates <- currentHtlcs:
case <-l.quit:
return
}
// As we've just received a commitment signature, we'll
// re-start the log commit timer to wake up the main processing
// loop to check if we need to send a commitment signature as
// we owe one.
//
// TODO(roasbeef): instead after revocation?
if !l.logCommitTimer.Stop() {
select {
case <-l.logCommitTimer.C:
default:
}
}
l.logCommitTimer.Reset(300 * time.Millisecond)
l.logCommitTick = l.logCommitTimer.C
// If both commitment chains are fully synced from our PoV,
// then we don't need to reply with a signature as both sides
// already have a commitment with the latest accepted.
if l.channel.FullySynced() {
return
}
// Otherwise, the remote party initiated the state transition,
// so we'll reply with a signature to provide them with their
// version of the latest commitment.
if err := l.updateCommitTx(); err != nil {
l.fail(LinkFailureError{code: ErrInternalError},
"unable to update commitment: %v", err)
return
}
case *lnwire.RevokeAndAck:
// We've received a revocation from the remote chain, if valid,
// this moves the remote chain forward, and expands our
// revocation window.
fwdPkg, adds, settleFails, err := l.channel.ReceiveRevocation(msg)
if err != nil {
// TODO(halseth): force close?
l.fail(LinkFailureError{code: ErrInvalidRevocation},
"unable to accept revocation: %v", err)
return
}
l.processRemoteSettleFails(fwdPkg, settleFails)
needUpdate := l.processRemoteAdds(fwdPkg, adds)
// If the link failed during processing the adds, we must
// return to ensure we won't attempted to update the state
// further.
if l.failed {
return
}
if needUpdate {
if err := l.updateCommitTx(); err != nil {
l.fail(LinkFailureError{code: ErrInternalError},
"unable to update commitment: %v", err)
return
}
}
2017-08-15 20:09:16 +03:00
case *lnwire.UpdateFee:
// We received fee update from peer. If we are the initiator we
// will fail the channel, if not we will apply the update.
fee := lnwallet.SatPerKWeight(msg.FeePerKw)
if err := l.channel.ReceiveUpdateFee(fee); err != nil {
l.fail(LinkFailureError{code: ErrInvalidUpdate},
"error receiving fee update: %v", err)
return
}
case *lnwire.Error:
// Error received from remote, MUST fail channel, but should
// only print the contents of the error message if all
// characters are printable ASCII.
errMsg := "non-ascii data"
if isASCII(msg.Data) {
errMsg = string(msg.Data)
}
l.fail(LinkFailureError{code: ErrRemoteError},
"ChannelPoint(%v): received error from peer: %v",
l.channel.ChannelPoint(), errMsg)
default:
log.Warnf("ChannelPoint(%v): received unknown message of type %T",
l.channel.ChannelPoint(), msg)
}
}
// ackDownStreamPackets is responsible for removing htlcs from a link's mailbox
// for packets delivered from server, and cleaning up any circuits closed by
// signing a previous commitment txn. This method ensures that the circuits are
// removed from the circuit map before removing them from the link's mailbox,
// otherwise it could be possible for some circuit to be missed if this link
// flaps.
//
// The `forgive` flag allows this method to tolerate restarts, and ignores
// errors that could be caused by a previous circuit deletion. Under normal
// operation, this is set to false so that we would fail the link if we were
// unable to remove a circuit.
func (l *channelLink) ackDownStreamPackets(forgive bool) error {
// First, remove the downstream Add packets that were included in the
// previous commitment signature. This will prevent the Adds from being
// replayed if this link disconnects.
for _, inKey := range l.openedCircuits {
// In order to test the sphinx replay logic of the remote
// party, unsafe replay does not acknowledge the packets from
// the mailbox. We can then force a replay of any Add packets
// held in memory by disconnecting and reconnecting the link.
if l.cfg.UnsafeReplay {
continue
}
l.debugf("removing Add packet %s from mailbox", inKey)
l.mailBox.AckPacket(inKey)
}
// Now, we will delete all circuits closed by the previous commitment
// signature, which is the result of downstream Settle/Fail packets. We
// batch them here to ensure circuits are closed atomically and for
// performance.
err := l.cfg.Circuits.DeleteCircuits(l.closedCircuits...)
switch err {
case nil:
// Successful deletion.
case ErrUnknownCircuit:
if forgive {
// After a restart, we may have already removed this
// circuit. Since it shouldn't be possible for a
// circuit to be closed by different htlcs, we assume
// this error signals that the whole batch was
// successfully removed.
l.warnf("forgiving unknown circuit error after " +
"attempting deletion, circuit was probably " +
"removed before shutting down.")
break
}
return err
default:
l.errorf("unable to delete %d circuits: %v",
len(l.closedCircuits), err)
return err
}
// With the circuits removed from memory and disk, we now ack any
// Settle/Fails in the mailbox to ensure they do not get redelivered
// after startup. If forgive is enabled and we've reached this point,
// the circuits must have been removed at some point, so it is now safe
// to un-queue the corresponding Settle/Fails.
for _, inKey := range l.closedCircuits {
l.debugf("removing Fail/Settle packet %s from mailbox", inKey)
l.mailBox.AckPacket(inKey)
}
// Lastly, reset our buffers to be empty while keeping any acquired
// growth in the backing array.
l.openedCircuits = l.openedCircuits[:0]
l.closedCircuits = l.closedCircuits[:0]
return nil
}
// updateCommitTx signs, then sends an update to the remote peer adding a new
// commitment to their commitment chain which includes all the latest updates
// we've received+processed up to this point.
func (l *channelLink) updateCommitTx() error {
// Preemptively write all pending keystones to disk, just in case the
// HTLCs we have in memory are included in the subsequent attempt to
// sign a commitment state.
err := l.cfg.Circuits.OpenCircuits(l.keystoneBatch...)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Reset the batch, but keep the backing buffer to avoid reallocating.
l.keystoneBatch = l.keystoneBatch[:0]
// If hodl.Commit mode is active, we will refrain from attempting to
// commit any in-memory modifications to the channel state. Exiting here
// permits testing of either the switch or link's ability to trim
// circuits that have been opened, but unsuccessfully committed.
if l.cfg.DebugHTLC && l.cfg.HodlMask.Active(hodl.Commit) {
l.warnf(hodl.Commit.Warning())
return nil
}
theirCommitSig, htlcSigs, err := l.channel.SignNextCommitment()
if err == lnwallet.ErrNoWindow {
l.tracef("revocation window exhausted, unable to send: %v, "+
"dangling_opens=%v, dangling_closes%v",
l.batchCounter, newLogClosure(func() string {
return spew.Sdump(l.openedCircuits)
}),
newLogClosure(func() string {
return spew.Sdump(l.closedCircuits)
}),
)
return nil
} else if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := l.ackDownStreamPackets(false); err != nil {
return err
}
commitSig := &lnwire.CommitSig{
ChanID: l.ChanID(),
CommitSig: theirCommitSig,
HtlcSigs: htlcSigs,
}
l.cfg.Peer.SendMessage(false, commitSig)
// We've just initiated a state transition, attempt to stop the
// logCommitTimer. If the timer already ticked, then we'll consume the
// value, dropping
if l.logCommitTimer != nil && !l.logCommitTimer.Stop() {
select {
case <-l.logCommitTimer.C:
default:
}
}
l.logCommitTick = nil
// Finally, clear our the current batch, so we can accurately make
// further batch flushing decisions.
l.batchCounter = 0
return nil
}
// Peer returns the representation of remote peer with which we have the
// channel link opened.
//
// NOTE: Part of the ChannelLink interface.
func (l *channelLink) Peer() lnpeer.Peer {
return l.cfg.Peer
}
// ShortChanID returns the short channel ID for the channel link. The short
// channel ID encodes the exact location in the main chain that the original
// funding output can be found.
//
// NOTE: Part of the ChannelLink interface.
func (l *channelLink) ShortChanID() lnwire.ShortChannelID {
htlcswitch: perform fee related checks at forwarding time In this commit, we fix a very old, lingering bug within the link. When accepting an HTLC we are meant to validate the fee against the constraints of the *outgoing* link. This is due to the fact that we're offering a payment transit service on our outgoing link. Before this commit, we would use the policies of the *incoming* link. This would at times lead to odd routing errors as we would go to route, get an error update and then route again, repeating the process. With this commit, we'll properly use the incoming link for timelock related constraints, and the outgoing link for fee related constraints. We do this by introducing a new HtlcSatisfiesPolicy method in the link. This method should return a non-nil error if the link can carry the HTLC as it satisfies its current forwarding policy. We'll use this method now at *forwarding* time to ensure that we only forward to links that actually accept the policy. This fixes a number of bugs that existed before that could result in a link accepting an HTLC that actually violated its policy. In the case that the policy is violated for *all* links, we take care to return the error returned by the *target* link so the caller can update their sending accordingly. In this commit, we also remove the prior linkControl channel in the channelLink. Instead, of sending a message to update the internal link policy, we'll use a mutex in place. This simplifies the code, and also adds some necessary refactoring in anticipation of the next follow up commit.
2018-04-04 05:51:40 +03:00
l.RLock()
defer l.RUnlock()
return l.shortChanID
}
// UpdateShortChanID updates the short channel ID for a link. This may be
// required in the event that a link is created before the short chan ID for it
// is known, or a re-org occurs, and the funding transaction changes location
// within the chain.
//
// NOTE: Part of the ChannelLink interface.
2018-05-02 02:29:47 +03:00
func (l *channelLink) UpdateShortChanID() (lnwire.ShortChannelID, error) {
chanID := l.ChanID()
2018-05-02 02:29:47 +03:00
// Refresh the channel state's short channel ID by loading it from disk.
// This ensures that the channel state accurately reflects the updated
// short channel ID.
err := l.channel.State().RefreshShortChanID()
if err != nil {
l.errorf("unable to refresh short_chan_id for chan_id=%v: %v",
chanID, err)
return sourceHop, err
}
sid := l.channel.ShortChanID()
l.infof("Updating to short_chan_id=%v for chan_id=%v", sid, chanID)
2018-05-02 02:29:47 +03:00
l.Lock()
l.shortChanID = sid
2018-05-02 02:29:47 +03:00
l.Unlock()
go func() {
err := l.cfg.UpdateContractSignals(&contractcourt.ContractSignals{
HtlcUpdates: l.htlcUpdates,
2018-05-02 02:29:47 +03:00
ShortChanID: sid,
})
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("Unable to update signals for "+
"ChannelLink(%v)", l)
}
}()
2018-05-02 02:29:47 +03:00
return sid, nil
}
// ChanID returns the channel ID for the channel link. The channel ID is a more
// compact representation of a channel's full outpoint.
//
// NOTE: Part of the ChannelLink interface.
func (l *channelLink) ChanID() lnwire.ChannelID {
return lnwire.NewChanIDFromOutPoint(l.channel.ChannelPoint())
}
// Bandwidth returns the total amount that can flow through the channel link at
// this given instance. The value returned is expressed in millisatoshi and can
// be used by callers when making forwarding decisions to determine if a link
// can accept an HTLC.
//
// NOTE: Part of the ChannelLink interface.
func (l *channelLink) Bandwidth() lnwire.MilliSatoshi {
channelBandwidth := l.channel.AvailableBalance()
overflowBandwidth := l.overflowQueue.TotalHtlcAmount()
// To compute the total bandwidth, we'll take the current available
// bandwidth, then subtract the overflow bandwidth as we'll eventually
// also need to evaluate those HTLC's once space on the commitment
// transaction is free.
linkBandwidth := channelBandwidth - overflowBandwidth
// If the channel reserve is greater than the total available balance
// of the link, just return 0.
reserve := lnwire.NewMSatFromSatoshis(l.channel.LocalChanReserve())
if linkBandwidth < reserve {
return 0
}
// Else the amount that is available to flow through the link at this
// point is the available balance minus the reserve amount we are
// required to keep as collateral.
return linkBandwidth - reserve
}
// AttachMailBox updates the current mailbox used by this link, and hooks up
// the mailbox's message and packet outboxes to the link's upstream and
// downstream chans, respectively.
func (l *channelLink) AttachMailBox(mailbox MailBox) {
l.Lock()
l.mailBox = mailbox
l.upstream = mailbox.MessageOutBox()
l.downstream = mailbox.PacketOutBox()
l.Unlock()
}
// UpdateForwardingPolicy updates the forwarding policy for the target
// ChannelLink. Once updated, the link will use the new forwarding policy to
// govern if it an incoming HTLC should be forwarded or not. Note that this
// processing of the new policy will ensure that uninitialized fields in the
// passed policy won't override already initialized fields in the current
// policy.
//
// NOTE: Part of the ChannelLink interface.
func (l *channelLink) UpdateForwardingPolicy(newPolicy ForwardingPolicy) {
htlcswitch: perform fee related checks at forwarding time In this commit, we fix a very old, lingering bug within the link. When accepting an HTLC we are meant to validate the fee against the constraints of the *outgoing* link. This is due to the fact that we're offering a payment transit service on our outgoing link. Before this commit, we would use the policies of the *incoming* link. This would at times lead to odd routing errors as we would go to route, get an error update and then route again, repeating the process. With this commit, we'll properly use the incoming link for timelock related constraints, and the outgoing link for fee related constraints. We do this by introducing a new HtlcSatisfiesPolicy method in the link. This method should return a non-nil error if the link can carry the HTLC as it satisfies its current forwarding policy. We'll use this method now at *forwarding* time to ensure that we only forward to links that actually accept the policy. This fixes a number of bugs that existed before that could result in a link accepting an HTLC that actually violated its policy. In the case that the policy is violated for *all* links, we take care to return the error returned by the *target* link so the caller can update their sending accordingly. In this commit, we also remove the prior linkControl channel in the channelLink. Instead, of sending a message to update the internal link policy, we'll use a mutex in place. This simplifies the code, and also adds some necessary refactoring in anticipation of the next follow up commit.
2018-04-04 05:51:40 +03:00
l.Lock()
defer l.Unlock()
// In order to avoid overriding a valid policy with a "null" field in
// the new policy, we'll only update to the set sub policy if the new
// value isn't uninitialized.
if newPolicy.BaseFee != 0 {
l.cfg.FwrdingPolicy.BaseFee = newPolicy.BaseFee
}
if newPolicy.FeeRate != 0 {
l.cfg.FwrdingPolicy.FeeRate = newPolicy.FeeRate
}
if newPolicy.TimeLockDelta != 0 {
l.cfg.FwrdingPolicy.TimeLockDelta = newPolicy.TimeLockDelta
}
if newPolicy.MinHTLC != 0 {
l.cfg.FwrdingPolicy.MinHTLC = newPolicy.MinHTLC
}
htlcswitch: perform fee related checks at forwarding time In this commit, we fix a very old, lingering bug within the link. When accepting an HTLC we are meant to validate the fee against the constraints of the *outgoing* link. This is due to the fact that we're offering a payment transit service on our outgoing link. Before this commit, we would use the policies of the *incoming* link. This would at times lead to odd routing errors as we would go to route, get an error update and then route again, repeating the process. With this commit, we'll properly use the incoming link for timelock related constraints, and the outgoing link for fee related constraints. We do this by introducing a new HtlcSatisfiesPolicy method in the link. This method should return a non-nil error if the link can carry the HTLC as it satisfies its current forwarding policy. We'll use this method now at *forwarding* time to ensure that we only forward to links that actually accept the policy. This fixes a number of bugs that existed before that could result in a link accepting an HTLC that actually violated its policy. In the case that the policy is violated for *all* links, we take care to return the error returned by the *target* link so the caller can update their sending accordingly. In this commit, we also remove the prior linkControl channel in the channelLink. Instead, of sending a message to update the internal link policy, we'll use a mutex in place. This simplifies the code, and also adds some necessary refactoring in anticipation of the next follow up commit.
2018-04-04 05:51:40 +03:00
}
htlcswitch: perform fee related checks at forwarding time In this commit, we fix a very old, lingering bug within the link. When accepting an HTLC we are meant to validate the fee against the constraints of the *outgoing* link. This is due to the fact that we're offering a payment transit service on our outgoing link. Before this commit, we would use the policies of the *incoming* link. This would at times lead to odd routing errors as we would go to route, get an error update and then route again, repeating the process. With this commit, we'll properly use the incoming link for timelock related constraints, and the outgoing link for fee related constraints. We do this by introducing a new HtlcSatisfiesPolicy method in the link. This method should return a non-nil error if the link can carry the HTLC as it satisfies its current forwarding policy. We'll use this method now at *forwarding* time to ensure that we only forward to links that actually accept the policy. This fixes a number of bugs that existed before that could result in a link accepting an HTLC that actually violated its policy. In the case that the policy is violated for *all* links, we take care to return the error returned by the *target* link so the caller can update their sending accordingly. In this commit, we also remove the prior linkControl channel in the channelLink. Instead, of sending a message to update the internal link policy, we'll use a mutex in place. This simplifies the code, and also adds some necessary refactoring in anticipation of the next follow up commit.
2018-04-04 05:51:40 +03:00
// HtlcSatifiesPolicy should return a nil error if the passed HTLC details
// satisfy the current forwarding policy fo the target link. Otherwise, a
// valid protocol failure message should be returned in order to signal to the
// source of the HTLC, the policy consistency issue.
//
// NOTE: Part of the ChannelLink interface.
func (l *channelLink) HtlcSatifiesPolicy(payHash [32]byte,
incomingHtlcAmt, amtToForward lnwire.MilliSatoshi,
incomingTimeout, outgoingTimeout uint32,
heightNow uint32) lnwire.FailureMessage {
htlcswitch: perform fee related checks at forwarding time In this commit, we fix a very old, lingering bug within the link. When accepting an HTLC we are meant to validate the fee against the constraints of the *outgoing* link. This is due to the fact that we're offering a payment transit service on our outgoing link. Before this commit, we would use the policies of the *incoming* link. This would at times lead to odd routing errors as we would go to route, get an error update and then route again, repeating the process. With this commit, we'll properly use the incoming link for timelock related constraints, and the outgoing link for fee related constraints. We do this by introducing a new HtlcSatisfiesPolicy method in the link. This method should return a non-nil error if the link can carry the HTLC as it satisfies its current forwarding policy. We'll use this method now at *forwarding* time to ensure that we only forward to links that actually accept the policy. This fixes a number of bugs that existed before that could result in a link accepting an HTLC that actually violated its policy. In the case that the policy is violated for *all* links, we take care to return the error returned by the *target* link so the caller can update their sending accordingly. In this commit, we also remove the prior linkControl channel in the channelLink. Instead, of sending a message to update the internal link policy, we'll use a mutex in place. This simplifies the code, and also adds some necessary refactoring in anticipation of the next follow up commit.
2018-04-04 05:51:40 +03:00
l.RLock()
policy := l.cfg.FwrdingPolicy
l.RUnlock()
htlcswitch: perform fee related checks at forwarding time In this commit, we fix a very old, lingering bug within the link. When accepting an HTLC we are meant to validate the fee against the constraints of the *outgoing* link. This is due to the fact that we're offering a payment transit service on our outgoing link. Before this commit, we would use the policies of the *incoming* link. This would at times lead to odd routing errors as we would go to route, get an error update and then route again, repeating the process. With this commit, we'll properly use the incoming link for timelock related constraints, and the outgoing link for fee related constraints. We do this by introducing a new HtlcSatisfiesPolicy method in the link. This method should return a non-nil error if the link can carry the HTLC as it satisfies its current forwarding policy. We'll use this method now at *forwarding* time to ensure that we only forward to links that actually accept the policy. This fixes a number of bugs that existed before that could result in a link accepting an HTLC that actually violated its policy. In the case that the policy is violated for *all* links, we take care to return the error returned by the *target* link so the caller can update their sending accordingly. In this commit, we also remove the prior linkControl channel in the channelLink. Instead, of sending a message to update the internal link policy, we'll use a mutex in place. This simplifies the code, and also adds some necessary refactoring in anticipation of the next follow up commit.
2018-04-04 05:51:40 +03:00
// As our first sanity check, we'll ensure that the passed HTLC isn't
// too small for the next hop. If so, then we'll cancel the HTLC
// directly.
if amtToForward < policy.MinHTLC {
htlcswitch: perform fee related checks at forwarding time In this commit, we fix a very old, lingering bug within the link. When accepting an HTLC we are meant to validate the fee against the constraints of the *outgoing* link. This is due to the fact that we're offering a payment transit service on our outgoing link. Before this commit, we would use the policies of the *incoming* link. This would at times lead to odd routing errors as we would go to route, get an error update and then route again, repeating the process. With this commit, we'll properly use the incoming link for timelock related constraints, and the outgoing link for fee related constraints. We do this by introducing a new HtlcSatisfiesPolicy method in the link. This method should return a non-nil error if the link can carry the HTLC as it satisfies its current forwarding policy. We'll use this method now at *forwarding* time to ensure that we only forward to links that actually accept the policy. This fixes a number of bugs that existed before that could result in a link accepting an HTLC that actually violated its policy. In the case that the policy is violated for *all* links, we take care to return the error returned by the *target* link so the caller can update their sending accordingly. In this commit, we also remove the prior linkControl channel in the channelLink. Instead, of sending a message to update the internal link policy, we'll use a mutex in place. This simplifies the code, and also adds some necessary refactoring in anticipation of the next follow up commit.
2018-04-04 05:51:40 +03:00
l.errorf("outgoing htlc(%x) is too small: min_htlc=%v, "+
"htlc_value=%v", payHash[:], policy.MinHTLC,
htlcswitch: perform fee related checks at forwarding time In this commit, we fix a very old, lingering bug within the link. When accepting an HTLC we are meant to validate the fee against the constraints of the *outgoing* link. This is due to the fact that we're offering a payment transit service on our outgoing link. Before this commit, we would use the policies of the *incoming* link. This would at times lead to odd routing errors as we would go to route, get an error update and then route again, repeating the process. With this commit, we'll properly use the incoming link for timelock related constraints, and the outgoing link for fee related constraints. We do this by introducing a new HtlcSatisfiesPolicy method in the link. This method should return a non-nil error if the link can carry the HTLC as it satisfies its current forwarding policy. We'll use this method now at *forwarding* time to ensure that we only forward to links that actually accept the policy. This fixes a number of bugs that existed before that could result in a link accepting an HTLC that actually violated its policy. In the case that the policy is violated for *all* links, we take care to return the error returned by the *target* link so the caller can update their sending accordingly. In this commit, we also remove the prior linkControl channel in the channelLink. Instead, of sending a message to update the internal link policy, we'll use a mutex in place. This simplifies the code, and also adds some necessary refactoring in anticipation of the next follow up commit.
2018-04-04 05:51:40 +03:00
amtToForward)
// As part of the returned error, we'll send our latest routing
// policy so the sending node obtains the most up to date data.
var failure lnwire.FailureMessage
update, err := l.cfg.FetchLastChannelUpdate(l.ShortChanID())
htlcswitch: perform fee related checks at forwarding time In this commit, we fix a very old, lingering bug within the link. When accepting an HTLC we are meant to validate the fee against the constraints of the *outgoing* link. This is due to the fact that we're offering a payment transit service on our outgoing link. Before this commit, we would use the policies of the *incoming* link. This would at times lead to odd routing errors as we would go to route, get an error update and then route again, repeating the process. With this commit, we'll properly use the incoming link for timelock related constraints, and the outgoing link for fee related constraints. We do this by introducing a new HtlcSatisfiesPolicy method in the link. This method should return a non-nil error if the link can carry the HTLC as it satisfies its current forwarding policy. We'll use this method now at *forwarding* time to ensure that we only forward to links that actually accept the policy. This fixes a number of bugs that existed before that could result in a link accepting an HTLC that actually violated its policy. In the case that the policy is violated for *all* links, we take care to return the error returned by the *target* link so the caller can update their sending accordingly. In this commit, we also remove the prior linkControl channel in the channelLink. Instead, of sending a message to update the internal link policy, we'll use a mutex in place. This simplifies the code, and also adds some necessary refactoring in anticipation of the next follow up commit.
2018-04-04 05:51:40 +03:00
if err != nil {
failure = &lnwire.FailTemporaryNodeFailure{}
htlcswitch: perform fee related checks at forwarding time In this commit, we fix a very old, lingering bug within the link. When accepting an HTLC we are meant to validate the fee against the constraints of the *outgoing* link. This is due to the fact that we're offering a payment transit service on our outgoing link. Before this commit, we would use the policies of the *incoming* link. This would at times lead to odd routing errors as we would go to route, get an error update and then route again, repeating the process. With this commit, we'll properly use the incoming link for timelock related constraints, and the outgoing link for fee related constraints. We do this by introducing a new HtlcSatisfiesPolicy method in the link. This method should return a non-nil error if the link can carry the HTLC as it satisfies its current forwarding policy. We'll use this method now at *forwarding* time to ensure that we only forward to links that actually accept the policy. This fixes a number of bugs that existed before that could result in a link accepting an HTLC that actually violated its policy. In the case that the policy is violated for *all* links, we take care to return the error returned by the *target* link so the caller can update their sending accordingly. In this commit, we also remove the prior linkControl channel in the channelLink. Instead, of sending a message to update the internal link policy, we'll use a mutex in place. This simplifies the code, and also adds some necessary refactoring in anticipation of the next follow up commit.
2018-04-04 05:51:40 +03:00
} else {
failure = lnwire.NewAmountBelowMinimum(
amtToForward, *update,
)
}
return failure
}
htlcswitch: perform fee related checks at forwarding time In this commit, we fix a very old, lingering bug within the link. When accepting an HTLC we are meant to validate the fee against the constraints of the *outgoing* link. This is due to the fact that we're offering a payment transit service on our outgoing link. Before this commit, we would use the policies of the *incoming* link. This would at times lead to odd routing errors as we would go to route, get an error update and then route again, repeating the process. With this commit, we'll properly use the incoming link for timelock related constraints, and the outgoing link for fee related constraints. We do this by introducing a new HtlcSatisfiesPolicy method in the link. This method should return a non-nil error if the link can carry the HTLC as it satisfies its current forwarding policy. We'll use this method now at *forwarding* time to ensure that we only forward to links that actually accept the policy. This fixes a number of bugs that existed before that could result in a link accepting an HTLC that actually violated its policy. In the case that the policy is violated for *all* links, we take care to return the error returned by the *target* link so the caller can update their sending accordingly. In this commit, we also remove the prior linkControl channel in the channelLink. Instead, of sending a message to update the internal link policy, we'll use a mutex in place. This simplifies the code, and also adds some necessary refactoring in anticipation of the next follow up commit.
2018-04-04 05:51:40 +03:00
// Next, using the amount of the incoming HTLC, we'll calculate the
// expected fee this incoming HTLC must carry in order to satisfy the
// constraints of the outgoing link.
expectedFee := ExpectedFee(policy, amtToForward)
htlcswitch: perform fee related checks at forwarding time In this commit, we fix a very old, lingering bug within the link. When accepting an HTLC we are meant to validate the fee against the constraints of the *outgoing* link. This is due to the fact that we're offering a payment transit service on our outgoing link. Before this commit, we would use the policies of the *incoming* link. This would at times lead to odd routing errors as we would go to route, get an error update and then route again, repeating the process. With this commit, we'll properly use the incoming link for timelock related constraints, and the outgoing link for fee related constraints. We do this by introducing a new HtlcSatisfiesPolicy method in the link. This method should return a non-nil error if the link can carry the HTLC as it satisfies its current forwarding policy. We'll use this method now at *forwarding* time to ensure that we only forward to links that actually accept the policy. This fixes a number of bugs that existed before that could result in a link accepting an HTLC that actually violated its policy. In the case that the policy is violated for *all* links, we take care to return the error returned by the *target* link so the caller can update their sending accordingly. In this commit, we also remove the prior linkControl channel in the channelLink. Instead, of sending a message to update the internal link policy, we'll use a mutex in place. This simplifies the code, and also adds some necessary refactoring in anticipation of the next follow up commit.
2018-04-04 05:51:40 +03:00
// If the actual fee is less than our expected fee, then we'll reject
// this HTLC as it didn't provide a sufficient amount of fees, or the
// values have been tampered with, or the send used incorrect/dated
// information to construct the forwarding information for this hop. In
// any case, we'll cancel this HTLC.
actualFee := incomingHtlcAmt - amtToForward
if incomingHtlcAmt < amtToForward || actualFee < expectedFee {
l.errorf("outgoing htlc(%x) has insufficient fee: expected %v, "+
"got %v", payHash[:], int64(expectedFee), int64(actualFee))
htlcswitch: perform fee related checks at forwarding time In this commit, we fix a very old, lingering bug within the link. When accepting an HTLC we are meant to validate the fee against the constraints of the *outgoing* link. This is due to the fact that we're offering a payment transit service on our outgoing link. Before this commit, we would use the policies of the *incoming* link. This would at times lead to odd routing errors as we would go to route, get an error update and then route again, repeating the process. With this commit, we'll properly use the incoming link for timelock related constraints, and the outgoing link for fee related constraints. We do this by introducing a new HtlcSatisfiesPolicy method in the link. This method should return a non-nil error if the link can carry the HTLC as it satisfies its current forwarding policy. We'll use this method now at *forwarding* time to ensure that we only forward to links that actually accept the policy. This fixes a number of bugs that existed before that could result in a link accepting an HTLC that actually violated its policy. In the case that the policy is violated for *all* links, we take care to return the error returned by the *target* link so the caller can update their sending accordingly. In this commit, we also remove the prior linkControl channel in the channelLink. Instead, of sending a message to update the internal link policy, we'll use a mutex in place. This simplifies the code, and also adds some necessary refactoring in anticipation of the next follow up commit.
2018-04-04 05:51:40 +03:00
// As part of the returned error, we'll send our latest routing
// policy so the sending node obtains the most up to date data.
var failure lnwire.FailureMessage
update, err := l.cfg.FetchLastChannelUpdate(l.ShortChanID())
htlcswitch: perform fee related checks at forwarding time In this commit, we fix a very old, lingering bug within the link. When accepting an HTLC we are meant to validate the fee against the constraints of the *outgoing* link. This is due to the fact that we're offering a payment transit service on our outgoing link. Before this commit, we would use the policies of the *incoming* link. This would at times lead to odd routing errors as we would go to route, get an error update and then route again, repeating the process. With this commit, we'll properly use the incoming link for timelock related constraints, and the outgoing link for fee related constraints. We do this by introducing a new HtlcSatisfiesPolicy method in the link. This method should return a non-nil error if the link can carry the HTLC as it satisfies its current forwarding policy. We'll use this method now at *forwarding* time to ensure that we only forward to links that actually accept the policy. This fixes a number of bugs that existed before that could result in a link accepting an HTLC that actually violated its policy. In the case that the policy is violated for *all* links, we take care to return the error returned by the *target* link so the caller can update their sending accordingly. In this commit, we also remove the prior linkControl channel in the channelLink. Instead, of sending a message to update the internal link policy, we'll use a mutex in place. This simplifies the code, and also adds some necessary refactoring in anticipation of the next follow up commit.
2018-04-04 05:51:40 +03:00
if err != nil {
failure = &lnwire.FailTemporaryNodeFailure{}
htlcswitch: perform fee related checks at forwarding time In this commit, we fix a very old, lingering bug within the link. When accepting an HTLC we are meant to validate the fee against the constraints of the *outgoing* link. This is due to the fact that we're offering a payment transit service on our outgoing link. Before this commit, we would use the policies of the *incoming* link. This would at times lead to odd routing errors as we would go to route, get an error update and then route again, repeating the process. With this commit, we'll properly use the incoming link for timelock related constraints, and the outgoing link for fee related constraints. We do this by introducing a new HtlcSatisfiesPolicy method in the link. This method should return a non-nil error if the link can carry the HTLC as it satisfies its current forwarding policy. We'll use this method now at *forwarding* time to ensure that we only forward to links that actually accept the policy. This fixes a number of bugs that existed before that could result in a link accepting an HTLC that actually violated its policy. In the case that the policy is violated for *all* links, we take care to return the error returned by the *target* link so the caller can update their sending accordingly. In this commit, we also remove the prior linkControl channel in the channelLink. Instead, of sending a message to update the internal link policy, we'll use a mutex in place. This simplifies the code, and also adds some necessary refactoring in anticipation of the next follow up commit.
2018-04-04 05:51:40 +03:00
} else {
failure = lnwire.NewFeeInsufficient(
amtToForward, *update,
)
}
return failure
}
htlcswitch: perform fee related checks at forwarding time In this commit, we fix a very old, lingering bug within the link. When accepting an HTLC we are meant to validate the fee against the constraints of the *outgoing* link. This is due to the fact that we're offering a payment transit service on our outgoing link. Before this commit, we would use the policies of the *incoming* link. This would at times lead to odd routing errors as we would go to route, get an error update and then route again, repeating the process. With this commit, we'll properly use the incoming link for timelock related constraints, and the outgoing link for fee related constraints. We do this by introducing a new HtlcSatisfiesPolicy method in the link. This method should return a non-nil error if the link can carry the HTLC as it satisfies its current forwarding policy. We'll use this method now at *forwarding* time to ensure that we only forward to links that actually accept the policy. This fixes a number of bugs that existed before that could result in a link accepting an HTLC that actually violated its policy. In the case that the policy is violated for *all* links, we take care to return the error returned by the *target* link so the caller can update their sending accordingly. In this commit, we also remove the prior linkControl channel in the channelLink. Instead, of sending a message to update the internal link policy, we'll use a mutex in place. This simplifies the code, and also adds some necessary refactoring in anticipation of the next follow up commit.
2018-04-04 05:51:40 +03:00
// We want to avoid accepting an HTLC which will expire in the near
// future, so we'll reject an HTLC if its expiration time is too close
// to the current height.
timeDelta := policy.TimeLockDelta
if incomingTimeout-timeDelta <= heightNow {
l.errorf("htlc(%x) has an expiry that's too soon: "+
"outgoing_expiry=%v, best_height=%v", payHash[:],
incomingTimeout-timeDelta, heightNow)
var failure lnwire.FailureMessage
update, err := l.cfg.FetchLastChannelUpdate(
l.ShortChanID(),
)
if err != nil {
failure = lnwire.NewTemporaryChannelFailure(update)
} else {
failure = lnwire.NewExpiryTooSoon(*update)
}
return failure
}
// Finally, we'll ensure that the time-lock on the outgoing HTLC meets
// the following constraint: the incoming time-lock minus our time-lock
// delta should equal the outgoing time lock. Otherwise, whether the
// sender messed up, or an intermediate node tampered with the HTLC.
if incomingTimeout-timeDelta < outgoingTimeout {
l.errorf("Incoming htlc(%x) has incorrect time-lock value: "+
"expected at least %v block delta, got %v block delta",
payHash[:], timeDelta, incomingTimeout-outgoingTimeout)
// Grab the latest routing policy so the sending node is up to
// date with our current policy.
var failure lnwire.FailureMessage
update, err := l.cfg.FetchLastChannelUpdate(
l.ShortChanID(),
)
if err != nil {
failure = lnwire.NewTemporaryChannelFailure(update)
} else {
failure = lnwire.NewIncorrectCltvExpiry(
incomingTimeout, *update,
)
}
return failure
}
htlcswitch: perform fee related checks at forwarding time In this commit, we fix a very old, lingering bug within the link. When accepting an HTLC we are meant to validate the fee against the constraints of the *outgoing* link. This is due to the fact that we're offering a payment transit service on our outgoing link. Before this commit, we would use the policies of the *incoming* link. This would at times lead to odd routing errors as we would go to route, get an error update and then route again, repeating the process. With this commit, we'll properly use the incoming link for timelock related constraints, and the outgoing link for fee related constraints. We do this by introducing a new HtlcSatisfiesPolicy method in the link. This method should return a non-nil error if the link can carry the HTLC as it satisfies its current forwarding policy. We'll use this method now at *forwarding* time to ensure that we only forward to links that actually accept the policy. This fixes a number of bugs that existed before that could result in a link accepting an HTLC that actually violated its policy. In the case that the policy is violated for *all* links, we take care to return the error returned by the *target* link so the caller can update their sending accordingly. In this commit, we also remove the prior linkControl channel in the channelLink. Instead, of sending a message to update the internal link policy, we'll use a mutex in place. This simplifies the code, and also adds some necessary refactoring in anticipation of the next follow up commit.
2018-04-04 05:51:40 +03:00
return nil
}
// Stats returns the statistics of channel link.
//
// NOTE: Part of the ChannelLink interface.
func (l *channelLink) Stats() (uint64, lnwire.MilliSatoshi, lnwire.MilliSatoshi) {
snapshot := l.channel.StateSnapshot()
return snapshot.ChannelCommitment.CommitHeight,
snapshot.TotalMSatSent,
snapshot.TotalMSatReceived
}
// String returns the string representation of channel link.
//
// NOTE: Part of the ChannelLink interface.
func (l *channelLink) String() string {
return l.channel.ChannelPoint().String()
}
// HandleSwitchPacket handles the switch packets. This packets which might be
// forwarded to us from another channel link in case the htlc update came from
// another peer or if the update was created by user
//
// NOTE: Part of the ChannelLink interface.
func (l *channelLink) HandleSwitchPacket(pkt *htlcPacket) error {
l.tracef("received switch packet inkey=%v, outkey=%v",
pkt.inKey(), pkt.outKey())
l.mailBox.AddPacket(pkt)
return nil
}
// HandleChannelUpdate handles the htlc requests as settle/add/fail which sent
// to us from remote peer we have a channel with.
//
// NOTE: Part of the ChannelLink interface.
func (l *channelLink) HandleChannelUpdate(message lnwire.Message) {
l.mailBox.AddMessage(message)
}
// updateChannelFee updates the commitment fee-per-kw on this channel by
// committing to an update_fee message.
func (l *channelLink) updateChannelFee(feePerKw lnwallet.SatPerKWeight) error {
log.Infof("ChannelPoint(%v): updating commit fee to %v sat/kw", l,
feePerKw)
// We skip sending the UpdateFee message if the channel is not
// currently eligible to forward messages.
if !l.EligibleToForward() {
log.Debugf("ChannelPoint(%v): skipping fee update for "+
"inactive channel", l.ChanID())
return nil
}
// First, we'll update the local fee on our commitment.
if err := l.channel.UpdateFee(feePerKw); err != nil {
return err
}
// We'll then attempt to send a new UpdateFee message, and also lock it
// in immediately by triggering a commitment update.
msg := lnwire.NewUpdateFee(l.ChanID(), uint32(feePerKw))
if err := l.cfg.Peer.SendMessage(false, msg); err != nil {
return err
}
return l.updateCommitTx()
}
// processRemoteSettleFails accepts a batch of settle/fail payment descriptors
// after receiving a revocation from the remote party, and reprocesses them in
// the context of the provided forwarding package. Any settles or fails that
// have already been acknowledged in the forwarding package will not be sent to
// the switch.
func (l *channelLink) processRemoteSettleFails(fwdPkg *channeldb.FwdPkg,
settleFails []*lnwallet.PaymentDescriptor) {
if len(settleFails) == 0 {
return
}
log.Debugf("ChannelLink(%v): settle-fail-filter %v",
l.ShortChanID(), fwdPkg.SettleFailFilter)
var switchPackets []*htlcPacket
for i, pd := range settleFails {
// Skip any settles or fails that have already been
// acknowledged by the incoming link that originated the
// forwarded Add.
if fwdPkg.SettleFailFilter.Contains(uint16(i)) {
continue
}
// TODO(roasbeef): rework log entries to a shared
// interface.
switch pd.EntryType {
// A settle for an HTLC we previously forwarded HTLC has been
// received. So we'll forward the HTLC to the switch which will
// handle propagating the settle to the prior hop.
case lnwallet.Settle:
// If hodl.SettleIncoming is requested, we will not
// forward the SETTLE to the switch and will not signal
// a free slot on the commitment transaction.
if l.cfg.DebugHTLC && l.cfg.HodlMask.Active(hodl.SettleIncoming) {
l.warnf(hodl.SettleIncoming.Warning())
continue
}
settlePacket := &htlcPacket{
outgoingChanID: l.ShortChanID(),
outgoingHTLCID: pd.ParentIndex,
destRef: pd.DestRef,
htlc: &lnwire.UpdateFulfillHTLC{
PaymentPreimage: pd.RPreimage,
},
}
// Add the packet to the batch to be forwarded, and
// notify the overflow queue that a spare spot has been
// freed up within the commitment state.
switchPackets = append(switchPackets, settlePacket)
l.overflowQueue.SignalFreeSlot()
// A failureCode message for a previously forwarded HTLC has
// been received. As a result a new slot will be freed up in
// our commitment state, so we'll forward this to the switch so
// the backwards undo can continue.
case lnwallet.Fail:
// If hodl.SettleIncoming is requested, we will not
// forward the FAIL to the switch and will not signal a
// free slot on the commitment transaction.
if l.cfg.DebugHTLC && l.cfg.HodlMask.Active(hodl.FailIncoming) {
l.warnf(hodl.FailIncoming.Warning())
continue
}
// Fetch the reason the HTLC was cancelled so we can
// continue to propagate it.
failPacket := &htlcPacket{
outgoingChanID: l.ShortChanID(),
outgoingHTLCID: pd.ParentIndex,
destRef: pd.DestRef,
htlc: &lnwire.UpdateFailHTLC{
Reason: lnwire.OpaqueReason(pd.FailReason),
},
}
// Add the packet to the batch to be forwarded, and
// notify the overflow queue that a spare spot has been
// freed up within the commitment state.
switchPackets = append(switchPackets, failPacket)
l.overflowQueue.SignalFreeSlot()
}
}
// Only spawn the task forward packets we have a non-zero number.
if len(switchPackets) > 0 {
go l.forwardBatch(switchPackets...)
}
}
// processRemoteAdds serially processes each of the Add payment descriptors
// which have been "locked-in" by receiving a revocation from the remote party.
// The forwarding package provided instructs how to process this batch,
// indicating whether this is the first time these Adds are being processed, or
// whether we are reprocessing as a result of a failure or restart. Adds that
// have already been acknowledged in the forwarding package will be ignored.
func (l *channelLink) processRemoteAdds(fwdPkg *channeldb.FwdPkg,
lockedInHtlcs []*lnwallet.PaymentDescriptor) bool {
l.tracef("processing %d remote adds for height %d",
len(lockedInHtlcs), fwdPkg.Height)
decodeReqs := make([]DecodeHopIteratorRequest, 0, len(lockedInHtlcs))
for _, pd := range lockedInHtlcs {
switch pd.EntryType {
// TODO(conner): remove type switch?
case lnwallet.Add:
// Before adding the new htlc to the state machine,
// parse the onion object in order to obtain the
// routing information with DecodeHopIterator function
// which process the Sphinx packet.
onionReader := bytes.NewReader(pd.OnionBlob)
req := DecodeHopIteratorRequest{
OnionReader: onionReader,
RHash: pd.RHash[:],
IncomingCltv: pd.Timeout,
}
decodeReqs = append(decodeReqs, req)
}
}
// Atomically decode the incoming htlcs, simultaneously checking for
// replay attempts. A particular index in the returned, spare list of
// channel iterators should only be used if the failure code at the
// same index is lnwire.FailCodeNone.
decodeResps, sphinxErr := l.cfg.DecodeHopIterators(
fwdPkg.ID(), decodeReqs,
)
if sphinxErr != nil {
l.fail(LinkFailureError{code: ErrInternalError},
"unable to decode hop iterators: %v", sphinxErr)
return false
}
var (
needUpdate bool
switchPackets []*htlcPacket
)
for i, pd := range lockedInHtlcs {
idx := uint16(i)
if fwdPkg.State == channeldb.FwdStateProcessed &&
fwdPkg.AckFilter.Contains(idx) {
// If this index is already found in the ack filter,
// the response to this forwarding decision has already
// been committed by one of our commitment txns. ADDs
// in this state are waiting for the rest of the fwding
// package to get acked before being garbage collected.
continue
}
// An incoming HTLC add has been full-locked in. As a result we
// can now examine the forwarding details of the HTLC, and the
// HTLC itself to decide if: we should forward it, cancel it,
// or are able to settle it (and it adheres to our fee related
// constraints).
// Fetch the onion blob that was included within this processed
// payment descriptor.
var onionBlob [lnwire.OnionPacketSize]byte
copy(onionBlob[:], pd.OnionBlob)
// Before adding the new htlc to the state machine, parse the
// onion object in order to obtain the routing information with
// DecodeHopIterator function which process the Sphinx packet.
chanIterator, failureCode := decodeResps[i].Result()
if failureCode != lnwire.CodeNone {
// If we're unable to process the onion blob than we
// should send the malformed htlc error to payment
// sender.
l.sendMalformedHTLCError(pd.HtlcIndex, failureCode,
onionBlob[:], pd.SourceRef)
needUpdate = true
log.Errorf("unable to decode onion hop "+
"iterator: %v", failureCode)
continue
}
// Retrieve onion obfuscator from onion blob in order to
// produce initial obfuscation of the onion failureCode.
obfuscator, failureCode := chanIterator.ExtractErrorEncrypter(
l.cfg.ExtractErrorEncrypter,
)
if failureCode != lnwire.CodeNone {
// If we're unable to process the onion blob than we
// should send the malformed htlc error to payment
// sender.
l.sendMalformedHTLCError(pd.HtlcIndex, failureCode,
onionBlob[:], pd.SourceRef)
needUpdate = true
log.Errorf("unable to decode onion "+
"obfuscator: %v", failureCode)
continue
}
heightNow := l.cfg.Switch.BestHeight()
fwdInfo := chanIterator.ForwardingInstructions()
switch fwdInfo.NextHop {
case exitHop:
// If hodl.ExitSettle is requested, we will not validate
// the final hop's ADD, nor will we settle the
// corresponding invoice or respond with the preimage.
if l.cfg.DebugHTLC &&
l.cfg.HodlMask.Active(hodl.ExitSettle) {
l.warnf(hodl.ExitSettle.Warning())
continue
}
// First, we'll check the expiry of the HTLC itself
// against, the current block height. If the timeout is
// too soon, then we'll reject the HTLC.
if pd.Timeout-expiryGraceDelta <= heightNow {
log.Errorf("htlc(%x) has an expiry that's too "+
"soon: expiry=%v, best_height=%v",
pd.RHash[:], pd.Timeout, heightNow)
failure := lnwire.FailFinalExpiryTooSoon{}
l.sendHTLCError(
pd.HtlcIndex, &failure, obfuscator, pd.SourceRef,
)
needUpdate = true
continue
}
// We're the designated payment destination. Therefore
// we attempt to see if we have an invoice locally
// which'll allow us to settle this htlc.
invoiceHash := chainhash.Hash(pd.RHash)
invoice, minCltvDelta, err := l.cfg.Registry.LookupInvoice(
invoiceHash,
)
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("unable to query invoice registry: "+
" %v", err)
failure := lnwire.FailUnknownPaymentHash{}
l.sendHTLCError(
pd.HtlcIndex, failure, obfuscator, pd.SourceRef,
)
needUpdate = true
continue
}
// If the invoice is already settled, we choose to
// accept the payment to simplify failure recovery.
//
// NOTE: Though our recovery and forwarding logic is
// predominately batched, settling invoices happens
2018-04-18 05:03:27 +03:00
// iteratively. We may reject one of two payments
// for the same rhash at first, but then restart and
// reject both after seeing that the invoice has been
// settled. Without any record of which one settles
// first, it is ambiguous as to which one actually
// settled the invoice. Thus, by accepting all
// payments, we eliminate the race condition that can
// lead to this inconsistency.
//
// TODO(conner): track ownership of settlements to
// properly recover from failures? or add batch invoice
// settlement
if invoice.Terms.Settled {
log.Warnf("Accepting duplicate payment for "+
"hash=%x", pd.RHash[:])
}
// If we're not currently in debug mode, and the
// extended htlc doesn't meet the value requested, then
// we'll fail the htlc. Otherwise, we settle this htlc
// within our local state update log, then send the
// update entry to the remote party.
//
// NOTE: We make an exception when the value requested
// by the invoice is zero. This means the invoice
// allows the payee to specify the amount of satoshis
// they wish to send. So since we expect the htlc to
// have a different amount, we should not fail.
if !l.cfg.DebugHTLC && invoice.Terms.Value > 0 &&
pd.Amount < invoice.Terms.Value {
log.Errorf("rejecting htlc due to incorrect "+
"amount: expected %v, received %v",
invoice.Terms.Value, pd.Amount)
failure := lnwire.FailIncorrectPaymentAmount{}
l.sendHTLCError(
pd.HtlcIndex, failure, obfuscator, pd.SourceRef,
)
needUpdate = true
continue
}
// As we're the exit hop, we'll double check the
// hop-payload included in the HTLC to ensure that it
// was crafted correctly by the sender and matches the
// HTLC we were extended.
//
// NOTE: We make an exception when the value requested
// by the invoice is zero. This means the invoice
// allows the payee to specify the amount of satoshis
// they wish to send. So since we expect the htlc to
// have a different amount, we should not fail.
if !l.cfg.DebugHTLC && invoice.Terms.Value > 0 &&
fwdInfo.AmountToForward < invoice.Terms.Value {
log.Errorf("Onion payload of incoming htlc(%x) "+
"has incorrect value: expected %v, "+
"got %v", pd.RHash, invoice.Terms.Value,
fwdInfo.AmountToForward)
failure := lnwire.FailIncorrectPaymentAmount{}
l.sendHTLCError(
pd.HtlcIndex, failure, obfuscator, pd.SourceRef,
)
needUpdate = true
continue
}
// We'll also ensure that our time-lock value has been
// computed correctly.
expectedHeight := heightNow + minCltvDelta
switch {
case !l.cfg.DebugHTLC && fwdInfo.OutgoingCTLV < expectedHeight:
log.Errorf("Onion payload of incoming "+
"htlc(%x) has incorrect time-lock: "+
"expected %v, got %v",
pd.RHash[:], expectedHeight,
fwdInfo.OutgoingCTLV)
failure := lnwire.NewFinalIncorrectCltvExpiry(
fwdInfo.OutgoingCTLV,
)
l.sendHTLCError(
pd.HtlcIndex, failure, obfuscator, pd.SourceRef,
)
needUpdate = true
continue
case !l.cfg.DebugHTLC && pd.Timeout != fwdInfo.OutgoingCTLV:
log.Errorf("HTLC(%x) has incorrect "+
"time-lock: expected %v, got %v",
pd.RHash[:], pd.Timeout,
fwdInfo.OutgoingCTLV)
failure := lnwire.NewFinalIncorrectCltvExpiry(
fwdInfo.OutgoingCTLV,
)
l.sendHTLCError(
pd.HtlcIndex, failure, obfuscator, pd.SourceRef,
)
needUpdate = true
continue
}
preimage := invoice.Terms.PaymentPreimage
err = l.channel.SettleHTLC(
preimage, pd.HtlcIndex, pd.SourceRef, nil, nil,
)
if err != nil {
l.fail(LinkFailureError{code: ErrInternalError},
"unable to settle htlc: %v", err)
return false
}
// Notify the invoiceRegistry of the invoices we just
// settled (with the amount accepted at settle time)
// with this latest commitment update.
err = l.cfg.Registry.SettleInvoice(
invoiceHash, pd.Amount,
)
if err != nil {
l.fail(LinkFailureError{code: ErrInternalError},
"unable to settle invoice: %v", err)
return false
}
l.infof("settling %x as exit hop", pd.RHash)
// If the link is in hodl.BogusSettle mode, replace the
// preimage with a fake one before sending it to the
// peer.
if l.cfg.DebugHTLC &&
l.cfg.HodlMask.Active(hodl.BogusSettle) {
l.warnf(hodl.BogusSettle.Warning())
preimage = [32]byte{}
copy(preimage[:], bytes.Repeat([]byte{2}, 32))
}
// HTLC was successfully settled locally send
// notification about it remote peer.
l.cfg.Peer.SendMessage(false, &lnwire.UpdateFulfillHTLC{
ChanID: l.ChanID(),
ID: pd.HtlcIndex,
PaymentPreimage: preimage,
})
needUpdate = true
// There are additional channels left within this route. So
// we'll simply do some forwarding package book-keeping.
default:
// If hodl.AddIncoming is requested, we will not
// validate the forwarded ADD, nor will we send the
// packet to the htlc switch.
if l.cfg.DebugHTLC &&
l.cfg.HodlMask.Active(hodl.AddIncoming) {
l.warnf(hodl.AddIncoming.Warning())
continue
}
switch fwdPkg.State {
case channeldb.FwdStateProcessed:
// This add was not forwarded on the previous
// processing phase, run it through our
// validation pipeline to reproduce an error.
// This may trigger a different error due to
// expiring timelocks, but we expect that an
// error will be reproduced.
if !fwdPkg.FwdFilter.Contains(idx) {
break
}
// Otherwise, it was already processed, we can
// can collect it and continue.
addMsg := &lnwire.UpdateAddHTLC{
Expiry: fwdInfo.OutgoingCTLV,
Amount: fwdInfo.AmountToForward,
PaymentHash: pd.RHash,
}
// Finally, we'll encode the onion packet for
// the _next_ hop using the hop iterator
// decoded for the current hop.
buf := bytes.NewBuffer(addMsg.OnionBlob[0:0])
// We know this cannot fail, as this ADD
// was marked forwarded in a previous
// round of processing.
chanIterator.EncodeNextHop(buf)
updatePacket := &htlcPacket{
incomingChanID: l.ShortChanID(),
incomingHTLCID: pd.HtlcIndex,
outgoingChanID: fwdInfo.NextHop,
sourceRef: pd.SourceRef,
incomingAmount: pd.Amount,
amount: addMsg.Amount,
htlc: addMsg,
obfuscator: obfuscator,
incomingTimeout: pd.Timeout,
outgoingTimeout: fwdInfo.OutgoingCTLV,
}
htlcswitch: perform fee related checks at forwarding time In this commit, we fix a very old, lingering bug within the link. When accepting an HTLC we are meant to validate the fee against the constraints of the *outgoing* link. This is due to the fact that we're offering a payment transit service on our outgoing link. Before this commit, we would use the policies of the *incoming* link. This would at times lead to odd routing errors as we would go to route, get an error update and then route again, repeating the process. With this commit, we'll properly use the incoming link for timelock related constraints, and the outgoing link for fee related constraints. We do this by introducing a new HtlcSatisfiesPolicy method in the link. This method should return a non-nil error if the link can carry the HTLC as it satisfies its current forwarding policy. We'll use this method now at *forwarding* time to ensure that we only forward to links that actually accept the policy. This fixes a number of bugs that existed before that could result in a link accepting an HTLC that actually violated its policy. In the case that the policy is violated for *all* links, we take care to return the error returned by the *target* link so the caller can update their sending accordingly. In this commit, we also remove the prior linkControl channel in the channelLink. Instead, of sending a message to update the internal link policy, we'll use a mutex in place. This simplifies the code, and also adds some necessary refactoring in anticipation of the next follow up commit.
2018-04-04 05:51:40 +03:00
switchPackets = append(
switchPackets, updatePacket,
)
continue
}
// TODO(roasbeef): ensure don't accept outrageous
// timeout for htlc
// With all our forwarding constraints met, we'll
// create the outgoing HTLC using the parameters as
// specified in the forwarding info.
addMsg := &lnwire.UpdateAddHTLC{
Expiry: fwdInfo.OutgoingCTLV,
Amount: fwdInfo.AmountToForward,
PaymentHash: pd.RHash,
}
// Finally, we'll encode the onion packet for the
// _next_ hop using the hop iterator decoded for the
// current hop.
buf := bytes.NewBuffer(addMsg.OnionBlob[0:0])
err := chanIterator.EncodeNextHop(buf)
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("unable to encode the "+
"remaining route %v", err)
var failure lnwire.FailureMessage
update, err := l.cfg.FetchLastChannelUpdate(
l.ShortChanID(),
)
if err != nil {
failure = &lnwire.FailTemporaryNodeFailure{}
} else {
failure = lnwire.NewTemporaryChannelFailure(
update,
)
}
l.sendHTLCError(
pd.HtlcIndex, failure, obfuscator, pd.SourceRef,
)
needUpdate = true
continue
}
// Now that this add has been reprocessed, only append
// it to our list of packets to forward to the switch
// this is the first time processing the add. If the
// fwd pkg has already been processed, then we entered
// the above section to recreate a previous error. If
// the packet had previously been forwarded, it would
// have been added to switchPackets at the top of this
// section.
if fwdPkg.State == channeldb.FwdStateLockedIn {
updatePacket := &htlcPacket{
incomingChanID: l.ShortChanID(),
incomingHTLCID: pd.HtlcIndex,
outgoingChanID: fwdInfo.NextHop,
sourceRef: pd.SourceRef,
incomingAmount: pd.Amount,
amount: addMsg.Amount,
htlc: addMsg,
obfuscator: obfuscator,
incomingTimeout: pd.Timeout,
outgoingTimeout: fwdInfo.OutgoingCTLV,
}
fwdPkg.FwdFilter.Set(idx)
switchPackets = append(switchPackets,
updatePacket)
}
}
}
// Commit the htlcs we are intending to forward if this package has not
// been fully processed.
if fwdPkg.State == channeldb.FwdStateLockedIn {
err := l.channel.SetFwdFilter(fwdPkg.Height, fwdPkg.FwdFilter)
if err != nil {
l.fail(LinkFailureError{code: ErrInternalError},
"unable to set fwd filter: %v", err)
return false
}
}
if len(switchPackets) == 0 {
return needUpdate
}
l.debugf("forwarding %d packets to switch", len(switchPackets))
// NOTE: This call is made synchronous so that we ensure all circuits
// are committed in the exact order that they are processed in the link.
// Failing to do this could cause reorderings/gaps in the range of
// opened circuits, which violates assumptions made by the circuit
// trimming.
l.forwardBatch(switchPackets...)
return needUpdate
}
// forwardBatch forwards the given htlcPackets to the switch, and waits on the
// err chan for the individual responses. This method is intended to be spawned
// as a goroutine so the responses can be handled in the background.
func (l *channelLink) forwardBatch(packets ...*htlcPacket) {
// Don't forward packets for which we already have a response in our
// mailbox. This could happen if a packet fails and is buffered in the
// mailbox, and the incoming link flaps.
var filteredPkts = make([]*htlcPacket, 0, len(packets))
for _, pkt := range packets {
if l.mailBox.HasPacket(pkt.inKey()) {
continue
}
filteredPkts = append(filteredPkts, pkt)
}
errChan := l.cfg.ForwardPackets(filteredPkts...)
go l.handleBatchFwdErrs(errChan)
}
// handleBatchFwdErrs waits on the given errChan until it is closed, logging
// the errors returned from any unsuccessful forwarding attempts.
func (l *channelLink) handleBatchFwdErrs(errChan chan error) {
for {
err, ok := <-errChan
if !ok {
// Err chan has been drained or switch is shutting
// down. Either way, return.
return
}
if err == nil {
continue
}
l.errorf("unhandled error while forwarding htlc packet over "+
"htlcswitch: %v", err)
}
}
// sendHTLCError functions cancels HTLC and send cancel message back to the
// peer from which HTLC was received.
func (l *channelLink) sendHTLCError(htlcIndex uint64, failure lnwire.FailureMessage,
e ErrorEncrypter, sourceRef *channeldb.AddRef) {
reason, err := e.EncryptFirstHop(failure)
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("unable to obfuscate error: %v", err)
return
}
err = l.channel.FailHTLC(htlcIndex, reason, sourceRef, nil, nil)
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("unable cancel htlc: %v", err)
return
}
l.cfg.Peer.SendMessage(false, &lnwire.UpdateFailHTLC{
ChanID: l.ChanID(),
ID: htlcIndex,
Reason: reason,
})
}
// sendMalformedHTLCError helper function which sends the malformed HTLC update
// to the payment sender.
func (l *channelLink) sendMalformedHTLCError(htlcIndex uint64,
code lnwire.FailCode, onionBlob []byte, sourceRef *channeldb.AddRef) {
shaOnionBlob := sha256.Sum256(onionBlob)
err := l.channel.MalformedFailHTLC(htlcIndex, code, shaOnionBlob, sourceRef)
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("unable cancel htlc: %v", err)
return
}
l.cfg.Peer.SendMessage(false, &lnwire.UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
ChanID: l.ChanID(),
ID: htlcIndex,
ShaOnionBlob: shaOnionBlob,
FailureCode: code,
})
}
// fail is a function which is used to encapsulate the action necessary for
// properly failing the link. It takes a LinkFailureError, which will be passed
// to the OnChannelFailure closure, in order for it to determine if we should
// force close the channel, and if we should send an error message to the
// remote peer.
func (l *channelLink) fail(linkErr LinkFailureError,
format string, a ...interface{}) {
reason := errors.Errorf(format, a...)
// Return if we have already notified about a failure.
if l.failed {
l.warnf("Ignoring link failure (%v), as link already failed",
reason)
return
}
l.errorf("Failing link: %s", reason)
// Set failed, such that we won't process any more updates, and notify
// the peer about the failure.
l.failed = true
l.cfg.OnChannelFailure(l.ChanID(), l.ShortChanID(), linkErr)
}
// infof prefixes the channel's identifier before printing to info log.
func (l *channelLink) infof(format string, a ...interface{}) {
msg := fmt.Sprintf(format, a...)
log.Infof("ChannelLink(%s) %s", l.ShortChanID(), msg)
}
// debugf prefixes the channel's identifier before printing to debug log.
func (l *channelLink) debugf(format string, a ...interface{}) {
msg := fmt.Sprintf(format, a...)
log.Debugf("ChannelLink(%s) %s", l.ShortChanID(), msg)
}
// warnf prefixes the channel's identifier before printing to warn log.
func (l *channelLink) warnf(format string, a ...interface{}) {
msg := fmt.Sprintf(format, a...)
log.Warnf("ChannelLink(%s) %s", l.ShortChanID(), msg)
}
// errorf prefixes the channel's identifier before printing to error log.
func (l *channelLink) errorf(format string, a ...interface{}) {
msg := fmt.Sprintf(format, a...)
log.Errorf("ChannelLink(%s) %s", l.ShortChanID(), msg)
}
// tracef prefixes the channel's identifier before printing to trace log.
func (l *channelLink) tracef(format string, a ...interface{}) {
msg := fmt.Sprintf(format, a...)
log.Tracef("ChannelLink(%s) %s", l.ShortChanID(), msg)
}
// isASCII is a helper method that checks whether all bytes in `data` would be
// printable ASCII characters if interpreted as a string.
func isASCII(data []byte) bool {
isASCII := true
for _, c := range data {
if c < 32 || c > 126 {
isASCII = false
break
}
}
return isASCII
}